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i
Abstract
The blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies, its most prevalent application, continue
to gain acceptance and wide traction in research and practice within academia and the
industry because of its promise in decentralised and distributed computing. Notably, the
meteoric rise in the value and number of cryptocurrencies since the creation of Bitcoin in
2009 have ushered in newer innovations and interventions that addressed some of the
prominent issues that affect these platforms. Despite the increased privacy, security,
scalability, and energy-saving capabilities of new consensus protocols in newer systems, the
development and management of blockchains, mostly, do not reflect the decentralisation
principle despite blockchains being decentralised and distributed in their architecture. The
concept of treasury has been identified as a tool to address this problem. We explore the
idea of blockchain treasury systems within literature and practice, especially with relation
to funding and decision-making power towards blockchain development and maintenance.
Consequently, we propose a taxonomy for treasury models within cryptocurrencies.
Thereafter, we propose an efficient community-controlled and decentralised collaborative
decision-making mechanism to support the development and management of blockchains.
Our proposed system incentivises participants and is proven secure under the universally
composable (UC) framework while also addressing gaps identified from our investigation
of prior systems e.g. non-private ballots and insecure voting. Furthermore, we adapt our
system and propose a privacy-preserving general decision making system for blockchain
governance that supports privacy-centric cryptocurrencies. Besides, using a set of metrics,
we introduce a consensus analysis mechanism to enhance the utility of decision-making
of the systems by evaluating individual choices against collective (system-wide) decisions.
Finally, we provide pilot system implementations with benchmark results confirming the
efficiency and practicality of our constructions.
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Since the invention of the pioneer blockchain and cryptocurrency Bitcoin [Nak08] in 2009,
there has been a remarkable increase in the number and value of cryptocurrencies, as
well as blockchain research [Blo]. Similarly, there have been an increased acceptance,
adoption and application of blockchains and cryptocurrencies across various domains
and industries e.g. finance, insurance, healthcare, social computing, governance, research,
Internet of Things [ZS18,CXS+19,CDP19,MCLH19,WZN+19,XTH+19]. The distributed
and decentralised architecture of blockchains have enabled the construction of novel
systems that do not depend on trusted third parties across different sectors.
Cryptocurrency is the foremost application of blockchains [BMC+15, MSH+16,
NBF+16,LXS+19,Zca,DASa,VVL17]. Cryptocurrencies as decentralised ledgers, enable
payment transactions among parties, that are, perhaps, mutually distrusting, pseudony-
mous or anonymous. According to Coinmarketcap.com, a foremost cryptocurrencies
data platform, there are over 700 cryptocurrencies in existence, with a combined mar-
ket capitalisation of over \$1 trillion [Coi]. This growth have necessitated wide-ranging
improvements, regulations, legislations, user-interaction, engagement, community par-
ticipation and novel blockchain technologies that improve on early constructions such
as Bitcoin. For instance, newer protocols with strong security and privacy guaran-
1
Chapter 1: Introduction Overview
tees [KKKZ19, HBHW17, GHM+17], as well as distinctive underlying cryptographic
constructions such as cryptonote [vS13] and tangle [PSF19].
Other improvements include: development of ASIC-resistant mining puzzles through
memory-bound and memory-hard puzzles, e.g. Scrypt [PJ16]; more privacy-centric
cryptocurrencies e.g. Zcash [Zca], Monero [Mon]; new variants of proof-of-work consensus
e.g. Proof-Activity [BLMR14]; and new blockchain consensus protocols, e.g. Proof-of-
stake [GHM+17], Ouroboros [KRDO17]. Other developments in blockchain research and
practice have resulted in the creation of smart contract platforms, e.g. Ethereum [Woo14]
and EOS 1, which are able to execute `legal agreements' that are implemented in computer
programs. This represents an upgrade from previous blockchain platforms that offered
mainly basic payment transactions and limited computational capabilities [AO13] such
as notary services 2.
Cryptocurrencies have evolved from first generation blockchains that mainly facilitate
payment transactions among different parties e.g. Bitcoin, Litecoin [Tak18] and support
limited computational tasks to second generation blockchains that provide self-enforcing
agreements in programmable logic (smart contracts), that digitally mimic real world
contracts e.g. Ethereum [Woo14, ASB+17, MMAM+16, KMS+16]. Meanwhile, third
generation blockchains mainly seek to address scalability, sustainability and interop-
erability among different blockchains [MBB+19, KJG+18, ZMR18, YWY+20]. Some
solutions proposed to improve scalability include the use of off-chains for separation
of standard payment transactions (parallel payment networks) from main blockchain
(core) [PD16, MMK+17, GM17, KG17]; side-chains [BCD+14, CDE+16, GKZ19]; and
sharding [KJG+18,ZMR18,MBB+19,WSNH19,YWY+20]. Solutions for inter-operability
among various blockchain technologies include [ZCC+16a,BCD+14,LXS+19,ASB+17,
Her18,MMAM+16,KZ19,GKZ19].
Key sustainability issues are environmental, ethical and governance of the operations
of blockchains [Vra17,GRTT17]. For example, Bitcoin with an estimated electricity con-
1https://eos.io/
2blocknotary.com, notarised.io, stampd.io, notary.bitcoin.com
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sumption of 68.35TWh 3 consumes more energy than some countries such as Switzerland,
Ireland, Kuwait, and Czech Republic, according to the International Energy Agency.
Consequently, alternative consensus protocols such as proof-of-stake have been proposed
and adopted by newer blockchains and cryptocurrencies 4 [GHM+17,KRDO17,KKKZ19].
Moreover, older cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum are also migrating from proof-of-work
consensus to proof-of-stake consensus protocols to address the problem of excessive energy
usage 5.
Despite improved constructions, scalability, interoperability, privacy and security
in blockchains, the operation and maintenance of these platforms do not reflect the
decentralisation ethos embodied at the protocol level (layer), i.e. development and
management operations have remained largely centralised. In other words, the governance
by infrastructure is decentralised, while development and maintenance of the infrastructure
is not decentralised. This observation is fundamental to the contributions of this thesis.
Previous research works have investigated and documented centralisation risks (of
governance structures) within blockchains [GKCC14, MC13]. For instance, by investi-
gating the decision-making process on the issue of increasing the block size, Filippi et.
al, [DFL16] explained that Bitcoin's maintenance and development depends largely on a
small core of highly skilled developers. Similarly, Azouvi et. al. [AMM18] reveal only a
handful of users account for the majority of discussions and code towards cryptocurrency
development in Bitcoin and Ethereum. Clearly, developers and/or founders hold signifi-
cant amount of power, and therefore can effectively influence decision-making processes,
which in turn, can lead to unhealthy centralisation within the system.
To mitigate centralisation risks in blockchain development and maintenance, some
cryptocurrencies such as Dash [DASa,Dasb], Zcash [Zca,Fou], and Decred [Deca,Decb]
provide periodic funding to support projects that advance their platforms or blockchain
development in general. Examples of projects include: marketing activities, research,
development of blockchain tools (e.g. wallets), etc. Typically, this funding is provided
3www.cbeci.org
4A list of proof-of-stake coins can be found at cryptoslate.com/cryptos/proof-of-stake/
5https://ethereum.org/en/eth2/
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to any stakeholder or user or group interested in carrying out projects that support the
development of the blockchain. Usually, decision-making on fund distribution to projects
is done through voting, involving only a select group of participants or centrally decided
by an appointed board or committee. Participation in the process is not incentivised
(low-turnout) and decision-making processes are not securely coupled with the blockchain
and basic voting systems for determining winning projects are supported.
The main aim of this research is to provide provably secure and practical decentralised
system that support blockchains towards sustainable development and maintenance.
Specifically, we propose a novel cryptocurrency treasury system to support decentralised
utilisation of blockchain resources, by all stakeholders, for the advancement of the
blockchain. Mainly, the treasury system covers the sourcing of funds for proposals,
proposal submission process, decision-making on how funds are utilised and the eventual
distribution of funds to successful projects. The proposed treasury system is mostly
platform agnostic and can support cryptocurrencies with payment transactions. Moreover,
we build upon our treasury system and propose a privacy-preserving general decision-
making system for cryptocurrencies with private stake information. We remark that,
a key requirement of any proposed solution is that it should not introduce additional
centralisation to the blockchain as a result of its operation.
Therefore, to achieve the research aim, we outline the following pertinent objectives.
Primarily, this research investigates different sources of funding blockchain development
by exploring funding in cryptocurrencies. The examination resulted in identification,
classification of cryptocurrency funding and their associated potential effects on decision-
making within blockchains. Consequently, solutions that ultimately limit unhealthy
influence of powerful minority within blockchains, and better aggregate the collective
input of members of the cryptocurrency ecosystem were proposed (for adoption in the
designed treasury system).
Furthermore, to mitigate centralisation tendencies and powerful minorities in the
development and maintenance of blockchains, this work explored the degree of involvement
of holders of stake in a cryptocurrency in decision-making processes for maintaining
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and advancing the cryptocurrencies. Hence, this research combined insights identified
from the exploration of cryptocurrency funding mechanisms and decision-making, and
successfully proposed practical treasury system for cryptocurrencies. The treasury
system combines novel ideas from collaborative intelligence gathering (liquid democracy),
decision-making processes, and new efficient zero-knowledge constructions. The proposed
treasury solution has been adopted by real-world cryptocurrency platforms such as
Horizon [Hor18] (formerly Zencash) and Cardano [Car18b](IOHK).
To guarantee increased (stake-)participation in the treasury and decision-making
systems, we abstracted a cryptocurrency coin into the notion of coin-ownership and
stake-ownership. Essentially, the owner of a coin is the only user that can successfully
spend a coin while a stake-owner is any user who possesses the stake/value of a coin for
the purpose of decision-making or participating in the treasury system. Therefore, the
system support permanent/offline stake delegation, and also have an additional benefit of
potentially increasing the total amount of stake (participation) in any treasury/decision-
making period. This is because coin owners do not need to be online for their stake to
be involved in the treasury decision-making process.
Our proposed treasury system mainly applies to blockchains with public-stake in-
formation. However, there is an increasing number of (recent) blockchains where stake
information is private, i.e. cryptocurrencies where the amount of stake owned by any
user/stakeholder is not publicly available on the distributed ledger. Therefore, to address
this potential limitation of the application of the treasury system, we develop a general
collaborative decision-making system for blockchains with private stake. This research
work also proposed an efficient privacy-preserving general decision-making system for
blockchains using novel multiplicative-relation zero-knowledge proofs. Particularly, the
system is compatible with cryptocurrencies with hidden/private stake information e.g.
Zencash [BCG+14,vS13,KKKZ19].
Finally, to ensure that quality decisions are reached on these systems, the research work
also investigates the utility of decisions by analysing soft-consensus among participants in
the blockchain decision-making outcomes. Evaluation of soft-consensus assesses agreement
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on conclusions reached within the blockchain and provides insights for useful discussions,
which in turn, increases community engagement, participation and acceptance of system-
wide decisions.
1.2 Problem Statement
Given the established adoption of blockchains across various industries [MA18,AVP+18,
PSSK20] and increasing ubiquity of cryptocurrencies in particular, due to their distributed
and decentralised architecture, it is pertinent to investigate the degree of decentralisation
in the maintenance and development of these platforms. Despite the decentralised
architecture, there exists known centralisation threats to blockchains [BS15,AMM18,
GBE+18,GKCC14] such as concentration of mining power in mining pools, centralised
development, maintenance and governance, etc. Consequently, there have been clear
justifications for the blockchain users/community to contribute towards developmental
decision-making to address centralisation [But,KKN+17,Decb].
Specifically, we ask the following main research question. Is it possible to design
provably secure blockchain-based self-sustenance mechanisms that will ensure long-term de-
velopment, maintenance, and sustainability of cryptocurrencies that optimises community
contribution without introducing centralisation tendencies?
Treasury systems have been proposed to address some of these centralisation ten-
dencies in blockchain development and maintenance. Blockchain treasury systems
are self-sustenance mechanisms that mainly cover fund sourcing and utilisation for
blockchain development. Dash (Dash Governance system [KNS+16]), Decred (Decred
treasury [Decb]), and Zcash (Zcash governance [Fou]) are examples of cryptocurrencies
that have introduced/adopted a system of treasury, that allows community members
contribute to cryptocurrency development, thereby mitigating centralisation in the pro-
cess of blockchain development directions. Despite this increasing adoption of treasury
systems by blockchains, it has not been rigorously studied to ensure secure design and
wide adoption and earlier proposals have mostly been ad-hoc solutions with considerable
drawbacks. We provide more details about these issues in our exploration of the earlier
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proposals in Chapter 2.
For long-term sustainability of cryptocurrencies, the following questions are critical
to ensure decentralised development.
• How is the development and maintenance of a cryptocurrency funded?
• Who decides how the funds will be used?
Therefore, we explore the various funding sources for blockchain treasury systems.
Specifically, we identify and examine the attributes of the sources of funds for supporting
cryptocurrency development, with a view to understanding how they affect the decentral-
isation and (in turn) the security of their underlying blockchains. Thereafter, we provide
a taxonomy of models of treasury system following the exploration of some real-world
examples.
Furthermore, early cryptocurrency treasury systems utilise voting systems for allowing
users jointly make decisions about developmental proposals for the blockchain. Typically,
these voting systems support basic voting schemes, voting is public, not incentivised, and
without guarantees or accompanying proofs of security. Additionally, we asked that can
we design and develop a blockchain treasury system with secure voting scheme that helps
voters make informed decisions (with minimal effort) and potentially improve on existing
solutions? Given the often complex technical nature of some of the proposals being voted
on in blockchain treasury systems.
Consequently, this thesis provides an affirmative answer to the question as demon-
strated by the presentations in Chapter 3. Specifically, we designed and developed a
secure delegable blockchain-based voting system adopted within our proposed treasury
system for blockchains. We also provide details and performance results of a full-prototype
implementation of the proposed treasury system.
Moreover, our voting scheme finds application beyond blockchain treasury systems.
Hence, we adapt it and proposed a privacy-preserving system for general decision-making
on blockchains. The details of this system is provided in Chapter 4. Given the additional
potential applications of our secure delegable voting scheme, we explore an avenue
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for improving the quality of decisions and acceptance of voting outcomes, by analysing
consensus through aggregated distance measurements of voters' choices and system voting
outcomes. Chapter 4 provides detailed discussions on the specific distance measures
utilised for analysing the consensus on voting outcomes and individual preferences within
the system.
In summary, the underlisted objectives are key to answering the research questions
of this thesis.
• Explore the literature and existing blockchain proposals (for identification of gaps)
• Design of a secure blockchain-based treasury system that optimises community
participation through the design of a collaborative decision-making scheme that
supports liquid democracy
• Extension of proposed scheme to support privacy-preserving blockchains
• Consensus analysis of system decisions for improved utilisation
• System prototyping and evaluation
1.3 Contributions
The work presented in this thesis explored stable development and inclusive maintenance
of blockchains (mostly cryptocurrencies). The goal of this thesis has been to construct
provably-secure community-inclusive cryptographic protocols that exploits the decen-
tralised nature of blockchains and optimises community intelligence through appropriate
decision-making systems. The major contributions from this thesis are highlighted below.
• An examination and taxonomy of blockchain (cryptocurrency) de-
velopment funding, planning, management, and disbursement mech-
anisms (otherwise known as treasury systems) for cryptocurrencies
and blockchain systems. Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an exploration of
blockchain development funding. Specifically, we identified and emphasised the role
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of blockchain funding in the overall management of cryptocurrencies and how it is
valuable towards long-term cryptocurrency sustainability. In addition to examining
the sustainability and highlighting potential issues with various funding sources,
we present a taxonomy of blockchain treasury systems based on funding source
and method of utilisation. Therefore, we provide a taxonomy of blockchain system
reflecting their funding and management system and elaborate on the key features,
as well as potential and real issues within each classification. Hence, the closed,
open and hybrid treasury system classification.
• A provably-secure (security) modeling for a blockchain-based treasury
voting system that supports delegative voting. In Chapter 3, for the first
time, we model the voting system in the well-known Universally Composable (UC)
framework [Can00] via an ideal functionality \scrF t,k,n,mVote . The functionality interacts
with a set of voters and experts as well as k voting committee members. It allows
the voters to either delegate their voting power to some experts or vote directly
on the project. If at least t out of k voting committee members are honest, the
functionality guarantees protocol termination. Even in the extreme case, when all
voting committee members are corrupted, the integrity of the voting outcomes is
ensured. However, in that case, protocol termination is not guaranteed.
• We proposed the world's first honest verifier zero-knowledge proof /
argument for unit vector encryption with logarithmic size communica-
tion. Conventionally, to show a vector of lifted ElGamal ciphertexts element-wise
encrypt a unit vector, Chaum-Pedersen proofs [CP93] are used to show each of
the ciphertexts encrypts either 0 or 1 through Sigma OR composition, and the
product of all the ciphertexts encrypts 1. However, the proof size is linear in
the length of the unit vector. Therefore, the communication overhead is quite
significant when the unit vector length becomes larger. As a result, in Chapter 3
we propose a novel special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) proof/argument
for unit vector that allows the prover to convince the verifier that a vector of
ciphertexts (C0, . . . , Cn - 1) encrypts a unit vector e
(n)
i , i \in [0, n - 1] with O(log n)
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proof size. The proposed SHVZK protocol can also be Fiat-Shamir transformed to
a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof in the random oracle model.
• We provide prototype implementation [IOH19] of the proposed treasury
system for running and benchmarking in the real world environment. In
Chapter 3, we detail our implementation written in Scala programming language
over Scorex 2.0 framework, using TwinsCoin consensus for keeping the underlying
blockchain. Main functionality includes proposal submission, registration of voters,
experts, voting committee members and their corresponding deposit lock, ran-
domized selection of the voting committee members among voters, distributed key
generation (6-round protocol), ballots casting, joint decryption with recovery in case
of faulty committee members (4-round protocol), randomness generation for the
next treasury period (3-round protocol), reward payments, deposit paybacks, and
penalties for faulty actors. All implemented protocols are fully decentralized and
resilient up to 50\% of malicious participants. During verification, we successfully
launched a testnet comprising 12 full nodes operating tens of treasury periods with
different parameters.
• We extend the constructions of the treasury system to develop a privacy-
preserving system for general blockchain decision-making. We extend
the applicability of our initial voting protocol within treasury system to support
cryptocurrencies with private stake information. e.g. Zcash. Specifically, in
Chapter 4, we develop a novel honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proof for
the multiplicative relation between two vector ciphertexts. This proof enables us
to demonstrate that two vector ciphertexts satisfy a multiplicative relationship.
Hence, we design and implement a practical system that can be deployed for
community-inclusive collaborative general-purpose decision-making with support
for delegative voting on blockchains with private stake.
• Decision-making Consensus Evaluation. In Chapter 4, for the first time,
blockchain-based decision-making, to enhance the degree of participation and
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quality of decisions reached through the voting systems e.g. treasury system voting,
we provide a consensus evaluation system. The system allows individual participants
within the system to assess the degree of closeness or agreement of their choices with
general network decisions. Thus, enabling and encouraging participants' discussions
and awareness, which in turn increases participation and user satisfaction on the
outcomes of decisions reached within the system. The main measures we use for
consensus evaluation are distance measure, consensus degree, consensus measure,
and proximity measure. Distance measure is a measure of the separation between
a party's choice and the group/network decision while consensus degree is an
aggregation of the distance measure per project. Similarly, consensus measure is
an aggregation of the consensus degree using ordered weighted average (OWA).
Finally, proximity measure evaluates each party's voting preferences in relation to
the collective decision reached on the network by aggregating the distance measure
across all proposals/issues/candidates.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 presents related work for this thesis. It summarises pertinent issues
around blockchain funding and utilisation. Specifically, it covers blockchain funding and
alternatives in relation to sustainability and community-inclusiveness in fund utilisation.
To capture state-of-the-art, it further develops the presentations in a publication presented
at `The 18th IEEE International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM 2018) Workshop
on Blockchain and Sharing Economy Applications (BlockSEA) in Singapore (November,
2018)'.
Further, Chapter 2 presents background information on terminology, describe nota-
tions and cryptographic primitives used in subsequent chapters - Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Furthermore, it covers discussion on Universally composable (UC) [Can00] model of
secure computation for analysing security of cryptographic protocols. The UC-model is a
framework under the provable security paradigm in cryptography, and was adopted for
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proving the security of the systems developed within this thesis.
Chapter 3 presents a treasury system that addresses identified issues in the exploration
of blockchain maintenance and funding management discussed in Chapter 2. Essen-
tially, it discusses a high-level abstraction of fundamental operations and attributes
of cryptocurrencies. Additionally, it provides preliminary cryptographic concepts of
distributed key generation, and zero-knowledge protocols pertinent to the presentation of
the proposed treasury system. Furthermore, the chapter covers entities, participants and
details the operations and stages of the developed treasury system for cryptocurrencies.
The treasury system supports more robust funding sources, enables participation of stake-
holders/community members in decision-making process on fund utilisation. In order to
optimise community intelligence (`crowd wisdom'), the system supports delegation of
voting resources to experienced or more knowledgeable community members (experts)
within the voting system. That is, the voting protocol of the treasury system supports
delegative voting otherwise known as liquid democracy. The presentations in Chapter 3
is based on a publication presented at `The Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS 2019) held at San Diego, California in February 2019'.
Chapter 4 presents a privacy-preserving general decision-making system for blockchain
management. The system can be adapted for general decision-making such as change of
blockchain rules, transaction and block sizes, etc. Overall, the system builds upon tech-
niques and concepts from the earlier mentioned treasury system in Chapter 3. Specifically,
it presents a privacy-preserving decision-making system that supports cryptocurrency
with private stake information using novel multiplicative-relation non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs/arguments (NIZK). Furthermore, to enhance utility of decisions and
participation amongst stakeholders, we present a (soft-)consensus analysis of decisions
reached on the system using distance measures. This enables users to determine the
degree of agreement and proximity of individual choices with overall decisions reached on
the system. The work presented in this chapter is based on a research work submitted to
the IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing journal and a report of
further analysis of the treasury system available on Cryptology ePrint Archive [ZOB18].
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In Chapter 5, we first present an analysis of the security of the proposed systems.
This presentation is done by examining how the developed systems satisfy conventional
notions of security in the electronic voting literature. Thereafter, Chapter 5 provides
information around implementation, benchmarking, testing, and evaluation of the main
algorithms, protocols and systems discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Mainly, it
covers details about frameworks, computational resources, requirements, and libraries
used in the implementations of prototypes of the systems.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a reflection on the presentations of the previous
chapters of the thesis, limitations and ethical considerations of some design decisions.
Finally, the thesis concludes with research directions for future work.
13
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter provides information on cryptographic primitives, concepts, abstractions,
and notations used in subsequent chapters. Mainly, these are building blocks of the cryp-
tographic protocols presented in this thesis. Specifically, it covers public key encryption,
elliptic curve cryptography and definitions of security. Furthermore, it discusses ElGamal
encryption and its additive homomorphic encryption property used in the voting protocol
of the treasury system proposed in Chapter 3 and subsequently the general-decision
making system proposed in Chapter 4.
Zero-knowledge proofs, a tool used to ensure parties in a protocol execution behave
as outlined in the protocol, and critical for verifiable electronic voting is reviewed next.
Moreover, the review focuses on a Shamir-fiat transformation of sigma protocols (zero-
knowledge proofs) known as non-interactive zero knowledge proofs that are critical to
the presentations in this thesis. Thereafter, we present a brief discussion on universally
composable (UC) security [Can00], a new simulation-based paradigm of proving security
of cryptographic protocols.
The chapter also provides relevant literature review on related work - electronic voting
in Section 2.14 and blockhan voting and governance in Section 2.15 - and concludes with
a summary of the presentations covered in Chapter 2.
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2.1 Terminology and Notations
The following notations are used throughout this thesis. The security parameter is
defined as \lambda \in \BbbN . Let [a, b] denote the set \{ i \in \BbbN | a < i < b\} and [\ell ] denote the set
\{ i \in \BbbN | 1 < i < \ell \} . We denote by PPT probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines.
By a(\ell ), we denote a length-\ell vector (a1, . . . , a\ell ). We use the notation s\leftarrow S to denote
uniform random sampling of s s from a set, or distribution. When A is a randomised
process, i.e. PPT algorithm, y \leftarrow A(x) denotes running A on input x with a fresh random
coin r. When needed, we denote y := A(x; r) as running algorithm A on input x with r
as the explicit random coin.
Let poly(\cdot ) be a polynomially-bounded function and negl(\cdot ) be a negligible function.
A function is defined as negligible if for every positive polynomial p(\cdot ) and all sufficiently
large \lambda \prime s, it holds that negl(\lambda ) < 1/ poly(\lambda ). An event is said to occur with negligible
probability if the probability of the event is negl(\lambda ), and an event occurs with overwhelming
probability if its complement occurs with negligible probability, that is, 1 - negl(\lambda ).
2.2 Public Key Encryption
Formally, a public key encryption scheme consists of three algorithms defined as follows:
Definition 1. (Public Key Encryption, PKE). A public key encryption (PKE) scheme
PKE is a triple of PPT algorithms, PKE = (PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Encrypt,PKE.Decrypt)
defined as follows:
• Key Generation Algorithm, (sk, pk)\leftarrow PKE.KeyGen(1\lambda ): on input the security
parameter \lambda and outputs a secret key sk and a public key pk.
• Encryption Algorithm, c = PKE.Encrypt(pk,m): on input public key pk and a
message m \in \scrM (message space), outputs a ciphertext c.
• Decryption Algorithm, m = PKE.Decrypt(sk, c): on input secret key sk and a
ciphertext c, outputs a message m.
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Following is a presentation of the relevant correctness and security requirements for the
cryptographic constructions in this thesis.
Definition 2. (Correctness). A PKE scheme PKE is said to be correct for all \lambda \in \BbbN ,m \in 
\scrM , (sk, pk)\leftarrow PKE.KeyGen(1\lambda ), it holds that
Pr[PKE.Decrypt(sk,PKE.Encrypt(pk,m)) = m] = 1
Definition 3. (Indistinguishable Chosen Plaintext Attack, IND-CPA Security) A pub-
lic key encryption (PKE) scheme , PKE = (PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Encrypt,PKE.Decrypt) is
said to be IND-CPA secure, if for any PPT adversary \scrA , the following experiments
IND-CPA\scrA ,\sansP \sansK \sansE ,\sansb (\lambda ) parameterised by b \in \{ 0, 1\} it holds that :
Adv(\scrA ) \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}= | Pr[IND-CPA\scrA ,\sansP \sansK \sansE ,\sansone (\lambda ) = 1] - Pr[IND-CPA\scrA ,\sansP \sansK \sansE ,\sanszero (\lambda ) = 1]| \leq negl(\lambda )
IND-CPA\scrA ,\sansP \sansK \sansE ,\sansb (\lambda ):
1. The challenger runs (sk, pk)\leftarrow PKE.KeyGen(1\lambda ) and provides pk to \scrA .
2. \scrA outputs a pair of messages (m\ast 0,m\ast 1).
3. The challenger computes c\ast b \leftarrow PKE.Encrypt(pk,m\ast b) and provides c\ast b to the
adversary \scrA .
4. \scrA outputs a guess bit b\prime which is the output of the experiment returned by the
challenger.
ElGamal [Elg85] is a good example of public key encryptions scheme that is IND-
CPA secure and this thesis utilises IND-CPA security of ElGamal encryption from the
Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) assumption.
2.2.1 Elliptic Curve Over \BbbF p
For the purpose of improved efficiency, the implementation of cryptographic schemes
in this thesis are based on elliptic curve groups. Mainly, these are groups consisting of
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points on elliptic curves rather than groups based on modular arithmetic. Moreover, in
contrast to finite field multiplicative groups \BbbZ \ast p there exists no known sub-exponential
time algorithms for solving the discrete-logarithm (Dlog) problem in aptly chosen elliptic
curve groups [KL14]. Therefore, for cryptographic constructions based on the DDH or
Dlog problem such as our treasury protocol, the elliptic curve implementation is more
efficient than that based on prime-order sub-groups (DDH problem is hard and Dlog
problem are believed to be hardest). Hence, the choice of elliptic curve groups for our
implementation to achieve efficient solutions at a given level of security.
Let \sigma := (p, a, b, g, q, \zeta ) be the elliptic curve domain parameters over a finite field \BbbF p,
consisting of a prime p specifying the finite field \BbbF p, two elements a, b \in \BbbF p specifying an
elliptic curve E(\BbbF p) defined by E : y2 \equiv x3 + ax + b (mod p), a base point g = (xg, yg)
on E(\BbbF p), a prime q which is the order of g, and an integer \zeta which is the cofactor
\zeta = \#E(\BbbF p)/q. We denote by by \BbbG , the cyclic group generated by g. It is assumed that
the DDH assumption holds over \BbbG , that is for all PPT adversary \scrA :
Adv\sansD \sansD \sansH \BbbG (\scrA ) =
\bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| Pr
\left[   x, y \leftarrow \BbbZ q; b\leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} ;h0 = gxy;
h1 \leftarrow \BbbG : \scrA (g, gx, gy, hb) = b
\right]   
\bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \bigm| \leq 
1
2
+ negl(\lambda ) ,
Formally,
Definition 4. (Decisional Diffie-Hellman, DDH). The DDH problem is said to be hard
over the cyclic group \BbbG generated by g if for all PPT adversary \scrA there is a negligible
function negl such that
| Pr[\scrA (\BbbG , q, g, gx, gy, gz) = 1] - Pr[\scrA (\BbbG , q, g, gx, gy, gxy) = 1]| \leq negl(\lambda ),
where uniform x, y, z \in \BbbZ q are sampled.
2.2.2 Elliptic Curve Lifted ElGamal
This section contains a brief explanation of a variant of ElGamal encryption scheme known
as lifted or exponential ElGamal. This variant of the ElGamal scheme is particularly
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useful for the cryptographic voting protocol described in Section 3.5. because of its
additive homomorphic property.
Lifted ElGamal encryption scheme is used as the additively homomorphic public
key cryptosystem in our protocol construction and consists of the following four PPT
algorithms:
• Gen(1\lambda ): on input security parameter \lambda , and output \sigma := (\BbbG , p, a, b, g, q, \zeta ).
• EC.KeyGen(\sigma ): pick sk\leftarrow \BbbZ \ast q and set pk := h = g\sanss \sansk , and output (pk, sk).
• EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r): output c := (c1, c2) = (gr, gmhr).
• EC.Dec\sanss \sansk (c): output Dlog(c2 \cdot c - \sanss \sansk 1 ), where Dlog(x) is the discrete logarithm of x.
(Note that Dlog(\cdot ) is not efficient, therefore, the message space \scrM should be a
small set, e.g., \{ 0, 1\} \eta for \eta \leq 30, to enable efficient exhaustive search of logg gm.
Moreover, lookup tables are used in practice to enhance efficiency of the decryption
process).
As earlier stated, it is well established in the literature that lifted ElGamal encryption
scheme is IND-CPA secure under the DDH assumption [Gol04,KL14,DK15,Mol01,Sma03,
PP10]. Its key generation and decryption algorithm can be efficiently distributed and it
has additively homomorphic property (cf. Section 2.2.3 below).
2.2.3 Additively Homomorphic Encryption
Let Gen(1\lambda ) be the group generator algorithm that takes as input the security parameter
\lambda \in \BbbN , and outputs the group parameters param as earlier explained in Section 2.2.2,
which defines a multiplicative cyclic group \BbbG with prime order p, where | p| = \lambda . We
assume the DDH assumption holds with respect to the group generator Gen. Specifi-
cally, The additively homomorphic cryptosystem HE consists of four PPT algorithms
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Add, ) defined as follows:
• KeyGen(param): pick sk\leftarrow \BbbZ \ast q and set pk := h = gsk, and output (pk, sk).
• Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r): output c := (c1, c2) = (gr, gmhr).
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• Dec\sanss \sansk (c): output Dlog(c2 \cdot c - \sanss \sansk 1 ), where Dlog(x) is the discrete logarithm of x.





Lifted ElGamal encryption is additively homomorphic, that is:
Enc\sansp \sansk (m1; r1) \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (m2; r2) = (gr1 , gmhr1) \cdot (gr2 , gmhr2)
= (gr1+r2 , gm1+m2hr1+r2)
= Enc\sansp \sansk (m1 + m2; r1 + r2) .
We adopt the well known threshold lifted ElGamal encryption scheme as the candidate
threshold additively homomorphic public key cryptosystem for our treasury protocol.
2.2.4 Pedersen Commitment
Specifically, in the unit vector zero-knowledge proof, we use the Pedersen commitment
first introduced by Pedersen [Ped91] in 1991. The scheme has homomorphic properties
and is based on similar algebraic operations and hardness assumptions as the lifted
threshold ElGamal encryption used in our protocol. Moreover, it is perfectly hiding and
computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption.
The Pedersen commitment scheme consists of the following 4 PPT algorithms. Each
of these algorithms implicitly take as input the same group parameters, param\leftarrow Gen(1\lambda ).
• KeyGen\sansC (param): pick s\leftarrow \BbbZ \ast q and set ck := h = gs, and output ck.
• Com\sansc \sansk (m; r): output c := gmhr and d := (m, r).
• Open(c, d): output d := (m, r).
• Verify\sansc \sansk (c, d): return valid if and only if c = gmhr.
Pedersen commitment exhibits additively homomorphic property, i.e.
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Com\sansc \sansk (m1; r1) \cdot Com\sansc \sansk (m2; r2) = (gmhr1) \cdot (gmhr2)
= (gm1+m2hr1+r2)
= Com\sansc \sansk (m1 + m2; r1 + r2) .
2.3 Schwartz-Zippel lemma
Here, we briefly discuss a variation of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80] that is used in
proving the soundness of our zero-knowledge protocols.
Lemma 1 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let f be a non-zero multivariate polynomial of degree d
over \BbbZ p, then the probability of f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 evaluated with random x1, . . . , xn \leftarrow \BbbZ p
is at most dp .
Therefore, given two multi-variate polynomials f1, f2, if
f1(x1, . . . , xn) - f2(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
for random x1, . . . , xn \leftarrow \BbbZ p, then we can assume that f1 = f2. This is because, if
f1 \not = f2, the probability that the above equation holds is bounded by \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}(d1,d2)p , which is
negligible in \lambda .
2.3.1 Zero-knowledge Proofs/Arguments
Zero-knowledge (zk) proof is a fundamental cryptographic building block and have
wide application in general multiparty computation protocols [GMW87] such as secure
verifiable voting protocols [Adi06]. Generally, cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs lets
a party (the prover) prove/convince another party (the verifier) about an assertion or
truth of a statement without revealing any extra information. Mainly, the security of
zero-knowledge proofs are characterised by three main properties, namely, zero-knowledge,
soundness, and completeness.
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Let \scrL be an NP language and \scrR \scrL be its corresponding polynomial time decidable
binary relation, i.e. \scrL := \{ x | \exists w : (x,w) \in \scrR \scrL \} . We say a statement x \in \scrL if there is a
witness w such that (x,w) \in \scrR \scrL . Thus, statement x and witness w and only x is given
to the verifier V . Let the prover P and the verifier V be two PPT interactive algorithms.
Denote \tau \leftarrow \langle P (x,w), V (x)\rangle as the public transcript produced by P and V . After the
protocol, V accepts the proof if and only if \phi (x, \tau ) = 1, where \phi is a public predicate
function.
Definition 5. We say (P, V ) is a perfectly complete proof/argument for an NP relation
\scrR \scrL if for all non-uniform PPT interactive adversaries \scrA it satisfies
• Perfect completeness:
Pr
\left[   (x,w)\leftarrow \scrA ; \tau \leftarrow \langle P (x,w), V (x)\rangle :
(x,w) \not \in \scrR \scrL \vee \phi (x, \tau ) = 1
\right]   = 1
• (Computational) soundness:
Pr
\left[   x\leftarrow \scrA ; \tau \leftarrow \langle \scrA , V (x)\rangle :
x \not \in \scrL \wedge \phi (x, \tau ) = 1
\right]   = negl(\lambda )
Let V (x; r) denote the verifier V is executed on input x with random coin r. A
proof/argument (P, V ) is called public coin if the verifier V picks his challenges randomly
and independently of the messages sent by the prover P .
Definition 6. We say a public coin proof/argument (P, V ) is a perfect special honest
verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) for an NP relation \scrR \scrL if there exists a PPT simulator
Sim such that
Pr
\left[         
(x,w, r)\leftarrow \scrA ;
\tau \leftarrow \langle P (x,w), V (x; r)\rangle :
(x,w) \in \scrR \scrL \wedge 
\wedge \scrA (\tau ) = 1
\right]         
\approx Pr
\left[         
(x,w, r)\leftarrow \scrA ;
\tau \leftarrow Sim(x; r) :
(x,w) \in \scrR \scrL \wedge 
\wedge \scrA (\tau ) = 1
\right]         
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Sigma protocols (
\sum 
) are three-move proof protocols [DJN10] with a challenge-
generating verifier such as Schnorr [Sch91] and Chaum and Pedersen [CP93] used to
efficiently prove knowledge of Dlog (discrete logarithm) and exponents in a Diffie-Hellman
triple, respectively. At a high level, in the first move, the prover sends (commitment
to) a random value to the verifier, then the verifier sends a randomly generated value
to the prover. Finally, to convince the verifier, the prover sends a final value which is a
combination of the original value (in the first move), the challenge (in the second move),
and the witness to the verifier.
A public coin SHVZK proofs/arguments can be transformed to a non-interactive
one (in the random oracle model [BR93]) by using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] where
a cryptographic hash function is used to compute the challenge instead of having an
online verifier in the protocol interaction. We provide more details in Section 3.7 of the
zero-knowledge proofs used in the treasury system protocol.
2.3.2 Universal Composability
We model our proposed treasury system security under the standard Universally Com-
posable (UC) security framework [Can00] proposed by Canetti in 2000. UC provides a
framework for proving security of cryptographic protocols, and is, perhaps, the most
famous proof paradigm under simulation-based security proofs for cryptographic protocols
(alternative to game-based or property based definitions of security). A key concept of
the framework is to enable stand-alone security definitions of protocols that still holds
under concurrent general composition.
The main technique of UC is to create an ideal functionality \scrF that describes the
desired security goals of a protocol [BU13]. Following the specification of an ideal
functionality, we then develop a protocol that is as secure as the ideal functionality, in a
process known as `UC emulation'. The designed protocol is secure if it `UC-emulates' the
ideal functionality. In other words, a protocol is secure for a given task, if no adversary
attacking an execution of the protocol can gain more from the attack than attacking an
ideal process involving a trusted third party (that gets input from the parties and hands
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output back to them) running the ideal functionality for the protocol.
This approach to analysing security of protocols was first proposed in [GV87].
Essentially, the approach states that a secure protocol for a computational task should
`emulate' an ideal process for the task. In turn, an ideal process for a computational task
involves a `trusted third party' that receives input from all parties and locally executes
the tasks, computes the output and hands said output back to the parties. In the UC
framework, an environment \scrZ is responsible for generating and handling inputs to parties
and receiving outputs whilst communicating arbitrarily with the adversary.
Furthermore, the UC framework enables secure composition, i.e. given a secure proto-
col \rho with ideal functionality \scrF , protocol \rho is still a secure protocol if ideal functionality
\scrF is replaced by another protocol \pi that UC-emulates \scrF . Thus, enabling composition
of protocols. Moreover, the UC framework guarantees that a protocol proven secure in
a stand-alone model will remain secure when executed in an environment with other
concurrently run arbitrary protocols. This is otherwise known as achieving concurrent
general composition [Lin09].
Variants of UC framework include simplifed-UC (SUC) [CCL15], a simpler and
restricted framework with built-in authenticated channels, fixed parties, and less com-
plications than the generalized UC framework. Other variants are UC with joint state
(JUC) [CR03] where protocol instances have some joint state and randomness, UC
with global setup (GUC) [CDPW07] where protocols are analysed in a setting with
parties having access to trusted global information with specific properties. Others are
synchronous-UC [KMTZ13] that allows UC to support protocols achieving properties
such as input completeness, guaranteed termination, etc. through the introduction of
(ideal functionalities for) loosely synchronised clocks and bounded latency (in commu-
nication channels/networks). Synchronous-UC provided a novel formal approach for
achieving synchrony in the UC framework.
Under the framework, all entities (protocols, functionalities, environment) including
adversarial entities are represented as interactive Turing machines (ITMs), each of which
represents the program to be run by participants. Note that, we distinguish between
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ITMs (which represent static objects, or programs) and instances of ITMs (ITIs). ITIs
represent interacting processes in a running system initiated by an environment that
communicates with the adversary, hands input to and gets outputs from the protocols.
Moreover, an ITI is an ITM along with an identifier that distinguishes it from other ITIs
in the same system. The identifier consists of two parts: A session-identifier (SID) that
identifies which protocol instance the ITI belongs to, and a party identifier (PID) that
distinguishes among the parties in a protocol instance. Typically, the PID is also used
to associate ITIs with ``parties"" that represent some administrative domains or physical
computers. The pair (SID,PID) is a unique identifier of the ITI in the system. The model
of computation consists of a number of ITIs that can write on each other's tapes in ways
specified in the UC model. We assume that all ITMs are PPT.
Specifically, the security of our voting protocol is assessed in the UC framework
with static corruption in the random oracle (RO) model. The security is based on the
indistinguishability between real/hybrid world executions and ideal world executions, i.e.
for any possible PPT real/hybrid world adversary \scrA , we construct a PPT simulator \scrS 
(ideal world adversary) that can present an indistinguishable view to the environment \scrZ 
operating the protocol.
2.4 Background
Blockchain research has witnessed significant advances since the pioneer blockchain
Bitcoin was invented a decade ago. From first generation blockchains that are largely
passive distributed ledgers that facilitate token exchanges between potentially distrusting
parties [Nak08,Tak18,DD14], to second generation blockchains or programmable state
machines [Woo14] that support contracts expressed in logical computer codes, i.e. smart
contracts. Advances in blockchain research and practice have mainly focused on improved
security and privacy [DD14,Max13,KKKZ19,BCG+14,KMS+16], scalability [ASB+18,
KJG+18,ZMR18,KZ19,GKZ19,BCD+14], sustainability and interoperability [LXS+19].
Recent blockchains are rife with some or a combination of these features. They now offer
better scalability, privacy, security and support better transaction throughputs than first
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generation systems.
However, beyond these improvements, `inclusive' blockchain development and man-
agement is another main goal amongst modern cryptocurrencies [Hor18,Har16,Mer16,
But,DFL16, Th16,KNS+16]. Intuitively, this enables stakeholders of a cryptocurrency
(beyond developers, founders, investors) to have active roles in the management of de-
velopment funds for blockchain, and general decision-making that affects overall health
of these distributed platforms. The focus of this thesis aligns with the latter goal by
designing and developing provably-secure protocols that support inclusive management,
development and general-decision making in cryptocurrencies.
Real-world cryptocurrencies require continuous maintenance through developmen-
tal projects and steady funding for survival and continuous growth. Development
of early blockchains and cryptocurrencies e.g., Ethereum [Woo14], Dash [DD14], Ze-
roCash [BCG+14], were mainly funded by `founders', who are developers, investors,
researchers, etc. Consequently, cryptocurrency development and growth is largely in-
fluenced, driven and determined by founders. There abound ample evidences of failed
cryptocurrencies and disputes due to undemocratic control by `founders/owners' of these
supposed distributed platforms [DuP17,DFL16,Hac19].
However, blockchain-based treasury systems have been identified as an alternative fund-
ing and decision making mechanism for distributed ledgers [KKN+,KN+,KKN+17,ZOB18,
Th16,Hor18]. A treasury system is a self-sustenance mechanism for the advancement of
blockchain systems [KKN+17]. Generally, a blockchain treasury system covers sourcing of
funds, funding management and decision-making for fund utilisation to support cryptocur-
rency maintenance and development. Moreover, it is a decentralised, community-inclusive
collaborative decision-making system for cryptocurrencies and blockchains. Mainly, it
comprises regular (mostly decentralised) funding source, community-inclusiveness and
(incentivised) participation, collaborative, secure, periodic, and ideally an enforcement
(punishment) mechanism to ensure compliance with system-wide decisions. Section 2.5
provides a high-level description of treasury systems for cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrency projects such as core development, light-client support, mining
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pool software, decentralised exchanges, research etc. requires funding to execute. `He
who pays the piper dictates the tune', therefore, Section 2.6 examines funding sources
for cryptocurrency maintenance and development and their effect within treasury and
cryptocurrencies.
Treasury-like functions of key selected cryptocurrencies were further explored for
insights towards design decisions in our proposed blockchain treasury system, developed
and presented in Chapter 3. Analysis of details of operations, features, strengths and
weaknesses of these blockchain funding management systems is presented in Sections 2.8,
2.9, 2.10 and 2.11. Particularly, the analysis examines how these pioneer blockchain
platforms address pertinent problems such as community-inclusiveness, participant spread,
voting rules, privacy, security, fund sourcing, fund utilisation, etc. and their effects in
developing secure treasury systems for sustainable blockchain technologies. Moreover,
Section 2.13 discusses funding sources in relation to fund utilisation and decision-making
process, and provides a taxonomy of these (treasury-like) system functions based on
existing cryptocurrencies and beyond.
Note that due to the alluring nature of cryptocurrencies [MSA19] as a store of
value and attendant community interest, a considerable volume of work in this area
originate from non-academic, industrial [WZX+18] or grey literature such as whitepapers,
e.g., the Bitcoin whitepaper [Nak08], official websites, third-party service providers e.g.,
Coinmarketcap, official and unofficial chat forums e.g., Reddit, Medium, mailing lists,
Wiki pages, GitHub, etc. Moreover, practice is sometimes ahead of theory in blockchain
research [BMC+15,WZX+18]. Accordingly, the presentation in this chapter also draws
directly from these, largely unofficial, sources.
Subsequently, we provide a
Finally, Section 2.16 provides concluding remarks by highlighting key findings and
insights, and provides a summary of research questions that are addressed in subsequent
chapters of this thesis.
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2.5 Treasury System Overview
Generally, cryptocurrencies require skills spanning various fields such as cryptography,
economics, law, finance, software development etc. for tasks and projects such as
marketing, secure protocol design and proof, code for system core, business registration,
advertising and publicity, etc. Due to decentralisation on blockchains and absence of
trusted-third parties, ideally, extra care is required to prevent introduction of centralisation
through these `external' sources. Therefore, a treasury system seeks to address these
sources of centralisation from the operations of the cryptocurrency. For instance, by
allowing community stakeholders contribute to the system.
A treasury system is a `self-sustenance' mechanism for decentralised distributed
ledgers. Mainly, it encompasses blockchain funding, funding distribution, utilisation,
as well as decision-making, [KKN+17,KKN+,ZOB18,Car18a,Hor18,KNS+16] for the
development, maintenance, advancement and long-term sustainability of underlying
cryptocurrency. A cryptocurrency treasury system represents a decentralised means
of achieving and ensuring sustenance and improvement of its parent-system through
guaranteed regular funding for supportive developmental projects and democratised
decision-making.
Moreover, a treasury system covers how project proposal submissions are made,
community discussions, community-inclusive collaborative decision-making for reaching
decisions on proposals, and reliable robust funding for the treasury. Desirably, treasury
system parameters and features should be compatible with, and reflect considerations
for real-world scenarios in which the blockchain community and proposers are expected
to function. For example, it can mimic salary payment in the real-world by adopting
monthly cycles for all of its activities. Below, we highlight key requirements for treasury
systems [KNS+16, ZB18, Dasb] to help diminish centralisation in the operations of
cryptocurrencies.
• Treasury funding mechanism. Although blockchains can generate money for holders
through appreciation in exchange value, they cost money to develop and main-
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tain [Bit17,Bita,Bas,Ara, ICO]. Hence, a secure and reliably sustainable source of
funding is essential for a treasury system to successfully fund projects that support
cryptocurrency development. Potential funding sources include block rewards taxa-
tion [HBHW17,DD14], voluntary donations [Bit17], and minting [ZOB18] which
is particularly useful when deductions from block rewards become small. Block
rewards may reduce as a result of decrease in block rewards known as halving in
Bitcoin [NBF+16,Nak08], or as a result of money supply limit being reached and
only transaction fees making up block rewards.
• Community inclusive and stakeholder participation. Holders of stake and cryp-
tocurrency community members should be allowed and encouraged to participate
in the treasury system to ensure sufficient buy-in and minimise concentrating
blockchain operations in the hands of a minority few. Game-theoretically efficient
incentive structures can further drive increased stakeholder participation in treasury
process [KN+], and also help ensure that incentives do not lead to hyper-inflation
which can diminish cryptocurrency value.
• Collaborative decision-making mechanism e.g., a voting scheme. Treasury sys-
tems should integrate mechanisms that facilitate community-inclusive collaborative
decision-making in order to maximise the collective-intelligence of the cryptocur-
rency community in particular and larger blockchain ecosystem [KN+, ZOB19].
In addition the collective-decision making mechanisms should be flexible [Tez]
and reflect the peculiarities of the blockchain rather than general voting rules, to
enhance utility and participation in the system. For instance, a higher threshold
can be set for decisions on projects that exceeds a defined funding target, or for
proposals with high blockchain forking risks [KKN+17] rather than simple majority
voting rule for all proposals.
• Blockchain and stakeholders' security and privacy. Participation in treasury activity
should not compromise the security and privacy of participants and the cryptocur-
rency. For instance, the system should be secure against Sybil attacks [GKL15],
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rushing attacks [KMS+15], nothing-at-stake attacks [BNPW18] and stakeholders'
votes should be weighted relative to their stake in the system.
Next, we examine the main sources of development funding (treasury funding mechanism)
for cryptocurrencies in relation to risks, benefits and sustainability for treasury systems
and blockchains in general. The remaining above-listed requirements are covered in
Chapter 3, which details the proposed cryptocurrency treasury system with community-
inclusive decision-making mechanism that exploits collaborative intelligence through
delegative voting (cryptocurrency treasury system). We remark that, ideally, project
milestone compliance monitoring and/or refund mechanism in case of non-compliance
are desiderata for cryptocurrency treasury systems.
2.6 Funding Sources
Funding is essential for the development and maintenance of any real-world cryptocur-
rency. For example, human resources (salaries and compensation), computing resources
(hardware and software), marketing, legal fees, etc. are some necessary expenses accrued
in the development and maintenance process of real-world blockchain. Main sources
of development funding on blockchain systems include donations (charity), taxations,
venture capitalists (investor funding), patron organisations and more recently Initial
Coin Offerings (ICOs) [GMV20,HS18]. Today, cryptocurrencies largely rely on one or
a combination of these sources for development funding and maintenance. The next
Sections 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3, 2.6.4, 2.6.5, present an examination of each of these funding
sources.
2.6.1 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)
ICO is a means of crowd-funding done by issuing some cryptocoins to investors, or-
ganisations, or individuals, in exchange for other cryptocurrencies, usually Bitcoin or
Ethereum, or a fiat currency e.g, US Dollars. In recent years, ICOs have become a
substantial means of funding cryptocurrencies and other blockchain-based startups and
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businesses [CHSW19,GMV20]. Typically, most ICOs are deployed as smart contracts
that receive funds and distribute equivalent amount of the new or underlying cryptocur-
rency to the investors at a later date [Bita]. Technologies such as the ERC-20 [VB15]
which facilitate easy development of new tokens used for ICOs have enabled increase
in the number of ICOs in the cryptocurrency community. Usually, investors buy these
tokens in expectation that their value may rise if project/company offering the ICOs
are successful in the future [GMV20,MSA19]. ICOs represent a good way to raise rea-
sonable amount of money to support cryptocurrency development within a short period
of time. For instance, projects such as Basic Attention Token [Bas] and Aragon [Ara]
were able to respectively raise 35 million USD and 25 million USD in 30 seconds and 15
minutes [Kea17,CD17, ICO].
Due to the successes recorded by early ICOs, there has been a rise in the number
of ICOs for cryptocurrencies and other blockchain-based technologies [ICO]. According
to Cointelegraph [VB15], approximately 4 billion USD (fiat currency equivalent) was
raised in 2017 alone. While ICOs are good, there are uncertainties associated with the
legality of ICOs. For example, are ICO tokens regarded as payment token, utility tokens
or financial security [HT18,OEC19]? This classification is necessary for global regulators
in relation to protection of investments in ICOs [GMV20]. Unfortunately, ICOs can also
be abused by fraudsters who abuse the minting process that creates new coins used in
the ICOs [CHSW19] and have been used in Ponzi schemes and financial scams [WA17]
because of the low entry requirements (mainly technical costs) to organise an ICO as
evidenced by the plethora of over 250, 000 ERC-20 tokens [Eth20] on the Ethereum
blockchain. ICOs are susceptible to concentration of token ownership in the hands of a
minority, speculation, and scams. Moreover, recently there have been an apparent decline
in the rate of successful ICOs, perhaps due to an increase in the number of speculative
projects issuing ICOs.
Evidently, ICOs are valuable for initial development or starting out a project. This
is attributable to the relatively high amount of funds that can be raised in a short
span of time, especially as sources of low cost finance [OEC19]. However, uncertainties
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surrounding the amount of funds that can be raised at any given time [GMV20] make
them unsuitable for solely funding of cryptocurrency treasury system. Treasury systems
require stable, reliable and largely predictable funding sources [ZOB19,KKN+17,KNS+16]
to support cryptocurrency development. ICOs are incompatible with the methodical
planning and reliable funding that is expected of decentralised cryptocurrency treasury
systems. Therefore, an obvious drawback is that ICOs are not suitable as sustainable
source of funding for long-term planning of cryptocurrency maintenance and development.
2.6.2 Donations
Donations is one of the oldest and most common means of cryptocurrency development
funding. Often developers/inventors/founders of a cryptocurrency rely on donations
from charity e.g., from the public, stakeholders, or other third parties, for cryptocurrency
development funding e.g., Bitcoin Core Sponsorship [Bit17]. These donations can be in
form of cash money (cash) or through offering of services such as software development,
or marketing skills (kind). For instance, Bitcoin through its foundation- The Bitcoin
Foundation (whose goal is to increase global acceptance of Bitcoin) - have developed via
reliance on donations and membership registration fees. For the Monero (XMR) [Mon]
cryptocurrency, developers or proposers (planning to execute cryptocurrency development
projects) willing to contribute to the growth of Monero, seek donations from other
community members by discussing details of their proposals (including the amount of
funds needed) on the `getmonero forum' [Get].
Moreover, BitcoinCore, an open source endeavour responsible for the maintenance of
the Bitcoin client [Bitb], also runs a sponsorship program through which top companies
and industry players can contribute to the development of the cryptocurrency. Although,
donations represent an alternative funding mechanism to ICOs, they are not without
their own pitfalls. There have been instances where development activities have been
threatened because of low availability of funds. For instance, in 2015, a board member
published a note on the Bitcoin Foundation forum where he stated that the Foundation
was seriously struggling with funds.
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Although, donations are useful for cryptocurrency development funding, solely, they
are not suitable for long-term methodical planning and sustainability of cryptocurrencies
due to associated fund uncertainties [KNS+16]. Meticulous planning for blockchain
development activities is impractical under the donations only model due to uncertainties
about the amount of funds that will be available at any period of time. Furthermore,
donations could introduce centralisation in the system. For instance, popular donors
(not necessarily malicious) may take advantage of the model to influence decisions in the
system to their favour. In contrast, a malicious adversary or donor may try to influence
the system in ways that are detrimental to the sustainability and growth of the system.
For instance, this may be done to cripple the system due to the adversary holding a large
stake in an altcoin or competitor cryptocurrency.
2.6.3 Taxations
Taxation is an alternative development funding source found on existing cryptocurrencies
such as Dash [DD14], ZCash [Zca], etc. By design, a fraction of block rewards, payment for
finding new block, is taken and contributed to a decentralised pool, or the cryptocurrency
company/founders, or some other bodies providing services to the cryptocurrency. For
instance, 10\% of miners' rewards on the Dash blockchain is contributed to a central pool.
Developers and other community members can request funds from this pool for proposals
that will advance the Dash blockchain. On ZCash, the `founders reward' is 10\% of the
21 million ZEC that will be mined on the network. This represents tax that will be
distributed among founders, investors, employees, and advisors for services offered to
support the blockchain.
Taxation, perhaps, is the most sustainable of all cryptocurrency development funding
sources because it is a blockchain sustenance mechanism derived from activities on the
blockchain itself. Furthermore, it lends itself to methodical planning which are required by
disintermediation protocols such as cryptocurrencies and does not have the uncertainties
associated with ICOs [GMV20]. Therefore, taxation which is obtainable from miners'
rewards and potentially transaction fees represent a good treasury fund source. However,
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additional funding schemes may be required because of decreasing miners' reward, also
known as halving in Bitcoin [NBF+16, Nak08], which is a common feature of most
cryptocurrencies. Accordingly, to supplement the shortage from diminishing miners'
reward, a hybrid treasury source, such as one that combines taxation with donations or
minting represents a more robust and sustainable source of blockchain funding.
2.6.4 Minting
Minting is defined as the process of creating new cryptoassets [CHSW19] or cryptocoins to
mainly support cryptocurrency development [ZOB19]. On the Bitcoin blockchain, coinbase
transactions [NBF+16] are used to create new Bitcoins. Basically, this is the means
by which miners that propose new blocks get rewarded. The miner proposing the new
block receives some new cryptocoins for being the first to correctly solve a computational
puzzle (proof-of-work) or for being the leader of a committee responsible for proposing
a new block [KRDO17] (proof-of-stake). That is, nodes are rewarded for providing
critical services to the network. Similarly, minting would create new coins for solely
supporting cryptocurrency development by paying or rewarding community members who
propose and carry out projects that will advance the growth of the blockchain. In other
words, newly minted coins are used solely to fund projects (that support cryptocurrency
development) by awarding the minted coins to community members with successful
proposals.
Although minting provides stable funding for cryptocurrency development, it creates
overall inflation in the value of underlying cryptocurrency [CHSW19] and susceptible
to abuse by proposers who are only interested in taking funds from the system because
of the `seemingly unlimited' availability of funds supply. Therefore, there is need for
careful adoption, implementation and thorough economic and game-theoretic analysis to
determine the optimum amount of coins that should be minted at any given time towards
funding projects in the system. This analysis is also necessary to determine the overall
inflation impact and implications for long-term growth and value of the cryptocurrency.
Hence, to protect against adverse inflation, it is required to achieve an equilibrium between
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supply and demand, and Cohney et al., rightly posits that stakeholders participation is
necessary to attain optimal minting values [CHSW19].
2.6.5 Patron Organisations
Apart from ICOs, taxations, donations, and minting, patron organisations also provide
services to support blockchain development. Patron organisations provide dedicated
support for cryptocurrency development through the provision of support services. For
instance, Bitpay contributes to Bitcoin development by funding wages of some Bitcoin
Core developers. Furthermore, industrial organisations can also contribute human
resources and services to the growth of a cryptocurrency. For instance, in addition
to providing funding to Bitcoin Core, Blockstream 1 also contribute human resources
to the Bitcoin cryptocurrency e.g. developers contributing to Bitcoin Core software.
Patron organisations tend to wield ample influence in decision-making on the development
direction for cryptocurrencies. Issues generally arise when the decisions reached do not
reflect the inputs of the broader cryptocurrency community. Usually, these decisions
tend to occur in a centralised manner, and centralised sustenance mechanisms that do
not proportionately represent the interests of all stakeholders are not appropriate for
blockchains.
In summary, it is clear that a clever combination of the above funding sources con-
sidered with the peculiarities of given cryptocurrencies would provide adequate funding
source for secure, decentralised cryptocurrency treasury for supporting system develop-
ment. Each of the above-listed blockchain development funding sources, individually does
not provide a secure, methodical and robust funding source for decentralised blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies' treasury system.
2.7 Related Work
Here, we shed more light on the operations of key real-world cryptocurrencies (Dash,
Zencash, Decred, and Zcash) in relation to fund sourcing and utilisation through com-
1https://blockstream.com/
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munity participation. This exploration helps to identify gaps that are addressed in our
proposed treasury system presented in Chapter 3. Besides, e-voting, blockchain voting
and governance are topics closely related to the work presented in this thesis. Therefore,
we provide a review of these topics in Section 2.14 and Section 2.15 respectively. The
review provides a window into the state-of-the-art in literature around key topics related
to the presentations in this thesis. Specifically, we explore the literature on develop-
ments of e-voting systems and place a strong emphasis on end-to-end verifiability, before
concluding with discussions of blockchain-based voting and blockchain governance.
2.8 Dash Governance System
The Dash governance system (DGS) [Dasb] also referred to as Dash governance by
blockchain (DGBB) is a pioneering treasury implementation for cryptocurrency devel-
opment funding in any real-world cryptocurrency [KNS+16]. The DGS allows regular
users on the Dash network to participate in the development process of the Dash cryp-
tocurrency by allowing them submit project proposals that support the cryptocurrency
to the network. A subset of `special' nodes known as Masternodes then vote to decide
what proposals receive funding. Masternodes are a subset of dedicated servers with a
1000 Dash that provide special services such as instant and private pay, to the Dash
network [DASa]. Every voting cycle (approximately one month), winning proposals
are voted for and funded from the accrued resources in the blockchain treasury. 10\%
of all block rewards within each monthly voting period is contributed towards a pool
(superblock) from which proposals are then funded. Essentially, the DGS uses taxation
as the means of development funding and consists of three major stages: proposal stage,
voting stage, and payment stage.
Next, we provide descriptions of the DGS by discussing the proposal and decision-
making processes.
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2.8.1 Proposal Submission and Decision-making
Projects willing to support the Dash cryptocurrency request funds from the net-
work by submitting proposals through a special transaction known as GOVER-
NANCE OBJECT PROPOSAL [KNS+16]. This transaction burns 5 Dash to prevent
Denial-of-Service attacks on the network. Proposals include name, URL to detailed
proposal, date (start and end date for funding request), payment address (if proposal is
successful after voting), and the amount of funds requested.
Proposal transactions are stored `locally' by nodes on the Dash network after verifying
their validity because proposals are not stored on the Dash blockchain. Following
submission, proposers are expected to publicise their submissions to Masternodes who
vote on proposals within the Dash Blockchain. There exists third-party tools and
websites 2 to support campaigning, tracking and voting for proposals.
For decision-making on DGS, masternodes can vote, without the need for representa-
tives or delegates in a direct democracy process [Hel06,LIJ84,Tor05,Vat00]. The voting
ballot options on proposals are `YES', `NO', or `ABSTAIN', respectively implying support
`for', `against' or `neutrality'. Voters on the DGS vote directly on proposals in the system
using the Dash wallet or other third-party tools or websites. Voting is done via a special
transaction that identifies the masternode as well as the hash of the proposal that is
being voted on.
Ballots are also stored locally by the nodes on the network [KNS+16]. Similar to the
proposal submission process, every node on the network checks to confirm the validity of
the votes before adding to their internal storage. Note that, like proposals, votes are also
not stored on the blockchain.
In the payment stage, in order to be considered for funding at the end of voting,
accrued votes for any proposal must satisfy the fuzzy threshold voting rule [KNS+16].
The rule states that the number of net positive votes for any winning proposal must be
greater than 10\% of all masternodes on the network. Specifically, for Dash governance
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successful:
V\sansv \sanso \sanst \sanse \sanss = (V\sansy \sanse \sanss  - V\sansn \sanso ) \geq 0.1 \ast | masternodes| 
where V\sansy \sanse \sanss is the number of yes votes, V\sansy \sanse \sanss represents the number of votes in support
(yes votes), V\sansn \sanso represents the number of votes against (no votes) and | masternodes| is
the number of masternodes on the Dash network. That is, only proposals with V\sansv \sanso \sanst \sanse \sanss are
eligible for funding.
Finally, all eligible proposals are then ranked in descending order according to the
amount of net votes received and are funded accordingly until the available budget is
exhausted. Note that, once the available monthly budget is expended, other eligible
proposals are discarded. Therefore, only top-ranked proposals that fit within the available
budget are funded in an automated process that requires synchronisation of the proposal
rankings among masternodes and communication on the network. As earlier mentioned,
the total budget for any voting period is gotten from taxation of miners' block rewards,
and is calculated as follows:
Budget = (Block reward \ast 0.1) \ast 16616 blocks
2.8.2 Discussion
For the first time in cryptocurrencies, DGS provided a mechanism for supporting cryp-
tocurrency development from itself and allowed nodes on the network participate in the
process of determining who gets funding to support the system. However, the system
can be improved by addressing some of the issues highlighted below.
The reliance on off-chain proposal and voting data (local storage) in the processes of
DGS presents a potential issue that makes the system susceptible to validation attacks,
thereby, potentially leading to forks on the blockchain. Also, participation in the DGS
voting process is not incentivised, despite resources (time and computing resources)
expended by masternodes. Hence, there is not a high turnout in masternode participation
in the DGS [KNS+16] given that only masternodes (excluding other stakeholders) can vote
in the system. For example, a successful proposal titled DASH-CORE-GROUP-LEGAL-
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EXPENSES 3 received 752 Yes, 59 No, and 15 Abstain votes, which is approximately
18\% turnout with an estimation of 4500 masternodes.
Moreover, voting on the DGS is not private, as a result, voters can be subjected to
coercion from a powerful adversary. Furthermore, given the fact that miners' reward
decreases by about 7.14\% annually on the Dash blockchain, supplementary funding
sources for the DGS is necessary. This is because reliance on taxation alone may not
be sufficient for future budgeting considering projected increase in community size and
corresponding increase in number of proposals.
Meanwhile, proxy (delegation) voting or liquid democracy has emerged as an alterna-
tive model for community-wide decision-making that can reduce participation cost and
time especially for apathetic voters. Liquid democracy is a hybrid of direct and represen-
tative democracy that allows voters to directly vote on issues or select a representative
that they delegate their voting power/right to [For02, KKH+15, CG17, ZZ17a, KR20].
Therefore, liquid democracy can enable community collective (rather than masternode
only or selective) participation in the DGS voting process. An obvious advantage is
that it enables the community to take advantage of members with expertise within a
community i.e. optimise the wisdom of the crowd. Also, it enables increased participation,
belonging and acceptance from community members because of its inclusiveness. This is
in addition to the scaling advantage it provides to the system. That is, when the system
grows and there are enormous amounts of proposals to vote for, it will be practically
impossible for all members of the community to properly scrutinise the merits of all
submitted proposals. Therefore, reliance on experts through vote delegation, can help
more community members make confident voting decisions.
2.9 ZenCash Treasury
The ZenCash treasury (now transitioned to Horizen), by design, adopts a flexible multi-
stakeholder governance model [VVL17]. The core idea is to remove centralisation
which entrusts enormous power to a minority group. Participation is voluntary and
3https://www.dashcentral.org/p/dash-core-group-legal-expenses
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decision-making power cuts across all categories of stakeholders proportional to their
resources(stake).
Initially, the ZenCash system has a Core Team (inclusive of founders of Zen) and
a Decentralised Autonomous Organization(DAO) (consisting of industry leaders) that
controls 3.5\% of block mining reward and 5\% of rewards respectively. The plan is to
evolve, develop and adopt a hybrid voting mechanism that enables all stakeholders to
influence decisions and resource allocations on the blockchain. This evolution would
result in a system of DAOs, with competing DAOs responsible for working on different
problems. Collectively, the DAOs will be responsible for activities (building, maintaining,
improving software, legal, marketing, and advertising) that will ensure the long-term
sustainability of Zen.
The staff strength of each DAO is between 3 - 5 members and could potentially be
increased to any number. Community members / stakeholders are allowed to participate
in the development of Zen via project proposals which are obviously funded by the DAOs
through the 5\% block mining reward allocation they receive. Proposals are only funded
subject to successful voting and only one DAO existed at launch.
2.9.1 Proposal Submission and Decision-making
Proposal submission is done at no cost and available to any interested party [VVL17].
There is a proposal submission deadline of two weeks before commencement of voting
and starting period of one day after voting. The proposed governance mechanism has a
bimonthly (6 times in a year) voting period. Voting is done with the use of tokens, with a
cap of 1400 tokens available at any voting period. The tokens are distributed as follows:
• 360 tokens are available for sale to stakeholders
• 240 tokens are reserved for ZenCash project developers (based on some metrics e.g.,
number of commits or pull requests, etc.)
• 60 tokens are given to cryptocurrency exchanges that support ZenCash
• Another 60 tokens are provided for mining pool owners
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• 360 tokens are for Secure Nodes
• 120 tokens are distributed equally among DAO officers and
• Similarly, the final 240 tokens are shared among members of the core team
The system proposes a majority and super-majority voting (winning) rule of votes
greater than 720 and 1080 respectively out of the available 1400 tokens/votes. However,
the core team has a veto power over all proposals with a unanimous vote by all members
of the core team.
2.9.2 Discussion
Unlike Dash, voting is open to a wider range of stakeholders (including parties that
purchase tokens) instead of only a special subset of nodes, although with the limitation of
a fixed number of tokens. Community participation is further limited because stakeholders
can only hold 25\% of all available voting tokens. In comparison, the DAOs and Core
Team also have the same amount of voting power towards the decision-making process.
Moreover, the proposal submission process is susceptible to DoS attacks because it does
not cost tokens/money to make submissions [VVL17].
The ability of veto power granted to the core team comprising only 3 individuals
can lead to an excessive concentration of power in the hands of a minority. Potentially,
this power can be abused against decisions reached by the larger voting community i.e.
`tyranny of the powerful/founders'. The utility of the system to adapt to a larger audience
and optimise community knowledge is hindered by its voting structure. That is, the
system does not support delegative voting and only few members could participate due
to the limited amount of voting tokens.
Finally, there are plans to address some of the identified issues within ZenCash [VVL17]
and evolve governance structure into a more encompassing and effective system.
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2.10 Decred Treasury
Initially, the Decred cryptocurrency [Deca] also deployed a governance system like DGS(in
the Dash network). However, unlike the DGS, an organization known as Decred Holdings
Group, LLC (DHG) is responsible for management of `treasury funds'. Specifically, this
fund is known as development subsidies and is obtained by taxation of 10\% miners'
rewards [KNS+16]. Amongst other duties, the DHG is responsible for publishing periodic
financial statements, calling for proposals, and submitting budget proposals. Within
the DHG there are various `Councils', e.g., Admission Council, Attrition Council, that
oversee appointing community members to the Decred Assembly. The Decred Assembly
is responsible for voting on proposals and decide on projects to be funded in a process
described as Proof-of-Assembly (PoA).
However, in 2018, Decred released Politeia (Pi), a platform that supports its gov-
ernance. The platform allows community members to submit, discuss, vote and track
proposals. This allows stakeholders to participate in fund utilisation decisions and let
anyone to contribute to the development of Decred. Areas of contribution include develop-
ment, marketing, research, or community. To ensure sustainable funding for community
contributions to development of Decred, Politeia also relies on contribution of 10\% of
all block rewards(subsidies) to a treasury pool(taxation). The key goal is to prevent a
powerful minority from exercising disproportionate influence in the development of the
cryptocurrency projects [Decb]. Contributions are funded as Politeia proposals after they
have been created and recognised by other Contractors (members whose work have been
funded in the past). As a Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO), stakeholders
vote on budgets and policies [Deca].
2.10.1 Proposal Submission and Decision-making
Parties willing to carry out projects that request funds from the treasury submit their
proposals in a transaction that burns 0.1 Decred. Submitted proposals are checked for
validity and invalid proposals are removed by Politeia administrators. Politeia uses trans-
parent censorship to prevent malicious invalidation of proposals. However, this presents
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a potential bottle-neck in the system when the number of proposals grow exponentially.
Voting on any project is triggered by an administrator following authorization by the
proposer and spans 2016 blocks (about 1 week). For approval, at the end of voting a
proposal must get:
• 60\% `Yes' votes and
• Voter turnout of at least 20\%
Once a proposal is approved, the owner can begin execution of the projects and can
claim funds on submission of deliverables and manual verification by Decred Holdings
Group (DHG).
To participate in the voting, stakeholders must lock some Decred in return for a
voting-ticket. After obtaining tickets, it takes 256 blocks (approximately 20 hours) to
become eligible for participation in the voting process. Ticket price is set every 144
blocks (about 12 hours) to maintain a target of about 40,960 total tickets (ticket pool).
Random eligible tickets are selected to vote `Yes' or `No' for proposals. If a ticket holder
misses the voting window (e.g., due to being offline), their tickets become invalid and
their funds returned after voting ends. To avoid missing voting, individual users can
register with Voting Service Providers [Decc] who charge a fee (up to 5\%) for helping
individuals relay their voting choices to the network (through a 1-of-2 multi-signature
script). While VSPs do not have access to ticket funds, they receive voting rewards are
share to parties accordingly. Voters receive some rewards in addition to their locked
funds after voting. Voting tickets selection follows a Poisson distribution with an average
of 28 days before being selected to vote.
2.10.2 Discussion
The Decred approach to funding utilisation enables the DHG to implement useful checks
such as payment of contractors in arrears and verification of milestones of proposals
and projects. Although, data from the Politeia platform are committed to public git
repos and anchored to public the Decred blockchain using its time-stamping application,
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dcrtime, the Decred treasury system relies on trusted parties within its operations, e.g.,
proposal validity check, voting commencement, off-chain voting etc. Thus, potential
problems arising from reliance on trusted party for approval include conflict of interest,
coercion of members, risk of fund treasury fund theft and overall, introduction of a single
point of failure (to a desirably decentralised system).
Heavy reliance on human intervention at every point in the project funding process,
makes the system prone to inefficiencies and subtle attacks and abuse and complicates
the scaling process when there is a large growth in the number of community of users
participating in the process. Furthermore, it is quite difficult to adequately capture or
model the various ways in which users would interact with the system. Thus, making a
thorough security analysis of the system non-trivial.
Furthermore, the Voting Service Providers provide a form of delegated voting, however,
it is reliant on the VSPs to correctly relay user choices to the network (without guarantee
they would relay user's preferences). Within the Decred treasury, the main purpose of
delegation is to sustain user/system liveliness rather than optimisation of skills, experience
and intelligence of `expert' voters in the system. Currently, VSPs control about 37\% of
all tickets in the system (with 12.95\%, the largest held by a single VSP), thereby leading
to potential centralisation risks and overwhelming influence in voting outcomes.
The problem is further exacerbated given that voting ballots are not private, thereby,
potentially leading to voting bandwagon effect [SB96] (where users vote for projects that
are apparently winning regardless of their merit). Other attacks on the voting process
include collusion and coercion due to the open ballot system.
The irregularity of the voting windows (beginning and ending time) and voter ticket
selection/activation makes it complex for individual voters efficiently participate and
track the whole process. Hence, encouraging the participation in VSP's, which in turn
leads to further centralisation of the voting process through VSPs. Moreover, the DHG
relies on off-chain resources thereby introducing external threats to the system.
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2.11 Zcash Governance
Zcash is a privacy-centric proof of work mining-based cryptocurrency that utilises zk-
snark as its fundamental building block. Zcash was founded by the Zero Electric Coin
Company [Zca] and is the organisation responsible for developing the protocols of the
Zcash cryptocurrency. The company serves the interests of founders, investors and
developers of the Zcash coin. 20\% of all block mining rewards are paid to the company
under a scheme termed Founder's rewards.
Through the Zcash Foundation, an independent body from the Zero Electric Coin
Company, community members can propose projects to support the development of Zcash.
Particularly, the Zcash foundation through its GitHub Grant Proposal Page [Fou] requests
community members to submit proposals that fall within the foundation's defined scope,
as well as support the overall mission and vision of the foundation.
The Zcash Foundation Grant runs a quarterly funding cycle. The Zcash foundation
board oversee the process and decides the amount of funds approved towards community-
sponsored projects. During the first month, calls for proposals are released and deadlines
for initial submissions are approximately one month from the date of call for proposals.
Following this, discussions and critiquing of received submissions are then expected
to take place. Final submissions reflecting feedbacks from the discussions are then
expected to be submitted approximately twenty-one days from the initial submissions.
Thereafter, the Zcash Foundation Grant Review Committee review the proposals and
provide funding decisions (which also requires the approval of the Zcash Foundation
Board) in approximately one month.
Payment is made in a single lump sum in the ZEC equivalent of the fiat currency
requested in an approved proposal. As a means of ensuring transparency and future
evaluations, proposers of funded projects are required to provide progress reports six
months after receiving funding. In Q4-2017, only 5 members voted in the round of budget
approval that approved 300 ZEC (approximately \$80, 000) as the amount available for
community-driven projects. Nonetheless, at the board's discretion, it has power to fund
projects in excess of the approved budgeted amount.
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However, there are plans for changes to the funding process since the acceptance of
the Zcsah improvement proposal (ZIP) 1014 4 which directs the funding of Zcash protocol
development and privacy research. Specifically, a Major Grants Review Committee
(MGRC) comprising 5 members who are elected (using a Helios poll) by a `community
advisory panel' 5 assembled by the Zcash Foundation, will now be responsible for
distributing the 8\% grant constituent of the taxation from miners' reward on the Zcash
blockchain.
2.11.1 Proposal Submission and Decision-making
Community members with proposals wishing to be considered for funding need first
to submit an informal detailed description of their proposals (on GitHub). Following
this, based on comments, critiques, suggestions and feedback from other community
members, proposal owners submit a revised formal version of their initial proposals (also
on GitHub). Zcash Foundation Grant Review Committee (5 members) appointed by
Zcash foundation then considers all submitted proposals and decide on the winning
proposals (that receive funding) based on comments and the proposals (or by making
additional consultations where necessary).
Proposal submissions are expected to contain information about the following [Fou]:
Motivation and overview, technical approach, team background and qualification, plan,
security considerations, schedule, budget and justification. The details provided under
each of the listed sections are the basis upon which comments, critiques, and suggestions
are raised before a final proposal submission is made.
Final formal proposal submissions are to be made via attachments to the original
(informal) submissions on the `Zcash Foundation Grants: Call for Proposals'. In summary,
the submission process involves users submitting their proposals, and community members
providing comments, and suggestions for improvements. Proposal files are issues (on
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2.11.2 Funded Proposals
In October 2016, the first funded project was a contest (Zcash Open Source Miner
Challenge ), operated by LeastAuthority.com (a company that supports Zcash Electric
Coin Company), to support projects that would encourage wide and open source mining
of the ZEC in order to further strengthen the Zcash cryptocurrency. \$30, 000 was paid in
rewards to the top 5 winning projects selected by a panel of 3 judges.
The first set of of funding made by the Zcash Foundation (from revenues obtained
from the Founder's rewards) was the award of 33 ZEC each to three recipients under
the `Test Transaction Awards'. This was an award made to three vibrant members of
the Zcash community who have consistently developed tools and solutions that support
Zcash. Following the award, announcement about the launch of the Zcash Foundation
Grant program was made to encourage other community members to participate in the
development of the cryptocurrency whilst taking advantage of available funding.
Although, the process raised awareness about the Zcash Foundation Grant scheme,
the community was not a part of the decision making process in selecting the deserving
members. Similarly, the community also played no part in the process of selecting the
winning proposals of the Zcash Open Miner Challenge.
2.11.3 Discussion
Clearly, the Zcash approach to treasury would not scale for a cryptocurrency with a large
number of proposals to consider. When the Zcash system grows and there are hundreds
of proposal submissions, it is practically infeasible for each member of the Foundation
Grant Review Committee to scrupulously review each proposal to determine its merit
for funding approval. Moreover, relying on a select number of reviewers appointed by a
board (that grants final approval and also determines the amount of funds available for
funding proposals) is not representative of a decentralised, open and inclusive development
system for cryptocurrencies. Clearly, a better and alternative approach would be to
accommodate a larger number of community members (or possibly all willing members)
in the decision-making process.
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Having, a 5 member committee examine all proposals on a decentralised blockchain
system is clearly problematic, particularly considering that the members of the committee
can also submit proposals of their own. For example, in a funding round, one of the
members was unavoidably absent, thereby limiting the team strength to 4. Some proposals
were reviewed by only 3 reviewers due to conflict of interest by one of the review team
members who also submitted a proposal. Note that although the Zcash Calls for Proposals
states that Review committee members must exclude themselves from the discussion of
their own proposals, there are still subtle ways in which a committee member can still
influence their proposals towards getting funded. For instance, a committee member who
has submitted a proposal and has knowledge of the approved budget for proposals, can
deliberately down-vote or negatively review other projects under consideration, such that
total budget request of all approved proposals is less than the available budget. Thereby,
increasing the chances for the acceptance of the member's proposal.
Furthermore, while the feedback process of the initial submission is desirable and helps
the overall quality of proposals submitted to the system, only a limited amount of members
from the large Zcash or cryptocurrency community participate in this process. Definitely,
a system that encourages participation among all community members, such as delegative
democracy (a collaborative decision-making mechanism) represents an improvement over
the approach deployed in the Zcash Foundation Grant process. Another significant
drawback of the funding mechanism of the Zcash Foundation Grant system is the non-use
of the Zcash blockchain at any point in the decision-making process. Funding decisions
on a blockchain-based cryptocurrency should leverage the resources of the blockchain
to improve the decision-making process. For, instance, secure time-stamping of final
proposals, commitment(hashing) of proposal submissions, voting in the decision making
process, tamper-proof `locking' of voting and funding decisions, etc.
Moreover, at any point in future, it is not particularly clear how much money would
be available for funding proposals. In other words, the amount of community-driven
projects or proposals is solely dependent on the approved budget by the foundation board.
Although, the Zcash Foundation Board is empowered to make discretionary approvals
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above a budget for any particular quarter, uncertainty about available budget may inhibit
the amount of development proposals that the community can contribute to the overall
development of the cryptocurrency. Hence, an alternative solution, such as `decentralised
treasury pool' represents a better solution for the system.
In conclusion, the existing system will evolve with time and some of the issues raised
will be addressed towards achieving an improved system. For instance, the establishment
of `Working Groups' for monitoring volunteers/proposers is a proposed addition to the
system. Furthermore, information on the Zcash Foundation Grant GitHub page also
corroborates the suggestion that there are plans to evolve the system into an `open-
community review process'.
2.12 Ethereum Foundation Grants
So far, we have discussed Dash, Decred treasury and other cryptocurrency treasury
systems. Nonetheless, there are cryptocurrencies that do not adopt treasury system.
Therefore, we explore the Ethereum blockchain where much discussion and analysis
revolve around governance system rather than treasury system. Note that a governance
system is not the same as a treasury system, although, both systems support long-term
sustainability of blockchain technologies. Basically, treasury system handles and ensures
regular funding and decision-making on fund usage whereas a governance system is mainly
concerned with general blockchain and protocol rules such as soft-forks and hard-forks.
A governance system guides how and when changes are made to a blockchain's core.
Similar to the Bitcoin Foundation, the Ethereum Foundation is a not-for-profit organ-
isation that supports Ethereum through research, development and education [Woo14].
Like the Bitcoin Foundation, the Ethereum foundation also relies on donations as its
primary source of funding for Ethereum development and research. Basically, the foun-
dation uses donations to support `general' Ethereum development activities. However,
donors can specify specific projects for which their donations can be used for (provided
the foundation supports such projects).
Although, the Ethereum blockchain does not have a treasury system, it supports
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development projects through grants to support research that would improve blockchains.
For example, the programs referred to as subsidy programs were established to support
projects on sharding and layer-two protocols that would improve blockchain scalability.
Teams, researchers, developers, who do relevant work in this area can apply for support
through a process described as `flexible to accommodate various needs of different
applicants'. The Ethereum core leadership is responsible for deciding what proposals are
funded, with funding amounts of \$50, 000 up to \$1 million. Clearly, this encourages open
and community-wide participation, however, the core leadership wields much power in
the decision-making process.
Critics of decentralised governance argue that adaptation of blockchain protocols
to changes is slow on systems with decentralised governance due to the minimum
requirements for approval being high. They argue that decentralisation constitutes the
major point of arguments against existing off-chain or traditional blockchain governance
model. Critics further argue that a side-effect of decentralised on-chain governance is the
ability of a rich minority (with very substantial amount of stake) to have over-bearing
influence on decision-making via a voting process.
Other highlighted criticisms or suggested factors that hinder on-chain voting gover-
nance are low participation (or voter turnout) and unequal wealth distribution. Within
Ethereum, for instance, for Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 186 titled `Reduce
ETH issuance before proof-of-stake' 6, voting was conducted through Carbonvote 7.
With approximately 2.7 million ETH in participation, it had less than 20\% (quorum)
voter turnout 8. Proposal 17 9 with about 10\% of the quorum has the highest voter
turnout of all received proposals on the DAO given about 23, 606 unique Ethereum
addresses holding tokens (DTH - DAO Token Holders) 10 at the time of voting. However,
low-voter turn-out is not peculiar to blockchain voting. According to FairVote, established
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turnout. For instance, only about 55.67\% of eligible voters participated in the 2016 US
presidential elections [KKH+17]. Similarly, the 2015 UK elections recorded about 66.6\%
voter turnout 11.
However, the problem of low voter incentive and low voter turnout can be addressed
through clever incentives engineering, by rewarding participants who take part in elections.
Furthermore, novel voting mechanisms such as liquid democracy mitigate some of the
well-known raised issues that affect traditional voting schemes. For instance, these issues
are addressed by delegative/liquid democracy where users effectively assign their voting
powers to other (better qualified) members of the voting community. Members who
receive delegation usually possess more subject-matter expertise and knowledge, and are
renowned within the ecosystem.
Having explored various fund sourcing and utilisation, i.e. treasury, on selected
cryptocurrencies, following is a presentation of a taxonomy of the different existing
systems into treasury models. Although the proposed ontology for treasury models
is motivated by current solutions found in existing cryptocurrencies, the classification
does extend to cover potential new treasury systems that could be adopted by other
cryptocurrencies.
2.13 Taxonomy of Treasury Models
A key motivation for the classification of treasury systems is to identify their properties,
common and distinguishing features, strengths and weaknesses towards facilitating further
understanding and analysis of the existing diverse groups in real-world cryptocurrencies.
Basically, it is to support the adoption of these systems based on their properties,
applicability and peculiarities of different blockchain technologies. A major overarching
attribute used in the classification of treasury systems is the source of development
funding for projects, as well as the input and contribution of community members of
the cryptocurrency ecosystem (especially, people who hold stake in the system) in the
process of fund utilisation.
11https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/general/
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Specifically, we categorise three main models of treasury systems:
• Open-System Treasury: This class consists of systems where the source of blockchain
development funding are external to the system, e.g, Donations, Patron organi-
sations, industry, founders' resources, etc. Additionally, participation in treasury
activities such as decision-making, proposal submission, proposal review, and project
execution, etc., are open to other members of the cryptocurrency, rather than the
cryptocurrency founders, developers and company only.
• Closed-System Treasury: Under this category, all fund sources are local to the
system, i.e., within/from the cryptocurrency. e.g, minting, taxation, and donations
from stakeholders of the cryptocurrency. Typically, decision-making and cryptocur-
rency development processes are organised in a centralised manner (e.g., by some
organisation) void of input from the general cryptocurrency ecosystem.
• Hybrid-System Treasury: This category of treasury systems represents a combina-
tion of the features of the closed and open-treasury systems. Here, cryptocurrency
development funding comes from sources within the cryptocurrency and from
sources external to the system.
Figure 2.1: Models of Cryptocurrency Treasury Systems.
Deriving from the above-listed treasury models, other concrete sub-classes are highlighted
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below.
• Taxation-Community-Controlled (TCC)
Taxation is the primary source of project funding on TCC treasury systems.
Primarily, funds are obtained by taxing miners' block rewards or block transaction
fees or a combination of both. The Dash governance system is a classic example of
a treasury system within the TCC sub-class because it relies on taxations of 10\% of
block rewards for funding treasury (or fund pool). Decred is another cryptocurrency
that relies on 10\% miners. reward taxation for self-funding of development projects.
Within this sub-class of treasury system, project funding decisions are reached
through the use of community-inclusive mechanisms such as voting. In other words,
funding decisions are made in a decentralised manner (which prevents excessive
centralisation of powers in the hands of a few members). A variety of voting systems
and rules can be adopted for decision-making such as liquid democracy, preferential
voting, plurality voting, approval voting, etc.
• Taxation-Organisation-Controlled (TOC)
TOC like TCC relies on taxation for development/treasury funding. However, unlike
TCC, decisions on how to use funds within the treasury are made in a centralised
manner. Typically, an organisation or group of individuals (usually company
founders or investors) are responsible for making funding decisions, with little or
no input from other members of the cryptocurrency ecosystem or cryptocurrency
stakeholders.
• Donation-Community-Controlled (DCC)
Under DCC, the major source of cryptocurrency development funding comes from
donations. This donation can be obtained from community members, patron or
charitable organisations with interest in the development of a particular blockchain.
For instance, Bitcoin Core receives donations from individuals and corporate
organisations, for carrying out activities that support the continued existence and
growth of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency.
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Similar to TCC, usage of funds within this treasury sub-class is decentralised.
Funding decisions for proposals are made through the use of community-inclusive
mechanisms, thereby supporting collaborative decision making.
• Donation-Organisation-Controlled (DOC)
Within this group of treasury system, funding available for cryptocurrency devel-
opment are sourced from donations. That is, like DCC, DOC treasury systems
are also funded from donations received from charities and corporate bodies or
community members. For example, proposers of projects that support the Mon-
ero cryptocurrency source for funding from donations made by other community
members.
Unlike DCC, DOC treasury decisions are made similarly to that of TOC, i.e.,
centralised funding decision-making.
• Hybrid-Community-Controlled (HCC)
As the name suggests, HCC relies on open and closed (hybrid) funding sources.
Therefore, HCC treasury systems are funded from a combination of sources such as
taxation, minting and donation.
Similar to other community controlled treasury systems, HCC treasury systems
use decentralised decision-making mechanisms to reach funding decisions and
community members of the cryptocurrency are major participants in the treasury
process.
• Hybrid-Organisation-Controlled (HOC)
The source of funding for this sub-class of treasury system is similar to the HCC
sub-class explained above. However, a major difference between the HCC sub-class
of treasury system and the HOC sub-class is the funding decision making process.
Within HCC treasury systems, funding decisions are made in a centralised manner.
In other words, the community members or holders of stake in the cryptocurrency
wield (little or) no power in the decision making process on how funds are used.
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Typically, an organisation responsible for the blockchain or cryptocurrency makes
all the decision regarding usage of funds within the HOC sub-class of treasury
systems.
Table 2.1: Table summarising the various treasury sub-classes based on funding and decision-
making rights.
XXXXXXXXXXXCategory
Feature Funding Decision-making Power
Open Closed Community Organisation
Taxation-Community-Controlled (TCC) \checkmark \checkmark 
Taxation-Organisation-Controlled (TOC) \checkmark \checkmark 
Donation-Community-Controlled (DCC) \checkmark \checkmark 
Donation-Organisation-Controlled (DOC) \checkmark \checkmark 
Hybrid-Community-Controlled (HCC) \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark 
Hybrid-Organisation-Controlled (HOC) \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark 
2.14 Electronic voting systems
Election systems can be deployed wherever there is a need to vote e.g., student union elec-
tion, general board meetings, parliamentary elections, etc. and the security, auditability,
and verifiability requirements largely depend on the system uses-case. Conceivably, the
requirements for a national election are more stringent than the election of executives of
a local student organisation at a university. The introduction of punched-card ballots in
the 1960\prime s and direct-recording electronic voting machines in the 1970\prime s [Jon03] signalled
the revolution towards the use of technology in elections and eventually Internet voting
(e-voting) as we know it today.
Chaum in [Cha82] mentioned how his techniques for anonymous communication can
be adapted for private e-voting systems. Chaum's solution for pseudonymous sending
and receipt of massages enabled the cryptographic design of voting schemes. In addition
to Chaum in [Cha82,Cha88], Yao in [Yao82], Benaloh in [Ben87] pioneered the earliest
cryptographic voting schemes. Burmester and Magkos in [BM03] provided a classification
of e-voting systems in the literature into four main models while Damgard et. al [DGS03]
provided a classification with three main models by combining the techniques of two
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models (mix-nets and blind signatures) into one. Following is a brief description of the
models.
1) The mix-net model : Voting schemes under this model use several connected
servers called mixes [Cha81, SK95, OA00] to provide unlinkable permuted encrypted
ballots as outputs, from encrypted input ballots. Essentially, mix servers produce
ciphertexts from input ciphertexts in a random manner with knowledge of the permutation
(needed to match input ciphertexts to output ciphertexts) [JCJ05] known to the servers
only [BG02]. Multiple rounds of shuffling and decryption by independent mixers is
critical to ensure unlinkability between inputs and outputs of the mix-nets and therefore
require vast amounts of computation [Fur04]. Examples of e-voting systems under this
model are [PIK93,SK95,HS00,JJR02,Nef01,BG02,FMS10]. Despite their well-established
universal verifiability property, mix-nets rely on trusted servers and mixing operations
can become prohibitively time consuming [SP06].
2) The blind signatures model : Voting schemes under this model use blind signatures,
first proposed by Chaum in [Cha82] for secure untraceable payments (and anonymous
communication), to provide unlinkability between voters and ballots through a validator
that blindly signs encrypted ballots. Subsequently, voters unblind the signatures and
send encrypted ballots and the `new' signatures to a voting authority, who in turn posts
same to a bulletin board. Anonymous channels e.g. mix-nets, are used to transmit
unblinded ballots to the tallying authority to protect voter privacy. Ensuring that
the authority learns nothing about the ballot [DGS03]. A bulletin board is basically
a public broadcast channel with memory [CGS97, SP06] for communication among
voters and voting authorities. This model heavily relies on a honest validator (although
can be distributed using threshold cryptography), and substantial multiple rounds of
communication between voters, voting authority and the bulletin board. Additionally,
ballots are decrypted by the voting authority and tally is posted to the bulletin board.
Malicious validators can compromise the security and correctness of voting results by
impersonating valid absentee voters [CC97]. Examples of e-voting schemes other this
model include [FOO92,OMA+99,GPZ17,Oka97,PHM95].
55
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work Electronic voting systems
3) The Benaloh's model : Unlike the blind signature model, voting schemes under
the Benaloh model utilise n > 1 voting authorities. Under this model voters share their
ballots (votes) among n authorities using a homomorphic secret sharing scheme [Cha04],
and post encryption of the shares under the public key of the recipient voting authority
to a bulletin board. Essentially, ballots are `verifiably secret shared' among the authority
servers responsible for tally computation. A t-out-n homomorphic secret sharing is used
to achieve robustness such that any number of authorities less than t have no information
about a user's ballot. At the end of voting, the set of voting authorities can jointly
compute the tally without leaking any additional information. However, there is high
communication overhead under for voting schemes under this model. This is as a result
of each voter sharing/casting their votes across n multiple channels for the n voting
authorities [BM03]. Consequently, this introduces significant practical limitations due
to its complexity and high communication overhead because it requires every voter to
communicate with every authority in an election. Examples of schemes under this model
include [Ben87,CF85,Sch99].
4) The homomorphic encryption model : Under this model, additive homomorphic
encryption algorithms such as lifted ElGamal [Elg85] or Paillier [Pai99] are used to achieve
universal verifiability and individual ballot privacy. Voting schemes under this model focus
on hiding the ballot content (through encryption) rather than voter identity or anonymous
voting channels, thereby enabling easy verifiability [LGT+03]. Further details on lifted
ElGamal encryption is provided in Subsection 2.2.2. Typically, users encrypt their ballots
(choice) with the public key of a voting authority (or authorities - where threshold
cryptography [Des94] is used), and post the ciphertexts to a bulletin board. A user's
choice is represented by a number [CGS97,DGS03], usually, a 1 signifying a yes/support or
0 or  - 1 signifying a no/against vote. In addition to the encrypted ballots, users also post a
proof of validity of the corresponding content (plaintext) from which the encrypted ballot
was produced. In other words, voters must prove (in zero-knowledge) that the ciphertexts
contain valid ballots (a 0, 1 or  - 1), in addition to proving their eligibility to vote. The
election authorities obtain the tally by combining (multiplying) individual ciphertexts
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(encrypted ballots) without needing to decrypt individual encrypted ballots. Examples
of schemes under this model include [BT94, CGS97, BFP+01, DJ01, Adi08, KMNV16].
Particularly, this thesis is related to the homomorphic encryption model which is discussed
in more details in the rest of this section.
Damgard et al. [DGS03] summarise informal security properties of e-voting systems.
Namely, privacy requires that only final results are released or leaked; robustness ensures
that all valid ballots are considered in tally computation; universal verifiability enables
anyone to verify correctness of results; receipt freeness prevents voters from proving how
they voted and address vote buying; coercion prevents an adversary from forcing voters
to vote a in a certain way. Mitrou et al. in [MGKQ03,MGK02] identified that secrecy
is a requirement for voter freedom and expression. Secrecy, essentially the inability to
link a ballot to a voter, is a distinctive tenet and requirement of a free political decision-
making system and modern democracy. Lambrinoudakis et al. in [LGT+03] provided
a list of requirements for voting systems: accuracy, democracy (eligibility), privacy,
robustness, verifiability, uncoercibility, fairness, and verifiable participation (in some
scenarios). Elections are critical to democratic systems because they allow the general
public express their views [KAK18]. Therefore, the process should be transparent and
voters and auditors alike should be convinced of the outcomes. Hence, the requirement
for end-to-end verifiability (E2E-V).
Verifiability covers mechanisms for auditing an election to ensure that it was correctly
conducted [LGT+03]. It can be provided in two different forms: a) Universal or public
verifiability first introduced by Sako and Kilian in [SK95] through the assumption of
physically untappable communication channels between mixing centers and voters, for
extending the mix-net based construction of Park et al. [PIK93] (which only provides
individual verifiability. Universal verifiability covers the requirement that anyone can
verify the correctness of the outcome of an election. b) Individual verifiability covers the
requirement that every voter can verify their ballot has been correctly accounted for in
the election outcome.
In the literature, only few cryptographic e-voting protocols are provably secure [BM03].
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Multiple research [KSRW04, FHF07, WWH+10, SFD+14] reveal security vulnerabili-
ties that compromise integrity of some early e-voting systems. Burmester [BM03]
highlights the need for secure and efficient cryptographic techniques for e-voting pro-
tocols. Consequently, newer voting schemes with E2E-V property have been devel-
oped [Cha04, Nef04, AM16]. However, there are no UC-secure decentralised decision-
making system.
Given the identified vulnerabilities from analysis of earlier e-voting systems [KSRW04,
FHF07], E2E-V e-voting schemes such as [Cha04,Adi08,Ben06] were proposed to address
the concerns. A comprehensive review of end-to-end-verifiable voting protocols is provided
in [AM16]. The work in [JMP13] provides a high-level survey of verifiability and privacy
in e-voting systems. Sampigethaya et al. in [SP06] proposed a framework and a set
of metrics for comparing properties of e-voting systems. Cortier et al. in [CGK+16]
provides a survey of several notions of verifiability in the literature.
2.14.1 End-to-end Verifiability
The importance of end-to-end verifiability (E2E-V) in electronic voting has been widely
established in electronic voting literature. Primarily, voters in any election deserve to be
convinced of the correctness of the outcome. Notably, election schemes with E2E-V allow
individual voters or interested parties (universal) check crucial parts of election tally
without the requirement of trusting any entity in the system [BRR+15]. That is, E2E-V
election systems provide mechanisms for voters and external auditors to verify election
outcomes and that all valid votes were counted even if devices/servers/election authorities
are malicious [CGK+16]. Benaloh et al. [BRR+15] suggests E2E-V technologies as
pre-requisites to mitigate inherent risks associated with e-voting systems and a strong
security requirement for adoption of e-voting systems [PKRV10,KZZ15b]. The two main
techniques/checks for E2E-V are votes are cast as intended and votes are tallied as cast.
Recorded as cast is an additional technique that is also found in literature [KZZ15b].
Together, these techniques ensure voters can get evidence that their encrypted ballots
reflect their choices by checking for their ballots on a `public bulletin board' [BRR+15],
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and verifying that the election tally includes all valid ballots on the public list. Moreover,
`homomorphic encryption' for tallying without first decrypting individual ballots, and
`verifiable mixing' for permuting and unlinking ballots with voters' identity before ballot
decryption, are the two approaches for achieving the tallied as recorded requirement.
To achieve E2E-V some voting schemes allow users to generate multiple ballots and
submit only one for the tally process. The remainder of the ballots are used as challenge
ballots (Benaloh challenge) to verify that the ballots encryptions match the voter's
intention. The Helios [Adi08] voting system uses the Benaloh challenge or `audit or
cast' procedure [KZZ15a] to achieve verifiability, while Wombat voting system [BFL+12]
and StarVote [BBE+13] combines the approach with paper trail audit mechanism for
verification. The scheme in [BPW12] is a Helios variant in the single-pass voting model
of [BCP+16] that provides formal guarantees of ballot privacy.
[PKRV10] proposed the first formal performance requirements-based definition for
E2E-V elections instead of design requirements-based definition. The requirements are
largely similar to those previously explained in [BRR+15]. Popoveniuc et al. identified
the following six checks as conditions any E2E-V election must satisfy. 1) Presented
ballots are well-formed 2) Cast ballots are well-formed 3) Ballots are recorded as cast 4)
Ballots are tallied as recorded 5) Consistency in ballots recorded and ballots tallied and
6) Every ballot is subjected to Check 3.
Pr\^et \`a Voter [CRS05] uses a paper-based system to achieve E2E-V with two-part
ballot and permuted order of candidates (that differs from one ballot to another), and uses
a mix-net for the tally process involving the permutation seeds. Xia et al. in [XSHT08]
analysed a Pallier encryption variant of [CRS05] and demonstrate that voter's choices
can be leaked in certain scenarios. PunchScan [PH10] is also an E2E-V e-voting scheme
that also combines a paper-based (two-stacked sheet of papers) mechanism.
Furthermore, Scratch\&Vote [AR06] is also a paper-based scheme and uses a ballot
style similar to [CRS05] but adds 2D bar code representing encryption of all possible
user voter's choice. It uses a homomorphic scheme for tallying of encrypted ballots.
Scantegrity II [CCC+08] extends Scantegrity [CEC+08] originally introduced by
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Chaum et al. which requires physically locating ballots for dispute resolution. It uses an
optical scan ballot with symbols in invisible ink. The ballots reveal a code (receipt which
is then publicly published) when marked that users can look up to verify the inclusion of
their ballot. Tally is produced using a two-mix scheme similar to PunchScan [PKRV10].
For its security, Scantegrity II requires trusted computing platform for election officials
and secure chain-of-custody for paper ballots prior to voting. Helios is a general Benaloh-
challenege based E2E-V scheme that uses homomorphic tallying of encrypted ballots.
The E2E-V schemes of Remotegrity/Scantegrity [ZCC+13] rely on randomness beacon
to verify correctness of result. Therefore, a biased beacon can compromise the integrity
of the system [KZZ15b]. Cortier et al. in [CS11] successfully compromised ballot privacy
in Helios using ballot replay attacks, and also proposed a countermeasure for the attack.
Gardner et al. in [GGR09] explored coercion in end-to-end voting protocols and
proposed a provably coercion-resistant scheme which extends Benaloh's scheme [Ben06]
by asking voters an additional question. However, the proposed scheme relies on a private
channel, and that for every election, at least one of the candidates is honest.
Neff [Nef04] introduced a coercion-resistant universally verifiable voting protocol that
utilises a receipt to enable any voter verify that their ballots are cast and recorded as
intended in the election tally. Chaum [Cha04] introduced a voter-verifiable e-voting
scheme (even in the presence of compromised election computers/records) that also
utilises physical receipts. Both schemes rely on the temporal availability or destruction of
some information. Karlof et al. [KSW05] identified possible methods to leak vote privacy
in the schemes of [Nef04, Cha04] which are the first e-voting schemes to allow voter's
verify their ballots without computational devices.
Kelsey et al. in [KRMC10] introduced methods for carrying out coercion attacks on
paper-based E2E-V e-voting systems such as [PH10,CRS05]. The authors also show how
to alter election results using misprinting attack with a countermeasure that requires
trusting a number of election observers.
Civitas [CCM08] achieves verifiability and coercion-resistance by allowing voters to
produce fake voting credentials used for generating ballots that are eventually deleted
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with a coercer not being able to detect. This requires the availability of an untappable
channel between a voter and one registration teller, and Civitas also requires anonymous
channel for voters to cast their votes for coercion-resistance.
Kiayias et al. introduced `DEMOS' in [KZZ15b], the first E2E-V and voter privacy
e-voting system in the standard model. Previous E2E-V systems such as [Adi08,ZCC+13]
rely on setup assumptions for their E2E-V. However, DEMOS also rely on the existence
of a bulletin board and a central election authority, and does not guarantee the recorded
as cast requirement [CZZ+16].
DEMOS-2 [KZZ15a] was introduced to address the heavy computation and storage
overload on the election authority, that arises from the pre-computation of multiple
ballot ciphertexts for each voter in an election. In DEMOS-2, voters generate their
ballot ciphertexts with associated non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs using
a common reference string (CRS) that is produced and proven secure by the election
authority.
To address the problem of single points of failure that affects prior e-voting sys-
tems [CRS05,PH10,CEC+08,BBE+13,CGS97,CCM08,Nef04,Cha04,KZZ15b], Chondros
et al. introduced D-DEMOS [CZZ+16]. For example, a common feature of e-voting sys-
tems is to assume the existence of a trusted public bulletin board [MSH17] such as Helios'
bulletin board. D-DEMOS is the first distributed end-to-end verifiable e-voting system
and it utilises a distributed bulletin board for election process verification. The scheme
depends on the honesty of a strong majority of election trustees who are responsible for
vote tallying, to guarantee privacy and E2E-V. Further, this scheme relies on a trusted
Election Authority (EA) at setup which is subsequently destroyed after it initializes all
other system components. Moreover, the scheme, like the other schemes explored, does
support delegable voting.
Next, we discuss some delegable voting scheme in the literature. Kulyk et
al. in [KMNV16] provides details about e-voting systems that are variants of He-
lios [CGGI14,CGGI13, KTV15,DvdGdSA12,CGG19] and introduced proxy voting to
Helios. This was done by using so-called delegation credentials to ensure proxies have
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authorisation to vote on behalf of a delegator. However, the scheme requires voters to
construct and anonymously send delegation tokens to delegates, who submit the tokens
and delegated votes. In essence, the delegate casts the vote on behalf of the delegator,
and the delegate may cast no vote at all [KMNV16]. Although, the authors provide a
back-up delegation option (a delegate assigned a lower priority) in case the main delegate
does not cast any vote. However, this implies that the voter has to generate multiple
delegation tokens and send to multiple delegates in an anonymised way. In addition
to the assumption of anonymous channels between voters and proxies (delegates), the
security of the system rely on the trustworthiness of the registration authority.
Zwattendorfer et al. in [ZHT13] proposed a proxy voting (based on liquid democracy)
system that relies on physical device (Austrian citizen card and associated eID) to
address the security issues with implementations of proxy voting systems. The authors
proposed two methods for vote delegation. Namely, server-based delegation (offline)
where voters encodes the delegation information similar to a ballot and client-based
delegation (online/manual) where voters copy the ballots of proxies. However, the
scheme requires strong assumptions to guarantee the security properties. For example,
the reliance on a Ballot Signer to authenticate voters constitutes a single point of failure.
Further, no formal proofs of security is provided to support the system claims and some
of the cryptographic components are unspecified.
The authors in [KNM+17] proposed a coercion-resistant proxy voting scheme which
builds on techniques of [JCJ05, CCM08] but requires additional delegation credential
that a voter, who wants to delegate their voting power, will send to their chosen proxy.
The coercion resistant property is claimed from the voter's ability to fake delegation
credentials (similar to voting credentials in the original schemes) However, there are no
formal proofs of secure delegation nor instantiation of the proposed scheme.
Unlike previous works, we designed and implemented the first provably secure
blockchain-based delegable voting scheme (i.e. that supports liquid democracy). We
extend the initial scheme to support privacy-preserving voting on blockchains with pri-
vate stake. These schemes are at the core of our proposed treasury system presented in
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Chapter 3 and general decision-making system in Chapter 4 respectively.
2.15 Blockchain voting and Governance
This section provides context on blockchain voting and governance in the academic
literature. A number of recent blockchain-based voting systems in the literature such as
[AmGMA20,KJ20] mainly discuss and leverage blockchains' distributed architecture as an
alternative to a trusted bulletin board. However, many of the claims from cryptographic
primitives are not instantiated and security analysis are missing. A survey of blockchain-
based e-voting systems in the literature and industry is detailed in [AKW19], and also
confirms the gap in literature of a provably secure blockchain-based delegable voting
system that supports liquid democracy with end-to-end verifiability.
Khan et al. in [KAK18] leverages the distributed ledger architecture of blockchains
and introduced a blockchain-based voting scheme based on [Rya08] and the Multichain12
blockchain platform. Their proposal mainly leverages the hash of voting transactions
to claim verifiability of elections. Moreover, the scheme does not support private proxy
voting and provides no formal treatment of the system security properties.
Hjalmarsson et al. in [HHHH18] evaluated the application of blockchain to e-voting
and proposed a private permissioned blockchain-based e-voting system that utilises smart
contracts. The introduced scheme requires electronic ID authentication.
Corry et al. in [MSH17] proposed The Open Vote Network, the first implementation
of a self-tallying (allowing any party to compute the tally) e-voting protocol (The Open
Vote Network) with voter privacy. The self-tallying procedure is susceptible to abortive
attacks which is addressed through a fund deposit (lock) and deposit paradigm. The
Open Vote network has a safe upper limit of about 50 voters [HHHH18] because all the
computations are performed on the smart contract [SGY20].
The need to securely evolve and develop blockchains has caused considerable interest
in blockchain governance among the community (of stakeholders), industry and in the
literature. Primarily, blockchain governance focuses on decision rights, accountability and
12https://www.multichain.com/
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incentives [LLZ+21] for the evolution (adaptability) and improvement of (the operations
of) blockchain. In other words, it covers participants, their powers, roles, rewards
(or penalties) and responsibilities. It covers how the different entities collaborate to
reach decisions that affects (maintain or change) the blockchain [CDP19]. Blockchain
governance covers how community members can provide authoritative decisions on
changes to blockchain that require human intervention [MARP20]. Governance is critical
for sustainable development and evolution of cryptocurrency systems [FCZ20].
Expectedly, research efforts have been focused on decentralised governance solutions
due to the decentralised architecture of blockchains. Some of the issues covered under
governance include, decisions of block size, consensus protocol (Proof-of-Work vs Proof-
of-Stake), etc.
DiRose et al. in [DM18] analysed the governance process of the Bitcoin and Dash
blockchains on the issue of increasing block size using the so-called Governance Analytical
Framework of [Huf11]. It investigated why Dash was able to receive approval for increasing
block size to 2MB in 24 hours while Bitcoin spent years without reaching a resolution.
Similar to the work in [KN+], Mosley et al. in [MPG+20] also analysed blockchain
governance through an exploration of the Dash governance system and explored the
possibility of collusion among masternodes, hence measure decentralisation in the voting
process by constructing a similarity matrix based on voting patterns of the masternodes.
The authors identified large clusters of similar voting patterns with more votes than the
decentralised majority. The open ballot of the voting system only serves to exacerbate
the problem because it makes it easy for a coercer to verify how masternodes voted.
Merrill et al. in [MARP20] proposed a voting scheme for updating blockchain-based
protocols that allows clients to vote by temporarily locking their tokens. The economic
cost to voting is used for gauging support for proposals in a so-called ping-pong governance
model that involves voting and counter-voting (or voting to veto outcome). This is to
allow minor changes pass easily and complex ones eventually pass. However, this can
result in an indefinite cycle of voting and counter-voting review periods. Moreover, voting
is neither private nor fair because new voters can see partial (current) tallies based on
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the choices of other voters, before they submit their own votes.
Baudlet et al. in [BFTK20] proposed the use of masternodes similar to Dash, but
allows nodes to reduce locked stake over a period of time, to accommodate other users
without much funds (compared to the current masternode requirements). It introduced
Importance score that can grant `honorary masternode' status to influential blockchain
nodes and enable them participate in governance. However, this proposal does not
address the privacy issues of the voting scheme. Moreover, there is no instantiation of
the proposed scheme nor the importance score algorithm as confirmed by the authors in
the paper.
Furthermore, Fan et al. proposed Multav [FCZ20] a multi-chain voting framework
for blockchain governance on new blockchains that distributes tokens to stakeholders
of other blockchains, to enable them vote on the new blockchain. The main aim is to
protect new cryptocurrencies that adopt on-chain governance from attack by wealthy
adversaries, due to their small market cap and initial circulating supply.
Zachariadis et al. [ZHS19] provides an exploration of issues surrounding blockchains to
enable better understanding of distributed governance of blockchain technology especially
as it relates to financial services. Smit et al. [SeMS+20] provides a literature review on
decision rights on blockchain governance and proposed a blockchain life-cycle model for
better understanding blockchain governance and decision rights. Additionally, Ziolkowski
et al. [ZMS20] provides a comprehensive analysis of governance of blockchain systems
through identification of decision problems to enable better understanding. Finally,
Liu et al. in [LLZ+21] provide a systematic literature review for understanding the
state-of-the-art on blockchain governance.
Unlike previous works, the system proposed in Chapter 4 is a useful solution to
support the process of reaching decisions that are necessary to evolve and upgrade the
blockchain itself, given the established need for blockchains (and software or technology
in general) to continually evolve throughout their life-cycles. Moreover, as far as we
know, it is the first UC-secure distributed voting scheme for private stake blockchains
that support liquid democracy. However, we emphasise that while the solution can be
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adapted to other use cases, it is not a solution for general (national/state) governance
through blockchains. Rather, it is a tool to support the development or evolution of the
blockchain itself.
2.16 Summary
This chapter explored sustainability of funding and fund utilisation for blockchains. It
examined different sources of blockchain funding, investigated real-world cryptocurrencies
with self-sustenance and community-inclusive development mechanisms, and introduced
a categorisation of treasury system models. Within blockchain research and practice,
there is increasing interest in treasury systems and increasing adoption among real-world
cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies such as Dash, that deploy treasury systems have
benefited from its adoption e.g., through community participation in cryptocurrency
development, minimising operational centralisation, and avoidance of forks from dispute
on development issues etc.
Although treasury systems constitute interesting solution to sustainable blockchain
funding, they require careful design and analysis to avoid problems that will hinder
their utility. Notably, utmost consideration should be given to source of treasury
funds, management of funds, decision-making (e.g., voting rule and systems such as
liquid democracy, receipt-free voting), partitionary budgeting, usability, security and
privacy, incentives for stakeholders, game-theoretic analysis, cryptocurrency inflation and
blockchain (resource) utilisation.
Despite the benefit witnessed from early adoption of variants of the treasury system,
these systems experience a number of issues e.g. ad-hoc, lack of incentives, insecure/non-
private balloting. Thus, affecting improved adoption and success of pioneering treasury
systems. Some of these issues include inadequate design analysis, security, privacy and
game-theoretic analysis and `incentivisation' of the systems prior to development and
deployment [KNS+16]. Evidently from the reviewed earlier systems, it is clear that they
were created in an ad-hoc fashion and changes were made as the systems mature. That is,
the systems are not secure by design and provide little to no analysis of overall security
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goals and requirements. Thus, we present our solution, covering these gaps, in Chapter 3.
Further, we provide a description of research work in the literature around e-voting
systems, blockchain-based voting and governance. These are related concepts at the
core of our proposed blockchain treasury system for cryptocurrencies and the extended
privacy-preserving system of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. The exploration
of the literature establishes the trend from early e-voting systems towards end-to-end
verifiable systems, and blockchain-based voting systems. Further, the exploration of
literature helps us to establish the research gap of a provably (UC) secure blockchain-
based (decentralised) decision-making system that supports delegable voting (liquid
democracy). The presentations in the next chapter addresses this gap in literature and
also fulfils our second objective from Section 1.2, an important step towards answering
the main research questions of this thesis.
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A Collaborative Blockchain Treasury
System
This chapter elaborates on the design and development of our provably secure treasury
system for cryptocurrencies. The system enables community-inclusive collaborative
intelligence gathering and supports incentivised participation and delegative voting
(liquid democracy). Liquid democracy, also known as delegative democracy [For02], is
a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy that aims to provide the
benefits of both types of democracy [GA15] by enabling organisations to take advantage
of skilled experts in a voting process. Mainly, liquid democracy enhances choice of
voters by distributing voting power, assist voters in their decision, improve systems of
proportional representation and scale direct democracy through specialisation [For20].
Moreover, it lowers participation cost and optimise attention budgets of participants in a
decision-making system.
A treasury system is a community-controlled and decentralized collaborative decision-
making mechanism for sustainable funding of blockchain development and maintenance.
The Dash governance system (DGS), Zcash [Fou] and Decred [Decb] are real-world
examples of treasury systems. For the first time, we provide a rigorous design of the
treasury system that is compatible with most existing blockchain infrastructures, such as
Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. because it mainly requires the blockchain to support payment
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transactions. At the core of the proposed treasury system is a distributed universally
composable secure end-to-end verifiable voting protocol.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 introduces the research
presented in the chapter by providing pertinent background, motivates the presentation in
this chapter and summarises main contributions. The main contributions are provided in
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses relevant cryptographic concepts, tools and abstractions
useful to the cryptographic schemes, algorithms and protocols that are used by the
treasury system. Section 3.4 details relevant zero-knowledge proofs and constructions
required to ensure parties honestly follow the protocol. Section 3.5 discusses the designed
treasury system and its features such as entities in the system, incentive mechanism,
funding sources, decision-making, etc.
Finally, Section 3.6 details the modeling of the voting scheme adopted in the treasury
system and Section 3.7 details the novel unit vector zero knowledge proof with logarithmic
communication. Note that, we defer the analysis of security the voting protocol of the
treasury system, implementation and performance to Chapter 5.
3.1 Overview
Absence of a centralized control over the operation process is a desirable key feature
expected of blockchains in general and cryptocurrencies in particular [AMM18,GKCC14]
i.e. blockchain solutions should neither rely on `trusted parties or powerful minority' for
their operations, nor introduce such (centralisation) tendencies into blockchain systems.
Decentralization help eliminates single point of failure and offers better security guarantees
and also enables enhanced user privacy techniques.
Real-world cryptocurrencies require steady funding for continuous development and
maintenance of the systems. Accordingly, their maintenance and developmental funding
should also be void of centralization. Therefore, secure and `community-inclusive' long-
term sustainability of funding and fund utilisation offers an avenue to fulfil this goal
towards ensuring the robustness of blockchains.
In the early years of blockchain development, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin,
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mainly rely on patron organizations and donations. Recently, an increasing number of
cryptocurrencies are funded through initial coin offering (ICO) -- a popular crowd-funding
mechanism to raise money for the corresponding startups or companies.
A major drawback of donations and ICOs is that they lack sustainable funding supply.
Consequently, they are not suitable as long-term funding sources for cryptocurrency
development due to the difficulty of predicting the amount of funds needed (or that will be
available) for future development and maintenance. Alternatively, some cryptocurrency
companies, such as Zcash Electric Coin Company, take certain percentage of hair-
cut/tax (founders reward) from the miners' reward. This approach would provide the
companies a more sustainable funding source for long-term planning of the cryptocurrency
development.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned development funding approaches have risks of
centralization in terms of decision-making on the development steering. Only a few
people (in the organisation or company) participate in the decision-making process on
how the available funds will be used. However, the decentralized architecture of blockchain
technologies makes it inappropriate to have a centralized control of the funding for secure
development processes. Sometimes disagreement among the organisation members may
lead to catastrophic consequences. Examples include the splitting of Ethereum to
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic and Bitcoin to Bitcoin and Bitcoin cash.
Ideally, all cryptocurrency stakeholders are entitled to participate in the decision-
making process on funding allocation. This democratic type of community-inclusive
decentralized decision-making enables a better collaborative intelligence due to the
optimisation of expertise and voter effort and time within the community. The concept
of treasury system has been raised to facilitate blockchain stakeholder participation in
decision-making [KNS+16,Fou,Decb,ZOB19,ZB18].
A treasury system is a community controlled and decentralized collaborative decision-
making mechanism for sustainable funding of the underlying blockchain development
and maintenance. The core component of a treasury system is a decision-making system
that allows members of the community collectively reach some resolution. During each
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treasury period, anyone can submit a proposal for projects to be funded. Due to shortage
of available funds, only a few of them can be supported. Therefore, a collaborative
decision-making mechanism is required.
The Dash governance system [DD14] is a real-world example of of such a system.
A treasury system consists of iterative treasury periods. During each treasury period,
project proposals are submitted, discussed, and voted for; top-ranked projects are then
funded. Earlier forms of treasury systems do not offer ballot privacy to voters [Dasb,
KNS+16,Decb,Fou], thereby conceivably adversely impacting soundness of any funding
decision due to risk of participant coercion. Moreover, they fail to effectively and efficiently
aggregate and optimise expertise within the community in the decision-making process.
This is due to the system only supporting basic type of voting schemes and limitation of
voting power (thus effective contribution) of experts within the systems. Furthermore, for
efficiency, these systems typically allow only a random subset of stakeholders, e.g. Decred
Pi, masternodes in DGS, to participate in treasury decision-making process, thereby
disenfranchising other community members.
In our treasury system, we put forward a different approach -- liquid democracy -- to
achieve better collaborative intelligence. Liquid democracy (also known as delegative
democracy [For02]) is a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy that
enables organisations to take advantage of experts in a treasury voting process by
supporting vote delegation, as well as giving the stakeholders the opportunity to directly
vote. For each project, a voter can either vote directly or delegate his/her voting power
to an expert who is knowledgeable and renowned in the corresponding area. Delegation
and ballot is private and voters and experts vote simultaneously, thereby eliminating
coercion risks and vote-buying.
In the literature, a few blockchain based e-voting schemes have been proposed [Dasb,
Dem17,McC16,nVo17,Ago18,LJEK16]. Some major differences between our treasury
system voting scheme and other e-voting schemes include:
• Conventional e-voting scheme requires real-world identity authentication while our
treasury decision-making do not need to link voters to their real identities.
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• Typically, each voter has one vote, while in our treasury decision-making, the voting
power is proportional to the corresponding stake.
• Our treasury decision-making supports liquid democracy with ballot privacy as-
surance, while, as far as we know, no other e-voting scheme can support liquid
democracy with provable security.
Proper selection of the voting scheme allows maximizing the number of voters satisfied
by the voting results as well as minimizing voters' effort required to study and adequately
analyse the issues being voted on. However, in practice, there are two widely used voting
schemes [KN+]:
• preferential or ranked voting
• approval voting
An extension of approval voting is the `Yes-No-Abstain' voting, where voters express
`Yes/No/Abstain' opinion for each proposal. Recent theoretical analysis of this election
rule with variable number of winners, called Fuzzy threshold voting [KKN+], shows
advantages of this voting scheme for treasury system application. These benefits include
simplicity, ease of understanding and result interpretation, election of more moderate
candidates [BF78, KKN+]. Furthermore, it guarantees that the Condorcet winner is
always a member of the winning set of proposals/candidates. Therefore, we adopt this
voting scheme in our treasury system. Nevertheless, we emphasize our treasury system
can adopt a different voting scheme with minimal changes to the underlying cryptographic
protocols.
Next, we provide a high level description of the basic protocol, covering the core
techniques and algorithms used.
3.1.1 Basic Protocol
Here, we provide a high-level description of the stake-weighted delegable voting scheme
at the core of our treasury system detailed in Section 3.5. For simplicity, without the
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loss of generality, this description covers the main processes in the pre-voting, voting and
post-voting stages by using an example treasury period with a single proposal.
Pre-voting: At the beginning of the treasury period, a proposer submits a
transaction with details of a proposal to support the blockchain. The proposal transaction
mainly covers the an identifier for the proposal, the amount of funds requested, and the
payment address for the proposal (if successful at the end of voting). Expectedly, these
transactions cost some coins to prevent denial of service attacks.
After the proposal submission process, intending participants (voters, experts, and
voting committee members) in the election process of the treasury system register to
participate in the voting process. Voters are stakeholders who deposit stake (corresponding
to their voting power) to partake in the election process while experts are a special
subset of voters that can receive delegation from other voters in the voting process.
The registration transaction mainly covers the participant's role, the amount of the
participant's deposited stake, and the return address for payment of voting rewards.
Voting: In the voting stage, the voting committee is selected using a procedure
that can be abstracted as follows. Potential committee members combine a seed with





The digest of the hash computation is compared with a system defined threshold T and
users are qualified as voting committee members by submitting registration transactions
that confirm they are able to satisfy the condition. See Subsection 3.5.4 for a complete
description of the voter committee selection. Consequently, the voting committee members
jointly generate the election public key to be used for encrypting unit-vector ballots in
the election. We adopt the distributed key generation (DKG) protocol of [GJKR99],
which uses a (t,n)-threshold verifiable secret sharing and can withstand the corruption of
less than half of the committee members. The public key is used to encrypt ballots and
the election tally is decrypted using partial decryption shares of the voting committee
members. Full details of the protocol is provided in Subsection 3.3.2.
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Following voter/expert registration and committee selection, we briefly describe the
ballot casting process for voters and experts. We adopt the ElGamal discrete-log problem
based cryptosystem due to its homomorphic property.
Specifically, for an election process involving m experts, a voter's ballot is an element-
wise encryption of a unit-vector of size m+ 3. Conceptually, this means that a ballot is a
length m + 3 `concatenation' of individual encryptions of either 0 or 1, where only one
position contains 1. In essence, the position of 1 in the individual encryptions indicate
whether a ballot is a delegation (positions 1 to m) or a direct vote (positions m + 1 to
position m + 3). The voter ballot is depicted in fig. 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1: A treasury system voter ballot with m experts.
However, the length of unit vector ballots for experts in the voting process is 3. That
is, representing a direct vote of yes, no, or abstain depending on the position of 1 in the
unit vector. To guarantee that ballots of voters and experts alike are formed correctly,
they must be accompanied by zero-knowledge proofs (cf. Section 3.7). These proofs are
necessary to prevent cheating because ballots are tallied homomorphically, i.e. without
first decrypting them. We provide more formal description of the ballot and voting
procedures in Subsection 3.6.4.
Post-Voting : At the end of voting, the voting committee members jointly compute
the voting tally. Essentially, the tally is a two-step process. In the first step, the delegation
section of voters' ballots are parsed and homomorphically added to obtain the (encryption
of ) total number of delegations received by individual experts as shown in fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: First step of the ballot tally process showing the homomorphic addition of the
delegations received by individual experts
Following the delegation summation, the voting committee jointly decrypt the dele-
gations ciphertexts to reveal the delegation received by each expert. In the next step,
the latter part of voter ballots (m + 1, m + 2, m + 3) signifying direct voting, is homo-
morphically added to the ballots the m experts to obtain the encryptions of the tally.
Similarly, the voting committee members jointly decrypt the tally to produce the final
voting outcome signifying the total number of Yes, No, Abstain votes received by the
proposal. Note that before the computing the final tally, each voter ballot is weighted by
the voting power of the voter and expert ballot is weighted by the amount of received
delegation.
The rest of the presentations in this chapter provides formal and complete description
of the entities and processes that make up our proposed treasury system.
3.2 Our Results
In this work, we aim to resolve the funding sustainability issue for long-term cryptocur-
rency development and maintenance by proposing a novel treasury system. The proposed
treasury system is compatible with most existing off-the-shelf cryptocurrencies/blockchain
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platforms, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. We highlight the major contributions of this
work as follows.
• For the first time, we provide a detailed security modeling for a blockchain-based
treasury voting system that supports liquid democracy/delegative voting. More
specifically, we model the voting system in the well-known Universally Composable
(UC) framework [Can00] via an ideal functionality \scrF t,k,n,mVote . The functionality
interacts with a set of voters and experts as well as k voting committee members.
It allows the voters to either delegate their voting power to some experts or vote
directly on the project. If at least t out of k voting committee members are honest,
the functionality guarantees termination. Even in the extreme case, when all the
voting committee members are corrupted, the integrity of the voting result is still
ensured by the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs which can be publicly verified
by any party; however, in that case we don't guarantee protocol termination.
• We propose an efficient design of the treasury system. The system collects funding
via three potential sources: (i) Minting new coins; (ii) Taxation from miners' reward;
(iii) Donations or charity. In an iterative process (see Fig. 3.3), the treasury funds
accumulate over time, and the projects are funded periodically. Each treasury
period consists of pre-voting epoch, voting epoch, and post-voting epoch, which can
be defined in terms of number of blockchain blocks. In the pre-voting epoch, project
proposals are submitted, and the voters/experts are registered. In the voting epoch,
the voting committee is selected; after that, they jointly generate the voting key
for the treasury period. The voters and experts then cast their ballots. In the
post-voting epoch, the voting committee computes and signs the treasury decision.
Winning proposals will then be funded. Any stakeholder in the community can
participate in the treasury voting, and their voting power is proportional to their
possessed stake. (Without loss of generality, we assume a coin has certain storage























Figure 3.3: A treasury period depicting the parties and processes involved in the treasury system.
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• We proposed the world's first honest verifier zero-knowledge proof/argument for unit
vector encryption with logarithmic size communication. Conventionally, to show a
vector of ElGamal ciphertexts element-wise encrypt a unit vector, Chaum-Pedersen
proofs [CP93] are used to show each of the ciphertexts encrypts either 0 or 1 (via
Sigma OR composition) and the product of all the ciphertexts encrypts 1. Such
kind of proof is used in many well-known voting schemes, e.g., Helios. However,
the proof size is linear in the length of the unit vector, and thus the communication
overhead is quite significant when the unit vector length becomes larger. In this
work, we propose a novel special honest verifier ZK (SHVZK) proof/argument
for unit vector that allows the prover to convince the verifier that a vector of
ciphertexts (C0, . . . , Cn - 1) encrypts a unit vector e
(n)
i , i \in [0, n - 1] with O(log n)
proof size. The proposed SHVZK protocol can also be Fiat-Shamir transformed to
a non-interactive ZK (NIZK) proof in the random oracle model.
• We provide prototype implementation [IOH19] of the proposed treasury system
for running and benchmarking in the real world environment. Our implementation
is written in Scala programming language over Scorex 2.0 framework and uses
TwinsChain consensus for keeping the underlying blockchain. Main functionality
includes proposal submission, registration of voters, experts, voting committee
members and their corresponding deposit lock, randomized selection of the voting
committee members among voters, distributed key generation (6-round protocol),
ballots casting, joint decryption with recovery in case of faulty committee members
(4-round protocol), randomness generation for the next treasury period (3-round
protocol), reward payments, deposit paybacks, and penalties for faulty actors. All
implemented protocols are fully decentralized and resilient up to 50\% of malicious
participants. During verification we launched a testnet that consisted of 12 full
nodes successfully operating tens of treasury periods with different parameters.
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Figure 3.4: Coin and transaction structure.
3.3 Building Blocks
Details of notations adopted in this thesis are presented in Section 2.1. However, here,
we provide preparatory information about other key cryptographic abstractions, and
building blocks use in the proposed treasury system.
3.3.1 Blockchain Abstraction
Without loss of generality, we abstract relevant underlying cryptocurrency as encompass-
ing the following concepts: Coin, Address and Transaction. This abstraction helps to
simplify our presentation of the treasury system through the use of appropriate concepts
that minimise the exploration of inessential details.
\circ Coin. We assume the underlying blockchain has the notion of Coins or its equivalent.
Each coin can be spent only once, and all the value of a coin must be consumed in a
spend transaction. Fig. 3.4 depicts four key attributes of each coin explained as follows:
• Coin ID: An implicit property of every coin used to uniquely identify the coin
from other coins.
• Value: Holds the `amount' of a coin.
• Cond: Holds the conditions that must be satisfied for a coin to be correctly/validly
spent.
• Payload: Holds useful non-transactional data (meta-data for the checks and
validations in the treasury system).
\circ Address. Conventionally, in blockhain-based cryptocurrencies an address is usually
a public key, pk, or hash of a public key, h(pk) [Nak08,NBF+16,KRDO17]. To create
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coins associated with an address, the spending condition of the coin is specified as a
valid signature under the corresponding public key pk of the address. For the purpose of
the treasury system, an address is defined as a generic representation of some spending
condition of a coin. Using a recipient's address, a sender is able to create a new coin
whose spending condition is one that only the recipient can satisfy, based on the public
information of the recipient's address. Thus, the recipient may legitimately spend the
coin later in a valid transaction as specified by our blockchain abstraction.
\circ Transaction. Every transaction takes one or more unspent coins, denoted by
\{ Ini\} i\in [n], as input, and outputs one or more new coins, denoted by \{ Outj\} j\in [m]. Except
for special transactions (e.g. specific treasury system transactions), the following condition







and the difference in value between the input and output coins is construed as transaction
fee. That is,







As shown in Fig. 3.4, the transaction has a Verification Data field that contains pertinent
verification data to satisfy all the spending conditions of the input coins \{ Ini\} i\in [n]. An
example of verification data is valid signatures from all the owners of the input coins.
In addition, each transaction also has a Payload field that can be used to store any
additional non-transactional data. Formally, a transaction is denoted as:
Tx(A;B;C)
where A is the set of input coins, B is the set of output coins, and C is the Payload field.
We remark that to the simplify notation, the verification data in a transaction is implicit
(not explicitly declared).
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3.3.2 Distributed Key Generation
In this section, we give a full description of our distributed key generation (DKG) protocol.
A secure DKG is essential and a fundamental building block in the voting protocol within
our treasury system. This is because the underlying blockchain does not have a `single
trusted third-party' that can independently generate the public key credentials required
for securing the ballots (of participants) and other cryptographic operations within the
treasury.
Naively, threshold distributed key generation can be achieved in the following way.
Every party \scrP i, i \in [n] to the DKG protocol initially generates a public/private key
pair (pki, ski) \leftarrow KeyGen(param). Each \scrP i then posts pki publicly (on the blockchain
or bulletin board) and use (t + 1, n)-threshold verifiable secret sharing (VSS) to share
ski to all the other committee members. The combined voting public key can then be
constructed as pk :=
\prod n
i=1 pki.
However, this approach is insecure because an adversary can influence the distribution
of the final voting public key pk by allowing the corrupted parties to selectively abort the
protocol execution. A detailed discussion of this attack scenario is covered in [GJKR99].
We adopt the distributed key generation protocol proposed by Gennaro et al. [GJKR99]
that addresses the subtle attack described earlier. Mainly, the DKG protocol allows
parties \scrP i to initially post a `commitment' of pki. The committed pki for every party is
then revealed by \scrP i after sharing of the corresponding ski through (t + 1, n)-threshold
VSS. This helps to prevent malicious parties from influencing the distribution of the
generated key.
Specifically, our DKG is an adaptation of the DKG proposed by Genarro et al. which
allows accommodation of up to t < n/2 malicious parties in the protocol. Thereby,
guaranteeing that, with at least \lfloor n2 \rfloor + 1 honest parties, all players should be able to
agree on a uniformly random public key pk such that no malicious party (parties) can
influence the distribution of the generated public key. The corresponding secret key sk is
shared among all the parties. Ideally, protocol termination should be guaranteed when
up to t = \lceil n2 \rceil  - 1 out of n committee members are corrupted.
81
Chapter 3: Proposed Treasury System Building Blocks
Our protocols use the blockchain to realise the broadcast channel and peer-to-peer
channels. Next is a detailed description of our distributed key generation protocol.
3.3.2.1 The Treasury System Distributed Key Generation
Given (g, h) as the Common Reference String (CRS), let C := \{ C1,C2, ...,Ck\} be the set
of election committee members, and let pki be the public key associated with Ci, for
i \in [k]. The adversary is able to corrupt up to t < k/2 committee members.
In the first round, each committee member Ci selects a random (ai,0, ...ai,t) and
random (a\prime i,0, ..., a
\prime 
i,t) where t is maximum number of members that can be corrupted.
Each member then define two polynomials of degree t in the following form:
fi(x) = ai,0 + ai,1x + ... + ai,tx
t
and








Therefore, each committee member Ci contributes xi = ai,0 = f(0) to the combined
secret x = sk. Furthermore, to confirm the correctness of commitments, each member Ci
posts a corresponding commitment Ei,l = g
ai,lha
\prime 
i,l on the blockchain. For every other





posts the encryption of si,j and s
\prime 
i,j under the public key of j to the blockchain. Note
that, j \not = i, i.e. each member posts ei,j \leftarrow Encpkj (si,j) and e\prime i,j \leftarrow Encpkj (s\prime i,j). Only Cj
can decrypt these commitments and this signifies the end of the first round.
In the second round, each committee member Cj fetch all ei,j and e
\prime 
i,j encrypted under
their public key from the blockchain and decrypt them using their private key ski to obtain
their corresponding shares si,j and s
\prime 
i,j . In order to verify that the shares they have received

















j,i, pki, ej,i, e
\prime 
j,i), (ski) :
sj,i = Dec\sanss \sansk i(ej,i)
\wedge s\prime j,i = Dec\sanss \sansk i(e
\prime 
j,i)
\wedge (pki, ski) \in \scrR PKE
\bigr\} 
.
Members with one valid complain against them are excluded from participating in the
key generation process.
In the third round, following the exclusion of no member or some members based
on the outcome of round 2, each qualified committee member Ci posts Ai,\ell := g
ai,\ell for




\gamma i \cdot sj,i
where \gamma i :=
\prod 
\ell \in \scrJ \setminus \{ i\} 
\ell 
\ell  - i .






Where the check fails, Ci posts complain against Cj together with the evidence (sj,i, s
\prime 
j,i)













In the fifth and final round, each qualified committee member Ci checks if complaints
raised against qualified committee members in the fourth round are valid. For all members
against whom valid complaints were raised, other qualified committee members posts the
shares sj,i they received from the members who have complaints against them. Thereby,
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\gamma j \cdot si,j and redefine Aj,0 := g\sanss \sansk j ,
where \gamma j :=
\prod 
\ell \in \scrJ \setminus \{ j\} 
\ell 
\ell  - j .





Distributed key generation \Pi DKG
Round 1: Each committee member Ci do the following:
• Pick random ai,0, ai,1, . . . , ai,t, bi,0, bi,1, . . . , bi,t \leftarrow \BbbZ p.
• Define two polynomials fi(x) :=
\sum t
\ell =0 ai,\ell x
\ell and f \prime i(x) :=
\sum t
\ell =0 bi,\ell x
\ell .
• For \ell \in [t], post Ei,\ell := gai,\ell hbi,\ell on the blockchain.
• For every other Cj , j \in [k], j \not = i, compute si,j := fi(j) and s\prime i,j := f \prime i(j) and
post ei,j \leftarrow Enc\sansp \sansk j (si,j) and e
\prime 
i,j \leftarrow Enc\sansp \sansk j (s
\prime 
i,j) on the blockchain. (Only Cj
can decrypt them.)
Round 2: Each committee member Ci do the following:
• Fetch \{ (ej,i, e\prime j,i)\} j\in [k],j \not =i from the blockchain, and use pki to decrypt them,
obtaining the corresponding shares \{ (sj,i, s\prime j,i)\} j\in [k],j \not =i.





i\ell . If not, post complain







j,i, pki, ej,i, e
\prime 
j,i), (ski) :
sj,i = Dec\sanss \sansk i(ej,i)
\wedge s\prime j,i = Dec\sanss \sansk i(e
\prime 
j,i)
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• (One valid complain against Cj , j \in [k] will disqualify Cj .)
Round 3: Define the indices of the qualified set of committee members as \scrJ .
Each committee member Ci do the following:
• For \ell \in [t], post Ai,\ell := gai,\ell to the blockchain.
• Return its secret key share as ski :=
\sum 
j\in [\scrJ ] \gamma i \cdot sj,i, where \gamma i :=
\prod 
\ell \in \scrJ \setminus \{ i\} 
\ell 
\ell  - i .
Round 4: Each committee member Ci do the following:
• For j \in \scrJ , j \not = i, check if gsj,i =
\prod t
\ell =0(Aj,\ell )
i\ell . If not, post complain
against Cj together with the evidence (sj,i, s
\prime 










Round 5: Each committee member Ci do the following:
• If there is a valid complain against Cj , j \in \scrJ , then post the share sj,i on the
blockchain. (Everyone can reconstruct skj :=
\sum 
i\in [\scrJ ] \gamma j \cdot si,j and re-define
Aj,0 := g
\sanss \sansk 
j , where \gamma j :=
\prod 
\ell \in \scrJ \setminus \{ j\} 
\ell 
\ell  - j .)
• Return the election public key as pk :=
\prod 
j\in [\scrJ ]Aj,0.
Figure 3.5: Distributed key generation \Pi DKG
3.3.3 UC Ideal Functionalities
In the following, we summarise UC ideal functionalities as building blocks adopted in
this research work.
3.3.3.1 The Distributed Key Generation Functionality
We use the key generation functionality \scrF t,kDKG of [Wik04] for threshold key generation
of the underlying public key cryptosystem. The functionality is depicted in Fig. 3.6 and
it interacts with a set of committees \scrC := \{ C1, . . . ,Ck\} to generate a public key pk and
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deal the corresponding secret key sk among the committees. In Section 3.3.2, we provide
a detailed description of our threshold distributed key generation protocol adopted from
Gennaro et al. [GJKR99].
The functionality \scrF t,kDKG interacts with a set of voting committees \scrC :=
\{ C1, . . . ,Ck\} , any party \scrP , and the adversary \scrA . It is parameterised with vari-
able \scrJ and algorithms KeyGen() and Deal().
Initially, set \scrJ := \emptyset .
• Upon receiving (KeyGen, sid) from Cj \in \scrC , set \scrJ := \scrJ \cup \{ Cj\} .
• If | \scrJ | = k, generate a public key pair (pk, sk)\leftarrow KeyGen(1\lambda ) and compute
(sk1, . . . , skk)\leftarrow Deal(t, k, sk). For j \in [k], send message
(PrivKey, sid, skj) to Cj .
• Upon receiving (ReadPK, sid) from any party p \in \scrP , if pk is not defined
yet, ignore the request. Otherwise, it sends (PublicKey, sid, pk) to the
requestor.
Functionality \scrF t,kDKG
Figure 3.6: Functionality \scrF t,kDKG
3.3.3.2 The Global Clock Functionality.
The global clock functionality \scrG Clock interacts with all the parties. To accommodate
offline parties, parties can register and deregister themselves to the functionality \scrG Clock.
The clock advances if and only if all registered honest parties have sent Tick command
to it. The functionality is depicted in detail in Fig. 3.7.
3.3.3.3 The Ledger Ideal Functionality
Our protocol builds on state-of-the-art ledger ideal functionality proposed by Badertscher
et al., [BMTZ17]. As shown, in Fig. 3.11, the functionality maintains a set of registered
parties \BbbP , a (sub-)set of honest parties \scrH \subseteq \BbbP , and a (sub-set) of de-synchronized honest
parties \BbbP DS \subset \scrH . The set \BbbP ,\BbbP DS ,\scrH are initially set to \emptyset . When a new honest party is
registered, it is added to \BbbP DS (hence also to \scrH and \BbbP ) and the current time of registration
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The functionality interacts with a set of parties \BbbP , a set of functionalities \BbbF ,
and the adversary \scrA . It is parametrized with variable \tau , \BbbP , and \BbbF .
Initially, set \tau := 0, \BbbP := \emptyset , and \BbbF := \emptyset .
Registration:
• Upon receiving (Register, sid) from party p, set \BbbP := \BbbP \cup \{ p\} and create
variable Tp := 0.
• Upon receiving (Register, sid) from functionality \scrF , set \BbbF := \BbbF \cup \{ \scrF \} 
and create variable T\scrF := 0.
• Upon receiving (De-Register, sid) from party p, set \BbbP := \BbbP \setminus \{ p\} and
remove variable Tp.
• Upon receiving (De-Register, sid) from functionality \scrF , set \BbbF := \BbbF \setminus \{ \scrF \} 
and remove variable T\scrF .
• Upon receiving (Get-Reg, sid) from \scrA , return (Get-Reg, sid,\BbbP ,\BbbF ) to \scrA .
Synchronization:
• Upon receiving (Tick, sid) from party p \in \BbbP , set Tp := 1; Invoke
procedure Clock-Update and send (Tick, sid, p) to \scrA .
• Upon receiving (Tick, sid) from functionality \scrF \in \BbbF , set T\scrF := 1; Invoke
procedure Clock-Update and send (Tick, sid,\scrF ) to \scrF .
• Upon receiving (GetTime, sid) from any participant, return
(GetTime, sid, \tau ) to the requester.
Procedure Clock-Update:
• If T\scrF = 1 for all \scrF \in \BbbF and Tp = 1 for all the honest p \in \BbbP , then set
\tau := \tau + 1, and reset T\scrF := 0 for all \scrF \in \BbbF and Tp := 0 for all p \in \BbbP .
Functionality \scrG Clock
Figure 3.7: Functionality \scrG Clock
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is recorded. Similarly, when a party is deregistered, it is removed from both \BbbP and \BbbP DS .
For each party p \in \BbbP , the functionality maintains a pointer pt\sansi (initially set to 1) and a
current state view state\sansi := \epsilon (initially set to empty). The functionality also keeps track
of the timed honest-input sequence in a vector I\sansT \sansH (initially I
\sansT 
\sansH := \epsilon ).
Functionality \scrF Ledger
It is parametrized by four algorithms Validate,ExtendPolicy,Blockify, and
predict-time, along with two parameters: windowSize,Delay \in \BbbN . The functionality
manages variables state,NxtBC, buffer, \tau L and \tau \sanss \sanst \sansa \sanst \sanse .
Initially, state := \tau state := NxtBC :=\epsilon , buffer := \emptyset , \tau \sansL =1.
The functionality maintains the set of registered parties \BbbP , the (sub-)set of honest
parties \scrH \subseteq \BbbP , and the (sub-set) of de-synchronized honest parties \BbbP DS \subset \scrH . The
set \BbbP ,\BbbP DS ,\scrH are all initially set to \emptyset . When a new honest party is registered, it is
added to all \BbbP DS (hence also to \scrH and \BbbP and the current time of registration is also
recorded; similarly, when a party is deregistered, it is removed from both \BbbP and
\BbbP DS . For each party p \in \BbbP , the functionality maintains a pointer pt\sansi (initially set
to 1) and a current state view state\sansi := \epsilon (initially set to empty). The functionality
also keeps track of the timed honest-input sequence in a vector I\sansT \sansH (initially I
\sansT 
\sansH := \epsilon )
Upon receiving any input I from any party or from the adversary, send
(GetTime, sid) to \scrG Clock and upon receiving response (GetTime, sid, \tau ) set
\tau L := \tau and do the following:
• Let \^\BbbP \subseteq \BbbP DS denote the set of desynchronized honest parties that were
registered at time \tau \prime \leq \tau L  - Delay. Set \BbbP DS := \BbbP DS \setminus \BbbP .
• If I was received from an honest party p \in \BbbP :
-- Set ITH := I
T
H| | (I, p, \tau L);
-- Compute N = (N1, . . . ,Nl) :=
ExtendPolicy(ITH, state,NxtBC, buffer, \tau state) and
if N \not = \epsilon , set state := state| | Blockify((Nl1)| | . . . ,Blockify((Nl)) and
\tau state := \tau state| | \tau lL, where \tau lL = \tau L| | , . . . \tau L
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-- For each BTX \in buffer: if (Validate,BTX, state, buffer) = 0 then delete
BTX from buffer. Also reset NxtBC := \epsilon 
-- If there exists pj \in \scrH such that | state|  - ptj > windowSize or ptj < | state| ,
then set ptk := | state| for all pk \in \scrH \setminus \BbbP DS
• Depending on the above input I and its sender's ID, \scrF Ledger executes the
corresponding code from the following list:
-- Submitting a transaction:
If I = (Submit, sid, tx) and is received from a party p \in \BbbP or from \scrA 
(on behalf of a corrupted party p) do the following
∗ Choose a unique transaction ID txid and set BTX :=
(tx, txid, \tau L, pi)
∗ if Validate(BTX), state, buffer = 1, then buffer := buffer \cup \{ BTX\} .
∗ Send (Submit,BTX) to \scrA 
-- Reading the state:
If I = (Read, sid) is received from a party p \in \BbbP then set
state| \sansm \sansi \sansn \{ \sansp \sanst \sansi ,| \sanss \sanst \sansa \sanst \sanse | \} and return (Read, sid, state\sansi ) to the requester. If
the requester is \scrA then send (state, buffer, ITH) to \scrA 
-- Maintaining the ledger state:
If I = (Maintain-Ledger, sid,minerID) is received by an honest
party p in \BbbP and (after updating ITH as above) predcit-time(ITH) = \^\tau > \tau L
then send (Tick, sid) to \scrG Clock. Else, send I to \scrA .
-- The adversary proposing the next block:
If I = (Next-Block, hFlag, (txid1, . . . , txidl)) is sent from the adver-
sary, update NxtBC as follows:
∗ Set listOfTxid\leftarrow \epsilon 
∗ For i = 1, . . . , l do: if there exists BTX :=
(x, txid,minerID, \tau L, pi) \in buffer with ID txid = txidi then
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set lisOfTxid := listOfTxid| | txidi
∗ Finally, set NxtBC := NxtBC| | (hF lag, listOfTxid) and output
(Next-Block, ok) to \scrA 
-- The adversary setting state-slackness:
If I = (Set-Slack, (pi1, \^pti1), (pil, \^ptil), ) with \{ pi1, . . . , pil\} \subseteq \scrH \setminus \BbbP DS
is received from the adversary \scrA do the following:
∗ If for all j \in [l] : | state|  - \^ptij \geq state\sansi \sansj | , setpti := \^pti for every j \in [l]
and return (Set-Slack, ok) to \scrA .
∗ Otherwise set ptj := state for all j \in [l]
-- The adversary setting the state for desynchronised parties:
If I = (DEesync-State, (pi1, state
\prime 
\sansi \sansl )) with \{ pi1, . . . , pil\} \subseteq \BbbP DS is
received from the adversary \scrA , set state\sansi \sansj := state\prime \sansi \sansj for each j \in [l] and
return (Desync-State, ok) to \scrA .
Figure 3.8: Functionality \scrF Ledger
3.4 Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Protocols
Looking ahead, in this section we cover non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs protocol
useful for convincing other participants of the voting process in the treasury system of
one's correct operation and following of the protocol. These pertinent zero-knowledge
proof protocols used in the treasury system are available in Appendix A.
3.5 The Proposed Treasury System
The proposed blockchain treasury system is characterised by iterative treasury periods
during which all of the treasury processes are repeated in every period. Conceptually,
every treasury period is divided into three epochs. Namely :
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• Pre-voting epoch
-- Project proposing stage
-- Voter/expert registration stage
• Voting epoch
-- Committee selection stage
-- Key setup stage




Figure 3.9 depicts a treasury period, the three epochs and their attendant stages.
The pre-voting epoch consists of two concurrent stages: project proposing stage and
voter/expert registration stage. In the project proposing stage, users can submit project
proposals (to support cryptocurrency development) requesting funds from the treasury.
At the same time, interested stakeholders can register themselves as either voters and/or
experts to participate in the decision making process by locking certain amounts of their
stake in the underlying cryptocurrency. A voter's voting power is proportional to his
locked stake. For experts, their voting power is proportional to the amount of voting
(power) delegation they receive. Delegation is covered in more details in Section 3.5.6.
Similarly, a voter's (respectively expert's) treasury reward is proportional to his locked
stake (respectively his received delegations).
At the beginning of the voting epoch, there is a voting committee selection stage,
where a set of voting committee members are randomly selected from all registered
voters who are willing to be considered for selection to the committee. For any voter,
the probability of being selected to the committee is proportional to the amount of
locked stake. Following the selection of the voting committee members, they jointly
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run the distributed key generation protocol to setup the election public key. Thereafter,
voters and experts can submit their (encrypted) ballots in the ballot casting stage. Cast
ballots are either direct or indirect votes on the proposals, i.e. voters can either specify
their choice or delegate their voting powers to some expert. Voting is on a per-project
basis, therefore within a given treasury period, voters can delegate their voting power to
different experts for different projects, vote directly, or use a combination of both options
for different proposals.
In the post-voting epoch, the voting committee members jointly compute and announce
the tally result on the blockchain in the tally stage. Finally, in the execution stage, the
winning projects are funded, and voters, experts and voting committee members are
rewarded (or punished based on their actions in the treasury period) accordingly. These
transactions will be jointly signed and executed by the voting committee. Meanwhile,
the committee members also jointly commit to a random seed, which is used to select a
















Figure 3.9: Treasury system epochs.
In the following, we elaborate on the principal entities that constitute the treasury
system.
3.5.1 Entities
At the core of our treasury system exists a collaborative decision-making system that
enables all stakeholders to actively participate and make meaningful contributions towards
cryptocurrency development. Let k, \ell , n,m be integers in poly(\lambda ). The stakeholders may
have one or more of the following roles.
• The project owners \scrO := \{ O1, . . . ,Ok\} are a set of stakeholders (or general commu-
nity members) that have submitted project proposals for supporting the blockchain.
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• The voting committees \scrC := \{ C1, . . . ,C\ell \} are a set of stakeholders that are respon-
sible for generating the voting public key and announcing the voting result.
• The voters \scrV := \{ V1, . . . ,Vn\} are a set of stakeholders that lock certain amount of
stake to participate in the treasury system voting on proposals.
• The experts \scrE := \{ E1, . . . ,Em\} are a special type of voters with specialist knowl-
edge and expertise in some field e.g. blockchain, cryptocurrency, cryptography,
economics.
3.5.2 Project Proposal
We adopt a two-stage project proposal submission scheme to prevent granting unfair
advantage to late proposal submissions (who might have seen early submissions). To
achieve this, we also use the well-known `commit and open later' approach.
In the first stage, project owners O1, . . . ,Ok post an encryption of their project
proposals, encrypted under the election public key of the previous treasury period, to
the blockchain. At the end of pre-voting epoch and at the beginning of the voting epoch,
the voting committee of previous treasury period will jointly decrypt the `committed'
projected proposals submitted at the pre-voting epoch. In addition to decrypting the
proposals, they also reveal a seed, seed (cf. Section 3.5.9).




\{ Ini\} ni=1;TCoin; \{ Project,TID,P-Enc,Addr\} 
\Bigr) 
,
where \{ Ini\} ni=1 are the input coins, and TCoin is a special output coin whose spending
condition is specified as : the coin can only be spent according to the corresponding
treasury decision (cf. Section 3.5.5). Moreover, for the coin value, the following condition
must hold:
TCoin.Value \geq \alpha \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} ,
where \alpha \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} is the minimum required fee for a project proposal submission, to prevent
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denial-of-service attacks. In the transaction Payload field, Project is a tag that indicates
it is a special project proposal transaction; TID is the treasury ID that is used to uniquely
identify a treasury period; P-Enc is the encrypted project proposal, and Addr is the
return address for the project owner to receive funds if the project is successful in the
decision-making (voting) process.
3.5.3 Voter/Expert Registration
In order to register to be a voter, a stakeholder (or a set of stakeholders combining their






Voter-Reg,TID, \{ Si\} \ell i=1, S-Cond, vk,Addr
\Bigr\} \Bigr) 
,
where \{ Ini\} ni=1 are the input coins, and TCoin is a special output coin whose spending
condition is defined in Section 3.5.5. In the Payload field, Voter-Reg is a tag that
indicates it is a special voter registration transaction; TID is the treasury ID that is used
to uniquely identify a treasury period; \{ Si\} \ell i=1 are the frozen unspent coins that will be
used to claim stake value (hence voting power); S-Cond is the required data that satisfies
all the stake attributes of \{ Si\} \ell i=1; vk is a freshly generated signature verification key;
and Addr is the return address for the voter to receive treasury reward. The voter's ID
denoted as Vi := hash(vk) is defined as the hash of vk.
Note that, the registration transaction is valid if and only if the payment conditions
of all the input coins are satisfied. Thus, this indicates that a registered voter may
represent a group of users' if the deposited coins in the registration transaction come
from different users. Moreover, the return address is especially useful and distinct for
a set of stakeholders that pool resources together to participate in the treasury system.
This allows for flexibility in payment of participation reward to an address agreed to
by all parties rather than to a fixed address. The address can have protective features
such as multi-signature spend requirements to prevent all parties in the pool e.g. Voting
Service Providers in Decred Treasury [Decc].
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Let \beta \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} be a predefined treasury system parameter. To register as an expert, a
stakeholder (or a set of stakeholders) need(s) to deposit exact \beta \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} amount of coins, by
submitting a special expert registration transaction in the following form:
Tx
\Bigl( 
\{ Ini\} ni=1;TCoin; \{ Expert-Reg,TID, vk,Addr\} 
\Bigr) 
,
where \{ Ini\} ni=1 are the input coins, and TCoin is a special output coin whose spending
condition is defined in Section 3.5.5. Moreover, for the coin value, the following condition
must hold:
TCoin.Value \geq \beta \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} .
In the Payload field, Expert-Reg is a tag that indicates it is a special transaction for
expert registration; TID is the treasury ID that is used to uniquely identify a treasury
period; vk is a freshly generated signature key; and Addr is the return address for the
expert to receive treasury reward. The expert's ID denoted as Ej := hash(vk) is defined
as the hash of vk.
Note that the expert does not gain reward based on the amount of deposited coins,
so it is not rational to deposit significantly more than \beta \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} coins in practice. Specifically,
expert rewards are based on the amount of received delegated votes.
3.5.4 Voting Committee Selection
At the beginning of the voting epoch, the voting committee of the previous treasury epoch
jointly reveal the committed seed. The seed serves as an unbiased source of randomness




j=1 Sj .Value for all the stake coins Sj claimed in the payload of a voter
registration transaction of vki, i.e. sti is the total stake amount claimed by vki. Once seed
is announced, any registered voter, with address vki and claimed stake sti, can volunteer
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to participate in the voting committee if the following inequality is satisfied:
hash
\bigl( 
vki, sign\sanss \sansk \prime i(seed)
\bigr) 
\leq sti \cdot T
where sk\prime i is the corresponding signing key for vki, and T is a pre-defined threshold for
the blockchain treasury system. The threshold T is properly defined to ensure that
approximately \lambda \prime = \omega (log \lambda ), for example, \lambda \prime = polylog(\lambda ) committee members are
selected, assuming a constant fraction of them will be active. Note that, as is the case
with most proof-of-stake systems, T needs to be updated frequently to ensure required
security and efficiency performance. Chepurnoy et. al., in [CDFZ17] provides a good
example of a method for threshold/difficulty T adjustment.
When the above inequality holds, the voter can then submit a special registration





VC-Reg,TID, vk, \~pk, sign\sanss \sansk \prime i(seed),Addr
\Bigr\} \Bigr) 
,
where \{ Ini\} ni=1 are the input coins, and TCoin is a special output coin whose spending
condition is defined in Section 3.5.5. Moreover, for the coin value, the following condition
must hold:
TCoin.Value \geq \gamma \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n} .
In the Payload field, VC-Reg is a tag that indicates it is a special voting committee
registration transaction; TID is the treasury ID used to uniquely identify a treasury
period; vk is a freshly generated signature verification key; \~pk is a freshly generated
public key for a pre-defined public key cryptosystem (lifted ElGamal); sign\sanss \sansk \prime i(seed) is
the signature of seed under the signing key corresponding to vki; and Addr is the return
address for the committee member to receive treasury reward.
We remark that, honest majority of the voting committee is required to guarantee
voter privacy and protocol termination. Assuming the majority of the stake of all the
registered voters is honest, therefore, the probability that a selected committee member
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is honest is
p = 1/2 + \varepsilon , for any \varepsilon \in (0, 1/2].
Let X be the number of malicious committee members selected among all \lambda \prime committee
members. Since \lambda \prime = \omega (log \lambda ), based on Chernoff bound, we have that, for \delta = 2\varepsilon /(1 - 2\varepsilon ):
Pr[X \geq \lambda \prime /2] = Pr[X \geq (1 + \delta )(1/2 - \varepsilon )\lambda \prime ]
< exp( - \delta 2(1/2 - \varepsilon )\lambda \prime /4)
=
1
exp(\omega (log \lambda ))
= negl(\lambda )
Thus, the Chernoff bound allows us to control the probability of a malicious majority
of committee members.
3.5.5 Supplying the Treasury
As earlier discussed in Section 2.6, treasury funding is perhaps the most crucial ingredient
in a decentralised community-controlled decision-making system. Treasury funding should
be secure, regular, sustainable and centralisation-free. That is, source of funding for
treasury system should not introduce centralisation into the system.
Note that, although, individually not all the potential funding sources possess the
properties mentioned above, a clever combination of some (or all) of these sources satisfy
the set out requirements listed above. Therefore, we propose 3 main sources of funding
for the treasury system.
• Taxation/Haircut from block reward: Most blockchain platforms offer block re-
wards (including transaction fees) to proposers of new blocks, incentivizing honest
behaviour. A fraction of such block rewards can be taken and contributed to
the decentralised treasury. This type of funding source is sustainable as long as
the block rewards of the underlying blockchain platform remain. However, block
rewards may fluctuate (reduce) over time, and it could cause a reduction in the
amount of funds available to the treasury.
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• Minting new coins: Coin minting represents, perhaps, the most sustainable funding
source of the potential sources. At the beginning of each treasury period, certain
amount of new coins are created to fund projects. However, minting must be
properly analysed prior to adoption because it may cause inflation in terms of the
fiat market value of the underlying cryptocurrency.
• Donations or charity: Treasury funds can also be supplemented by donations
although given the ad-hoc nature of donations they are unsuitable and unsustainable
as the main (or only) source funding cryptocurrency treasury system.
Treasury funds are accumulated via a collection of coins. For instance, during each
treasury period, taxation of block rewards, minting and donations can be collected
through a special transaction at the beginning of each block. This special transaction
outputs new coins whose spending condition, Cond, specifies that the coins can only be
spent according to the corresponding treasury decision. Treasury funds will be distributed
in forms of transactions jointly made by the corresponding voting committee. Therefore,
the accumulated coins for a given treasury period must allow the voting committee in
that treasury period to jointly spend them.
Formally, there are \lambda \prime committee members selected at the beginning of the voting
epoch of each treasury period. Let seed\sansT \sansI \sansD i denote the seed opened in the treasury period
indexed by TIDi. Let \{ vkj\} \ell j=1 be the set of signature verification keys in the valid




vki, sign\sanss \sansk \prime i(seed)
\bigr) 
\leq sti \cdot T
Therefore, the treasury coin spending condition is specified such that, a treasury coin can
only be spent in a transaction if the majority of the signatures with respect to \{ vkj\} \ell j=1
are present in the transaction.
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3.5.6 Enabling Stake Delegation
In our treasury system, we distinguish between the stake ownership and coin ownership.
In other words, the stake of a coin can be `owned' by a user other than the owner of
the coin. This distinction enables the delegation of the stake of a coin to a party (other
than the owner) without transferring the ownership of the coin. To realise this important
feature, we introduce a stake attribute, denoted as S-Attr, that can be attached to the
Payload of a coin. Any user/party who can provide the required data that satisfies the
condition(s) in the S-Attr is able to claim the stake (not own) of the coin.
Of course, the stake of an unspent coin can only be claimed at most once at any
moment (treasury period). In practice, to ensure secure realisation additional checks
might be executed. If a user A wants to delegate the stake of a coin to a user B, he
simply needs to put the user B's desired S-Attr in the Payload of the coin. Note that this
type of delegation is persistent in the sense that if the coin is not consumed, the S-Attr
of the coin remains the same. This feature allows users to stay offline while their coins'
stake can still be used in the treasury process by the delegatees. Hence, encouraging
increased stake (user) participation within treasury system decision-making. Recall that
voting power within the treasury system is proportional to the amount of locked stake.
However, this type of delegation only guarantees pseudonymity-based privacy, because
anyone can learn who the owner of the coin stake is, by checking the S-Attr of the coin.
3.5.7 Handling the Treasury Specific Data in the Payload
Typically, validation rules for most general blockchain transactions do not take into
account the content of transaction payload. Therefore, for treasury system transactions
with useful payload data, additional checks are required to support these treasury special
transactions. Specifically, we verify the payload data of those treasury system transactions
with additional algorithms.
For instance, a coin must be frozen during an entire treasury period in order to claim
its stake in the voting process. For example, this can be done by, adding extra constraints
in the spending condition, ensuring that the coin cannot be spent until a given block
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height, which is no earlier than the end of the treasury period. Furthermore, the stake of
one coin can only be claimed once during each treasury period to guarantee users' voting
power is tied to real (unused) stake and prevent Sybil attacks.
3.5.8 Decision-making
The voting committee members, voters, and experts follow the protocol described in
Section 3.6 for the decision-making process. The described protocol covers key generation
stage, the ballot casting stage, and the tally stage. In terms of security, as shown in
Section 3.5.4, with overwhelming probability, the majority of the committee members
are honest. Hence, guaranteeing voter privacy and protocol termination. In an unlikely
extreme case, where all voting committee members are corrupt, our voting scheme still
ensures the integrity of the voting tally result through the non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs which can be publicly verified by any party. As a further deterrent to prevent
malicious behaviour from voting committee members, if a cheating voting committee
member is detected, their locked stake deposited is seized (not returned to them).
Voters/experts need to submit an independent ballot for each project proposal. The
voter's ballot is either a delegation of his voting power to an expert or a direct expression
of his choice/decision on the project. However, an expert's ballot is a direct vote on
the project. In our prototype treasury system implementation, we adopt the `YES-NO-
ABSTAIN' voting scheme. Specifically, after the voting by all eligible parties (voters and
experts), the project proposals are scored based on the number of yes votes minus the
number of no votes.
For a project to be shortlisted for potential funding from the treasury system, its net
vote received must be least 10\% of all votes in treasury period. Proposals that do not
meet the net vote threshold are discarded. Thereafter, shortlisted proposals are ranked
according to their score, and the top ranked proposals are funded in turns until available
treasury fund is expended. Each of the voting committee members will then sign the
treasury decision and transactions (payment to winning projects), and those transactions
are valid if and only if they are signed by more than t-out-of-k voting committee members.
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3.5.9 Post-voting Execution
Certain proportion (e.g. 20\%) of the treasury fund will be used to reward the voting
committee members, voters and experts for participation in the treasury system. A voter
Vi \in \scrV will receive reward that is proportional to his/her locked stake, denoted as \zeta 2 \cdot sti,
where sti is the amount of the stake claimed by Vi. The expert Ej \in \scrE will receive reward
that is proportional to his/her received delegations, denoted as \zeta 3 \cdot Dj , where Dj is the
amount of delegations that Ej received. The voting committee members C\ell \in \scrC will
receive a fixed amount of reward, denoted as \zeta 1. Note that as the voting committee
members are required to perform additional actions in the next treasury period (seed
revelation), their reward will only be transferred after the completion of those actions at
the end of pre-voting epoch in the next treasury period. Meanwhile, if a voting committee
member cheats or an expert fails to submit a valid ballot, he/she will lose their deposited
coin as a penalty.
Specifically for the additional tasks carried out by voting committee members, they
will jointly generate and commit to a random seed for the next treasury period, in
a protocol depicted as follows. To generate and commit a random seed seed, voting
committee members C\ell , \ell \in [k] need to invoke a coin flipping protocol. However, given
that the committee members already jointly setup a public key ap, the cost of such
a protocol is very small. Specifically, in the final epoch of each treasury period, each
voting committee member C\ell , \ell \in [k] will pick a random group element R\ell \leftarrow \BbbG and
posts its encryption, C\ell \leftarrow Enc\sansp \sansk (R\ell ) to the blockchain. C :=
\prod k
\ell =1C\ell is defined as the
committed/encrypted seed for the next treasury period. Note that C can then be jointly
decrypted as far as majority of the voting committee members are honest (threshold
decryption). This two stage-process for seed generation helps guarantee that malicious
voting committee members cannot influence the distribution of the seed.
3.5.10 Partitionary Budgeting
As earlier established, the main goal of the treasury system is decentralized community-
driven self-sustainable cryptocurrency development through adoption and funding of
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projects. Naively, selection of projects for funding is done by ranking all submitted
proposals according to the number of votes they receive. Subsequently, fund a number
of projects whose total funding request does not exceed the available treasury budget.
However, in practice, there exists a risk of underfunding vital areas of cryptocurrency
development due to numerous project submissions and inflated discussions and interests
in some other areas. To prevent this undesirable scenario, project proposals are classified
into different categories and each category is independently allocated a percentage of
available treasury funds. Thus, guaranteeing funds to all vital areas of cryptocurrency
development (as long as voting threshold is satisfied by projects requesting treasury
funds).
Analysis of existing blockchain development funding [KN+,Fou,Decb] reveal marketing,
PR, integration, software development and organisational costs are most prominent
categories. Therefore, given this background and general business development rules, we
propose (at least) the following categories.
• Marketing : This covers activities devoted to cryptocurrency market share growth;
market analysis, advertisement, conferences, etc. The vastness of the area demands
this category should take a sizeable percentage of the available funding budget.
• Technology adoption : This includes costs needed for wider spreading of cryp-
tocurrency; integration with various platforms, websites and applications, deploy-
ment of ATMs, etc.
• Development and security : This includes costs allocated for funding core
and non-core development, security incident response, patch management, running
testnets, as well as similar critical technology areas.
• Support : This category includes user support, documentation, maintaining of
web-infrastructure needed for the community and other similar areas.
• Organization and management : This category includes costs on team
coordination and management, legal support, etc.
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• General : This includes projects not covered by the above-listed categories,
e.g. research on prospective technologies for cryptocurrency application, external
security audit, collaboration with other communities, and charity.
It should be noted that the provided categories are recommendations and not an exhaustive
list. Specifically, each cryptocurrency treasury deployment will factor in the peculiarities
of its system, development stage, community, uses, law and regulations, in determining
its applicable categories. For instance, a cryptocurrency in its early development stage,
will assign greater preference towards software development, adoption and marketing
efforts.
Nonetheless, having a categorisation approach to treasury system guarantees that
critical areas for cryptocurrency routine operation, support and development will always
receive funding via treasury, which in turn, guarantees cryptocurrency self-sustainability.
3.6 The proposed voting scheme
In this section, we formally present the decentralized voting scheme used in the treasury
system. The voting scheme supports direct voting and vote delegation and the description
done in the UC framework. In the following, the security model of the voting scheme is
presented in Section 3.6.1.
3.6.1 Security Modeling
The entities involved in the voting schemes are a set of voting committee mem-
bers \scrC := \{ C1, . . . ,Ck\} , a set of voters \scrV := \{ V1, . . . ,Vn\} , and a set of experts
\scrE := \{ E1, . . . ,Em\} . The security of the treasury voting scheme is analysed in the
Universally Composable framework with static corruption. The security of the scheme is
based on the indistinguishability between real/hybrid world executions and ideal world
executions, i.e. for any PPT real/hybrid world adversary \scrA we will construct an ideal
world PPT simulator \scrS that can present an indistinguishable view to the environment \scrZ 
operating the protocol.
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3.6.2 The Ideal World Execution
In the ideal world, the voting committee \scrC , the voters \scrV , and the experts \scrE only com-
municate to an ideal functionality \scrF t,k,m,nVote during the execution. The ideal functionality
\scrF t,k,m,nVote accepts a number of commands from \scrC ,\scrV , \scrE . At the same time it informs the
adversary of certain actions that take place and is also influenced by the adversary to elicit
certain actions. The ideal functionality \scrF t,k,m,nVote is depicted in Fig. 3.10 and it consists of
three phases: Preparation, Voting/Delegation, and Tally summarised as follows:
• Preparation phase: During the preparation phase, the voting committees Ci \in \scrC 
need to initiate the voting process by sending (Init, sid) to the ideal functionality
\scrF t,k,m,nVote . The voting will not start until all the committees have participated the
preparation phase.
• Voting/Delegation phase: During the voting/delegation phase, the expert
Ei \in \scrE can vote for his choice vi by sending (Vote, sid, vi) to the ideal functionality
\scrF t,k,m,nVote . Note that the voting choice vi is leaked only when majority of the voting
committees are corrupted. The voter Vj \in \scrV , who owns \alpha j stake, can either vote
directly for his choice vj or delegate his voting power to an expert Ei \in \scrE . Similarly,
when all the voting committees are corrupted, \scrF t,k,m,nVote leaks the voters' ballots to
the adversary \scrS .
• Tally phase: During tally phase, the voting committee Ci \in \scrC sends (DelCal, sid)
to the ideal functionality \scrF t,k,m,nVote to calculate and reveal the delegations received
by each expert. After that, they then send (Tally, sid) to the ideal functionality
\scrF t,k,m,nVote to open the tally. Once all the committees have opened the tally, any party
can read the tally by sending (ReadTally, sid) to \scrF t,k,m,nVote . Note that due to the
nature of threshold cryptography, the adversary \scrS can see the voting tally result
before all the honest parties. Hence, the adversary can refuse to open the tally
depending on the tally result. The tally algorithm TallyAlg is described in Fig. 3.13.
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The ideal functionality \scrF t,k,n,mVote
The functionality \scrF t,k,n,mVote interacts with a set of voting committees
\scrC := \{ C1, . . . ,Ck\} , a set of voters \scrV := \{ V1, . . . ,Vn\} , a set of experts
\scrE := \{ E1, . . . ,Em\} , and the adversary \scrS . It is parameterized by a delegation
calculation algorithm DelCal (described in Fig. 3.12) and a tally algorithm TallyAlg
(described in Fig. 3.13) and variables \phi 1, \phi 2, \tau , J1, J2, J3, T1 and T2. Denote \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr 
and \scrC \sansh \sanso \sansn \sanse \sanss \sanst as the set of corrupted and honest voting committees, respectively.
Initially, \phi 1 = \emptyset , \phi 2 = \emptyset , \tau = \emptyset , J1 = \emptyset , J2 = \emptyset , and J3 = \emptyset .
Preparation:
• Upon receiving (Init, sid) from the voting committee Ci \in \scrC , set J1 :=
J1 \cup \{ Ci\} , and send a notification message (InitNotify, sid,Ci) to the
adversary \scrS .
Voting/Delegation:
• Upon receiving (Vote, sid, vi) from the expert Ei \in \scrE , if | J1| < t, ignore the
request. Otherwise, record (Ei,Vote, vi) in \phi 1; send a notification message
(VoteNotify, sid,Ei) to the adversary \scrS . If | \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr | \geq t, then additionally
send a message (Leak, sid,Ei,Vote, vi) to the adversary \scrS .
• Upon receiving (Cast, sid, vj , \alpha j) from the voter Vj \in \scrV , if | J1| < t, ignore
the request. Otherwise, record (Vj ,Cast, vj , \alpha j) in \phi 2; send a notification
message (CastNotify, sid,Vj , \alpha j) to the adversary \scrS . If | \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr | \geq t, then
additionally send a message (Leak, sid,Vj ,Cast, vj) to the adversary \scrS .
Tally:
• Upon receiving (DelCal, sid) from the voting committee Ci \in \scrC , set J2 :=
J2 \cup \{ Ci\} , and send a notification message (DelCalNotify, sid,Ci) to the
adversary \scrS .
105
Chapter 3: Proposed Treasury System The proposed voting scheme
• If | J2 \cup \scrC \sansh \sanso \sansn \sanse \sanss \sanst | + | \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr | \geq t, send (LeakDel, sid,DelCal(\scrE , \phi 2)) to \scrS .
• If | J2| \geq t, set \delta \leftarrow DelCal(\scrE , \phi 2).
• Upon receiving (Tally, sid) from the voting committee Ci \in \scrC , set J3 :=
J3 \cup \{ Ci\} , and send a notification message (TallyNotify, sid,Ci) to the
adversary \scrS .
• If | J3 \cup \scrC \sansh \sanso \sansn \sanse \sanss \sanst | + | \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr | \geq t, send (LeakTally, sid,TallyAlg(\scrV , \scrE , \phi 1, \phi 2, \delta ))
to \scrS .
• If | J3| \geq t, set \tau \leftarrow TallyAlg(\scrV , \scrE , \phi 1, \phi 2, \delta ).
• Upon receiving (ReadTally, sid) from any party, if \delta = \emptyset \wedge \tau = \emptyset ignore the
request. Otherwise, return (ReadTallyReturn, sid, (\delta , \tau )) to the requester.
Figure 3.10: The ideal functionality \scrF t,k,n,mVote
3.6.3 The Real/Hybrid World Execution
In the real/hybrid world, the treasury voting scheme utilises a number of supporting
components modelled as ideal functionalities. Specifically, the underlying blockchain
infrastructure upon which the treasury system is built is modeled as ideal blockchain
functionality [BMTZ17]. Moreover, the key generation functionality \scrF t,kDKG [Wik04] is
adopted for threshold key generation of the underlying public key cryptosystem. Finally,
a global clock functionality \scrG Clock [BMTZ17] is adopted to model the synchronised
network environment.
Let EXEC\Pi ,\scrA ,\scrZ denote the output of the environment \scrZ when interacting with parties
running the protocol \Pi and real-world adversary \scrA . Let EXEC\scrF ,\scrS ,\scrZ denote the output
of \scrZ when running protocol \phi interacting with the ideal functionality \scrF and the ideal
adversary \scrS .
Definition 7. We say that a protocol \Pi UC-realizes an ideal functionality \scrF if for any
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real/hybrid world adversary \scrA there exists an ideal world adversary \scrS such that for any
environment \scrZ that follows the rules of interaction for Universally Composable security
we have:
EXEC\Pi ,\scrA ,\scrZ \approx EXEC\scrF ,\scrS ,\scrZ .
3.6.4 The Voting Scheme
Let m be the number of experts and n be the number of voters. Let e
(m)
i \in \{ 0, 1\} m be the
unit vector whose i-th coordinate is 1 and the remaining coordinates are 0. Furthermore,
we also use the notation e
(\ell )
0 to denote an \ell -vector that contains 0 in all its coordinates.
We use Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(\ell )





i ) := Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(\ell )











In the voting scheme, every vote is encoded into a unit vector. When a vote is from an
expert, it is encoded as the unit vector 100 when expert's choice is Yes, 010 for No and
001 when the input from the expert is Abstain. However, for other voters, the vote is
encoded as a unit-vector of length m+3, where m is the number of experts in the system.
The vote is encoded as a unit vector with 1 in the coordinate i, for i \in [m] where a voter
delegates their vote. Similarly, where a voter votes directly by themselves, the vote is
encoded as a unit vector with 1 in the coordinate i for i \in [m + 1, . . . ,m + 3].
Formally, let encode\sansE and encode\sansV be the vote encoding algorithm for the expert and
voter, respectively. For an expert, upon receiving input x \in \{ Yes,No,Abstain\} , the
encode\sansE returns 100, 010, 001 for Yes,No,Abstain, respectively. However, for a voter,
the input is y \in \{ E1, . . . ,Em\} \cup \{ Yes,No,Abstain\} . When y = Ei, for i \in [m], it implies
that the voter delegates his/her voting power to the expert Ei i.e. expert whose index is
i. Alternatively, when y \in \{ Yes,No,Abstain\} , it implies that the voter directly votes
on the project.
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The encode\sansV returns a unit vector of length (m+3), denoted as v, such that v = e
(m+3)
i
if y = Ei, for i \in [m]; and v is set to e(m+3)m+1 , e
(m+3)
m+2 , and e
(m+3)
m+3 if y is Yes,No,Abstain,
respectively.
Note that since sending data to the blockchain consumes coins, it is implicitly assumed
that all the experts \scrE and voters \scrV have spare coins to pay the transaction fees that is
incurred during the protocol execution. Given that participation in the voting scheme
is incentivised, voters and experts can reclaim the costs in the form of treasury reward.









The corresponding coins owned by a voter Vi \in \scrV , an expert Ej \in \scrE , and a voting commit-
tee member Ct \in \scrC is denoted as (\{ In(\sansV i)\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansV i)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1), (\{ In
(\sansE j)
\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansE j)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1),
and (\{ In(\sansC t)\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansC t)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1), respectively.
The vote encoding scheme is used in the voting protocol depicted in Fig. 3.11 and is
relevant to the voting/delegation phase, and tally phase of the voting protocol.
The voting protocol \Pi t,k,m,nVote
Denote the corresponding coins owned by a voter Vi \in \scrV , an expert Ej \in 
\scrE , and a voting committee member Ct \in \scrC as (\{ In(\sansV i)\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansV i)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1),
(\{ In(\sansE j)\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansE j)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1), and (\{ In
(\sansC t)
\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansC t)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1), respectively.
Preparation phase:
• Upon receiving (Init, sid) from the environment \scrZ , the committee Cj , j \in [k]
sends (KeyGen, sid) to \scrF t,kDKG to generate pk.
Voting/Delegation phase:
• Upon receiving (Vote, sid, vj) from the environment \scrZ , the expert Ej , j \in [m]
does the following:
-- Send (ReadPK, sid) to \scrF t,kDKG, and receive (PublicKey, sid, pk) from
\scrF t,kDKG.
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-- Set the unit vector e(3) \leftarrow encode\sansE (vj). Compute cj(3) \leftarrow Enc\sansp \sansk (e(3))
and its NIZK proof \pi j (see Section 3.7).
-- Execute macro Send-Msg
\Bigl( 
(cj
(3), \pi j), \{ In
(\sansE j)
\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansE j)




• Upon receiving (Cast, sid, vi, \alpha i) from the environment \scrZ , the voter Vi,
i \in [n] does the following:
-- Send (ReadPK, sid) to \scrF t,kDKG, and receive (PublicKey, sid, pk) from
\scrF t,kDKG.
-- Set the unit vector e(m+3) \leftarrow encode\sansV (vi). Compute ui(m+3) \leftarrow 
Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(m+3)) and its NIZK proof \sigma i (see Section 3.7).
-- Execute macro Send-Msg
\Bigl( 
(ui
(m+3), \sigma i, \alpha i), \{ In(\sansV i)\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansV i)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1
\Bigr) 
.
(see Fig. 3.14 )
Tally phase:
• Upon receiving (DelCal, sid) from the environment \scrZ , the committee Ct,
t \in [k] does:
-- Execute macro Read-Msg and obtain data.
-- Fetch the ballots \{ (ci(3), \pi i)\} i\in [m] and \{ (uj(m+3), \sigma j , \alpha j)\} j\in [n] from data.
-- For i \in [m], check Verify(ci(3), \pi i) = 1; for j \in [n], Verify(uj(m+3), \sigma j) =
1. Remove all the invalid ballots.
-- For j \in [n], if a valid uj(m+3) is posted, parse uj(m+3) to (aj(m),bj(3)).
-- For j \in [n], \ell \in [0,m - 1], compute zi,\ell := a
\alpha j
j,\ell .
-- For i \in [0,m - 1], compute si :=
\prod n
\ell =1 z\ell ,i and jointly decrypt it to wi
(see [GJKR99]).
• Upon receiving (Tally, sid) from the environment \scrZ , the committee Ct,
t \in [k] does:
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-- For i \in [0,m - 1], \ell \in [0, 2], compute di,\ell := cwii,\ell .
-- For \ell \in [0, 2], compute x\ell :=
\prod m - 1





jointly decrypt it to y\ell (see [GJKR99]). Execute macro
Send-Msg
\Bigl( 
(x\ell , y\ell ), \{ In
(\sansC t)
\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansC t)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1
\Bigr) 
. (see Fig. 3.14 )
• Upon receiving (ReadTally, sid) from the environment \scrZ , the party P does
the following:
-- Execute macro Read-Msg and obtain data.
-- Fetch \{ (xi, yi)\} i\in [0,2] from data, and return
(ReadTallyReturn, sid, (y0, y1, y2)) to the environment \scrZ .
Figure 3.11: The voting protocol \Pi t,k,m,nVote in \{ \scrF Ledger,\scrF 
t,k
DKG\} -hybrid model
Input: a set of the expert labels \scrE , and a set of ballots \phi 2
Output: the delegation result \delta 
Init:
• For i \in [1,m], create and initiate Di = 0.
Delegation interpretation:
• For each ballot B \in \phi 2: parse B in form of (Vj ,Cast, vj , \alpha j); if
vj = (Delegate,Ei) for some Ei \in \scrE , then Di := Di + \alpha j .
Output:
• Return \delta := \{ (Ei, Di)\} i\in [m].
Algorithm DelCal
Figure 3.12: The delegation calculation algorithm DelCal
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Input: a set of the voters \scrV , a set of the experts \scrE , two sets of ballots \phi 1, \phi 2
and the delegation \delta .
Output: the tally result \tau 
Init:
• Create and initiate \tau \sansy \sanse \sanss = 0, \tau \sansn \sanso = 0 and \tau \sansa \sansb \sanss \sanst \sansa \sansi \sansn = 0.
• Parse \delta as \{ (Ei, Di)\} i\in [m].
Tally Computation:
• For each ballot B \in \phi 2: parse B in form of (Vj ,Cast, vj , \alpha j); if
vj = (Vote, aj) for some aj \in \{ yes, no, abstain\} , then \tau aj := \tau aj + \alpha j .
• For each ballot B \in \phi 1: parse B in form of (Ei,Vote, bi) for some
bi \in \{ yes, no, abstain\} , then \tau bi := \tau bi + Di.
Output:
• Return \tau := (\tau \sansy \sanse \sanss , \tau \sansn \sanso , \tau \sansa \sansb \sanss \sanst \sansa \sansi \sansn ).
The tally algorithm TallyAlg
Figure 3.13: The tally algorithm TallyAlg
3.6.4.2 Sending/Reading Data to/from \scrF Ledger
For parties to send and read data from the blockchain, we provide a macro depicted
in Fig. 3.14. The macro captures the three main pertinent types of delay for sending
and reading blockchain data in the blockchain model of [BMTZ17]. First, we have a
bounded network delay, and assume that all messages can be delivered within \Delta 1 rounds,
which is 2\Delta 1 clock-ticks in [BMTZ17]. Subsequently, a desynchronised user can get
up-to-date within 2\Delta 1 rounds (i.e. 4\Delta 1 clock-ticks) after registration. The second type
of delay captures the fact that the adversary can hold a valid transaction up to certain
blocks, but the adversary cannot permanently deny service to (or DoS) such a transaction.
Specifically, this is modeled by the ExtendPolicy in \scrF Ledger, where if a transaction is
more than \Delta 2 rounds (i.e. 2\Delta 2 clock-ticks) old, and is still valid with respect to the
current state, then it will be included into the state. Finally, the third delay is windowsize.
This captures that the adversary can set state-slackness of all the honest parties up to
the windowsize, which is consistent with the common prefix property in [GKL15]. Hence,
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all the honest parties can have a common state of any block that has been proposed for
more than windowsize. The windowsize is denoted as \Delta 3 rounds (i.e. 2\Delta 3 clock-ticks).
To send a message x to \scrF Ledger, we need to first check that a party has deregistered
and desynchronized. If true, the party needs to first send (Register, sid) to \scrF Ledger. It
should be noted that a registered but desynchronised party can still send a transaction
before it is fully updated as synchronised. Effectively, the message x is stored in the
payload of a `dummy' transaction whose input coins and output coins share the same
owner (spending condition).
To read a message (stored in the payload of some transaction) from \scrF Ledger, anal-
ogously a deregistered party needs to first send (Register, sid) to \scrF Ledger. After 4\delta 1
clock-ticks, the party can become synchronised. In order to receive the latest message,
the party needs to wait a maximum of 2(\Delta 2 + \Delta 3) clock-ticks for the transaction that
carries the intended message to be included in the state of the party.
3.7 A Novel Unit Vector ZK Proof
We denote a unit vector of length n as: e
(n)
i = (ei,0, . . . , ei,n - 1), where its i-th coordinate is
1 and the rest coordinates are 0. Conventionally, to show a vector of ElGamal ciphertexts
element-wise encrypt a unit vector, Chaum-Pedersen proofs [CP93] are used to show each
of the ciphertexts encrypts either 0 or 1 (via Sigma OR composition) and the product
of all the ciphertexts encrypts 1. This type of proof is used in many well-known voting
schemes, e.g. Helios [Adi08]. Although this proof works (is valid), the proof size is
linear in the length of the unit vector. Thus the communication overhead is considerably
significant when the unit vector length becomes larger.
In this section, we propose a novel special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK)
proof for unit vector that allows the prover to convince the verifier that a vector of
ciphertexts (C0, . . . , Cn - 1) encrypts a unit vector e
(n)
i , i \in [0, n - 1] with O(log n) proof
size. Without loss of generality, assume n is a perfect power of 2. Otherwise, append
Enc\sansp \sansk (0; 0) (i.e. trivial ciphertexts) to take the total number of ciphertexts to the next
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Macro Send-Msg(x, \{ Ini\} \ell 1i=1, \{ Outj\} 
\ell 2
j=1):
• If the party has deregistered and desynchronized:
-- Send (Register, sid) to \scrF Ledger.
-- Send
\Bigl( 





-- Send (De-Register, sid) to \scrF Ledger.
• If the party is already synchronized:
-- Send
\Bigl( 






• If the party has deregistered and desynchronized:
-- Send (Register, sid) to \scrF Ledger.
-- Wait for max\{ 4\Delta 1, 2(\Delta 2 + \Delta 3)\} clock-ticks by keeping sending
(Tick, sid) to the \scrG Clock.
-- Send (Read, sid) to \scrF Ledger and receive (Read, sid, data) from
\scrF Ledger.
-- Send (De-Register, sid) to \scrF Ledger.
• If the party is already synchronized:
-- Wait for max\{ 4\Delta 1, 2(\Delta 2 + \Delta 3)\} clock-ticks by keeping sending
(Tick, sid) to the \scrG Clock.
-- Send (Read, sid) to \scrF Ledger and receive (Read, sid, data) from
\scrF Ledger.
• Return data.
Sending and reading messages
Figure 3.14: Macro for sending and receiving message via \scrF Ledger
113
Chapter 3: Proposed Treasury System A Novel Unit Vector ZK Proof
power of 2. Our proposed novel SHVZK protocol can also be Fiat-Shamir transformed
to a non-interactive ZK (NIZK) proof in the random oracle model [BR93].
The basic idea of our construction is inspired by [GK15], where Groth and Kohlweiss
proposed a Sigma protocol for the prover to show that he (the prover) knows how to
open one out of many commitments. The key idea behind our construction is that there
exists a data-oblivious algorithm that can take as input i \in \{ 0, 1\} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n and output the
unit vector e
(n)
i . Let i1, . . . , i\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n be the binary representation of i. The algorithm is
depicted in Fig. 3.15.
Input: index i = (i1, . . . , i\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n) \in \{ 0, 1\} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n
Output: unit vector e
(n)
i = (ei,0, . . . , ei,n - 1) \in \{ 0, 1\} n
• For \ell \in [log n], set b\ell ,0 := 1 - i\ell and b\ell ,1 := i\ell ;
• For j \in [0, n - 1], set ei,j :=
\prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n
\ell =1 b\ell ,j\ell , where j1, . . . , j\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n is the binary
representation of j;
• Return e(n)i = (ei,0, . . . , ei,n - 1);
The algorithm that maps i \in [0, n - 1] to e(n)i
Figure 3.15: The algorithm that maps i \in [0, n - 1] to e(n)i
Intuitively, we let the prover first bit-wisely commit the binary presentation of
i \in [0, n - 1] for the unit vector e(n)i . The prover then shows that each of the commitments
of (i1, . . . , i\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n) indeed contains a 0 or 1, using the Sigma protocol proposed in Section
2.3 of [GK15]. Note that in the 3rd move of such a Sigma protocol, the prover reveals a
degree-1 polynomial of the committed message.
Let the corresponding degree-1 polynomials be denoted as:
z\ell ,1 := i\ell x + \beta \ell , \ell \in [log n]
where \beta \ell are chosen by the prover and x is chosen by the verifier. By linearity, we can
also define:
z\ell ,0 := x - z\ell ,1 = (1 - i\ell )x - \beta \ell , \ell \in [log n].
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According to the algorithm described in Fig.3.15, for j \in [0, n - 1], let j1, . . . , j\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n be the
binary representation of j, and the product
\prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n
\ell =1 z\ell ,j\ell can be viewed as a degree-(log n)
polynomial of the form
pj(x) = ei,jx
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n +




for some pj,k, k \in [0, log n - 1]. We then use batch verification to show that each of Cj
indeed encrypts ei,j . Particularly, for a randomly chosen y \leftarrow \BbbZ p, let
Ej := (Cj)
x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot Enc( - pj(x); 0);
the prover needs to show that
E :=









D\ell := Enc\sansp \sansk (
n - 1\sum 
j=0
(pj,\ell \cdot yj);R\ell ), \ell \in [0, log n - 1]
with fresh randomness R\ell \in \BbbZ p.
Fig. 3.16 details our construction which consists of 5 moves. Both the prover and the
verifier share a common reference string (CRS), which is a Pedersen commitment key that
can be generated using random oracle. The prover first commits to each bits of the binary
representation of i, and the commitments are denoted as I\ell , \ell \in [log n]. Subsequently, it
produces B\ell , A\ell as the first move of the Sigma protocol in Sec. 2.3 of [GK15] showing I\ell 
commits to 0 or 1. Jumping ahead, later the prover will receive a challenge x\leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} \lambda ,
and it then computes the third move of the Sigma protocol by producing
\{ z\ell , w\ell , v\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1 .
To enable batch verification, before that, the prover is given another challenge y \leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} \lambda 
in the second move. The prover computes and sends \{ D\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1\ell =0 . The verification
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comprises two parts described as follows. In the first part, the verifier checks the following
equations to ensure that I\ell commits to 0 or 1.
• (I\ell )x \cdot B\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (z\ell ;w\ell )
• (I\ell )x - z\ell \cdot A\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (0; v\ell )
In the second part, the verifier checks if




x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk ( - 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\prod 
\ell =1
z\ell ,j\ell ; 0)




is encryption of 0 by asking the prover to reveal the randomness.
Theorem 1. The protocol described in Fig. 3.16 is a 5-move public coin special honest
verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of e
(n)
i = (ei,0, . . . , ei,n - 1) \in \{ 0, 1\} n and
(r0, . . . , rn - 1) \in (\BbbZ p)n such that Cj = Enc\sansp \sansk (ei,j ; rj), j \in [0, n  - 1] under the DDH
assumption.
Proof. For perfect completeness, we first observe that the verification equations
(I\ell )
x \cdot B\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (z\ell ;w\ell )
and
(I\ell )
x - z\ell \cdot A\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (0; v\ell )
holds. Indeed, by additively homomorphic property of the commitment scheme,
(I\ell )
x \cdot B\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (i\ell \cdot x + \beta \ell ;\alpha \ell \cdot x + \gamma \ell )
and
(I\ell )
x - z\ell \cdot A\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (i\ell \cdot (x - z\ell ) + i\ell \cdot \beta \ell ;\alpha \ell \cdot (x - z\ell ) + \delta \ell ) = Com\sansc \sansk (i\ell (1 - i\ell ) \cdot x; v\ell ) .
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CRS: the commitment key ck
Statement: the public key pk and the ciphertexts C0 :=
Enc\sansp \sansk (ei,0; r0), . . . , Cn - 1 := Enc\sansp \sansk (ei,n - 1; rn - 1)
Witness: the unit vector e
(n)
i \in \{ 0, 1\} n and the randomness r0, . . . , rn - 1 \in \BbbZ p
Protocol:
• The prover P , for \ell = 1, . . . , log n, does:
-- Pick random \alpha \ell , \beta \ell , \gamma \ell , \delta \ell \leftarrow \BbbZ p;
-- Compute I\ell := Com\sansc \sansk (i\ell ;\alpha \ell ), B\ell := Com\sansc \sansk (\beta \ell ; \gamma \ell ) and
A\ell := Com\sansc \sansk (i\ell \cdot \beta \ell ; \delta \ell );
• P \rightarrow V : \{ I\ell , B\ell , A\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1 ;
• V \rightarrow P : Random y \leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} \lambda ;
• The prover P for \ell = 0, . . . , log n - 1, does:
-- Pick random R\ell \leftarrow \BbbZ p and compute D\ell := Enc\sansp \sansk 
\bigl( \sum n - 1
j=0 (pj,\ell \cdot yj);R\ell 
\bigr) 
• P \rightarrow V : \{ D\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1\ell =0 ;
• V \rightarrow P : Random x\leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} \lambda ;
• The prover P does the following:
-- Compute R :=
\sum n - 1
j=0 (rj \cdot x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot yj) +
\sum \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1
\ell =0 (R\ell \cdot x
\ell );
-- For \ell = 1, . . . , log n, compute z\ell := i\ell \cdot x + \beta \ell , w\ell := \alpha \ell \cdot x + \gamma \ell , and
v\ell := \alpha \ell (x - z\ell ) + \delta \ell ;
• P \rightarrow V : R and \{ z\ell , w\ell , v\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1
Verification:
• Check the followings:
• For \ell = 1, . . . , log n, does:
-- (I\ell )
x \cdot B\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (z\ell ;w\ell )
-- (I\ell )
x - z\ell \cdot A\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (0; v\ell )
•




x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk ( - 
\prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n
\ell =1 z\ell ,j\ell ; 0)
\bigr) yj \cdot \prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1\ell =0 (D\ell )x\ell = Enc\sansp \sansk (0;R),
where zj,1 = zj and zj,0 = x - zj .
Unit vector ZK argument
Figure 3.16: Unit vector ZK argument
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Since i\ell (1 - i\ell ) = 0 when i\ell \in \{ 0, 1\} , we have
(I\ell )
x - z\ell \cdot A\ell = Com\sansc \sansk (0; v\ell ) .
Moreover, for each j \in [0, n - 1],
\prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n
\ell =1 z\ell ,j\ell is a polynomial in the form of
pj(x) = ei,jx
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n +




where x is the verifier's challenge. Therefore, it is easy to see




x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk ( - 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\prod 
\ell =1
z\ell ,j\ell ; 0)
\bigr) yj
\cdot 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1\prod 
\ell =0
Enc\sansp \sansk (
n - 1\sum 
j=0
(pj,\ell \cdot yj);R\ell )x
\ell 
= Enc\sansp \sansk 
\Bigl( n - 1\sum 
j=0
\bigl( 
ei,j \cdot x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n  - pj(x) +
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1\sum 
\ell =0




= Enc\sansp \sansk (0;R) .
For soundness, first of all, the Sigma protocols for commitments of i\ell , \ell \in [log n] is
specially sound, i.e., given two transactions with the same \{ I\ell , B\ell , A\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1 and two differ-
ent x and \{ z\ell , w\ell , v\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1 , there exists a PPT extractor that can output the corresponding
witness i\ell \in \{ 0, 1\} .
Moreover,




x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk ( - 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\prod 
\ell =1
z\ell ,j\ell ; 0)
\bigr) yj
builds a degree-log n polynomial with respect to x in the plaintext, while




encrypts a degree-(log n - 1) polynomial w.r.t. x. Since x is randomly sampled after D\ell 
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is committed, Schwartz-Zippel lemma,




x\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk ( - 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\prod 
\ell =1
z\ell ,j\ell ; 0)




encrypts a zero polynomial with respect to x with overwhelming probability if the
polynomial evaluation is 0. Therefore,
Q(y) :=
n - 1\sum 
j=0
(ei,j  - 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\prod 
\ell =1
i\ell ,j\ell ) \cdot y
j = 0
with overwhelming probability. Similarly, by Schwartz-Zippel lemma, Q(y) is a zero






In terms of special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK), we now construct a
simulator Sim that takes as input the statement (C0, . . . , Cn - 1) and the given challenges
x, y \in \{ 0, 1\} \lambda , and outputs a simulated transcript whose distribution is indistinguishable
from the real one. Specifically, Sim first randomly picks i\ell \leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} and
\alpha \ell , \beta \ell , \gamma \ell , \delta \ell \leftarrow \BbbZ p, \ell \in [log n] .
It then computes
\{ I\ell , B\ell , A\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1
and
\{ z\ell , w\ell , v\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1
according to the protocol description. For \ell \in \{ 1, . . . , log n - 1\} , it then picks random
U\ell , R\ell \leftarrow \BbbZ p and computes
D\ell := Enc\sansp \sansk (U\ell ;R\ell ) .
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It then randomly picks R\leftarrow \BbbZ p, computes
D0 :=




\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}nEnc\sansp \sansk ( - 
\prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n
\ell =1 z\ell ,j\ell ; 0)
\bigr) yj \cdot \prod \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1\ell =1 (D\ell )x\ell 
After that, Sim outputs the simulated transcript as
\Bigl( 
\{ I\ell , B\ell , A\ell \} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n\ell =1 , y, \{ D\ell \} 
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}n - 1





This concludes our proof.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we described our proposed treasury system for supporting decentralised
cryptocurrency development. This is a really important step towards answering our
research question and fulfils our second objective. Specifically, it enables us to provide an
affirmative answer to our research question of designing provably secure self-sustenance
mechanism for blockchain development through community collaboration. The proposed
system leverage insights from our exploration of current blockchain practices in the
industry and literature presented in Chapter 2.
We explain our design choices and provide a robust funding source for the treasury
to support community proposals. Additionally, we abstract the underlying blockchain
and explained how the different entities in our treasury system leverage the blockchain.
Moreover, we formally discuss crucial protocols e.g., the distributed key generation
protocol, that make up the voting scheme at the core of our treasury system.
Given the distributed architecture of our voting scheme, we provide details of voter/-
expert registration and voting committee selection. The voting scheme supports liquid
democracy by allowing voters to either delegate their votes to experts or vote directly on
proposals in the treasury system.
The integrity of the voting tally and privacy of voter and expert ballots are guaranteed
as long as a majority of the voting committee members are honest. However, in the
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unlikely scenario where the majority (or all) committee members are corrupted by an
adversary, the integrity of the election tally is still guaranteed using the zero-knowledge
proofs publicly available on the blockchain. Although, the ballot secrecy of all voters and
experts can is no longer guaranteed.
Furthermore, we provide the formal description of our novel zero-knowledge proofs
for unit vector ballot with log size communication. This helps improves efficiency when
compared with similar schemes e.g. Helios, that require proof size that is linear in the
size of the ballot.
However, the current scheme supports blockchains where the amount of stake of any
stakeholder is publicly available on the public distributed ledger. Therefore, we provide
an extension of the techniques and protocols in Chapter 4 to support blockchains with







Closely related to treasury system operations on distributed ledger technologies is
blockchain governance. Governance is mainly concerned with the process of establishing
and maintaining order within systems (comprising agents with potentially conflicting
interests) to ensure continued assured mutual benefits. Generally, IT governance is
defined as a framework for decision rights and accountabilities to promote helpful conduct
in the IT utilisation [MZZS18]. Specifically, within the context of blockchains, while
principally, a treasury system is focused on decentralised funding of blockchain projects
towards self-sustenance for maintenance and development [ZOB18,KKN+], blockchain
governance is mostly concerned with the procedures to approving or making protocol
changes that affect blockchain consensus rules.
Despite the profound enthusiasm and promise of disruptive innovation around
blockchain technologies, there remain questions around coordination and governance
of activities on the blockchain, i.e. who is in charge? [ZPMS19]. Although, related to
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free open-source software operations, a crucial goal of governance in blockchains is to
prevent adverse forks (which are largely cheap to carry out on open-source software)
from disagreements.
It is well documented that disagreement within communities of blockchain technologies
(cryptocurrencies) stakeholders and practitioners can result in forks of the systems,
thereby, leading to severe weakening, diminished exchange value and utility, etc. of those
systems [DFL16, DuP17]. Real-world examples of such cryptocurrency forks include
Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin Gold, Ethereum Classic, etc.
The research presented in this chapter mainly represents non-trivial extension of the
concepts, techniques, and model of the blockchain-based treasury system presented in
Chapter 3. Specifically, the collaborative blockchain-based treasury system in Chapter 3
finds application in blockchain cryptocurrencies with public stake distribution. Namely,
the treasury systems assumes that information about the amount of stake/coins owned
by all stakeholders is publicly available on the public ledger. Note that, the public
availability of stake distribution does not imply that identity of stakeholders is also public,
i.e. identities could be pseudonymous, e.g. tied to addresses which are (hash of) public
keys.
The Bitcoin blockchain represents a good example of such a blockchain protocol
because information about the amount of Bitcoins owned by any address can be obtained
from publicly available data on the blockchain [WHO19] whilst the identity of the owner
is not revealed by the blockchain. However, we note that there exists several heuristics
and techniques (e.g. transaction graph analysis, network de-anonymisation) to attack
and compromise privacy and anonymity on public blockchains. The interested reader is
referred to [CELR18] for a detailed survey on the topic.
The public availability of transaction information on the ledger resulted in privacy and
security issues in first generation blockchain protocols. Consequently, privacy enhancing-
techniques such as stealth addresses [NBF+16], coin mixing, coinjoin [Max13] were
introduced to Bitcoin. Additionally, entirely new privacy-centric blockchain protocols
e.g. Zerocash [BCG+14] and CryptoNote [vS13] were also created to address the privacy
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issues of the Bitcoin protocol. Recently, for the first time [KKKZ19] provided a secure
PoS-based blockchain protocol that securely realises a distributed ledger under the UC
framework. The PoS-based privacy-preserving protocol of [KKKZ19] rely on combinations
of new cryptographic primitives key-private forward-secure encryption and evolving coins
to achieve security while Zerocash [BCG+14] rely on `transaction pouring' through
zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs).
Meanwhile, our new general decision-making system for blockchain governance pro-
vides a means for reaching resolutions and supports cryptocurrencies with private stake
information where amount of stake owned by any stakeholder is not publicly available
on the open ledger e.g. Zcash, Monero. Beyond supporting general blockchain decision-
making, it is compatible with most existing off-the-shelf cryptocurrencies and is easily
adaptable to a variety of decision-making rules, e.g. simple majority, fuzzy threshold
voting. For instance, the approval voting rule in the treasury system can easily be
extended to accommodate beyond the three main options- `YES, NO, ABSTAIN' - based
on the issues being decided upon.
Furthermore, to accommodate private stake information, in addition to the novel
unit vector proof in Section 3.7, a new honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proof-
s/arguments for the multiplicative relation between two vector ciphertexts is provided in
Section 4.3. In essence, it is a \sigma -protocol for making proofs that the contents of some com-
mitments have a multiplicative relationship with each other, i.e. a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge to demonstrate that two ciphertexts satisfy a multiplicative relationship.
Liquid democracy (also known as delegative democracy [For02]) as a hybrid of direct
democracy and representative democracy provides the benefits of both system [GA15,
CMM+16,KMP18] by enabling organisations to take advantage of the experts in a voting
process and also gives every member the opportunity to vote [ZZ17a, ZZ17b]. Green
in [GA15] axiomatically analysed that a delegation system is more democratic than
traditional representative or a direct voting system. Although the advantages of liquid
democracy has been widely discussed in the literature [Lom03,BBCV09,Nor03,GA15,
Ito04], there are few provably secure construction of liquid democracy voting.
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Most real-world implementations of liquid democracy only focus on the functionality
aspect of their schemes. For instance, Google Vote [HL15] is an internal Google experiment
on liquid democracy over the social media, Google+, which does not consider voter privacy.
Similarly, systems such as proxyfor.me [Pro15], LiquidFeedback [Liq], Adhocracy [ Ad],
GetOpinionated, [Deg] also offer poor privacy guarantees. It is worth mentioning that
Sovereign [Dem17] is a blockchain-based voting protocol for liquid democracy; therefore,
its privacy is inherited from the underlying blockchain, which provides pseudonymity-
based privacy. Wasa2il [McC16] is able to achieve end-to-end verifiability because this
foils privacy. The best known liquid democracy and proxy democracy voting schemes are
nVotes [nVo17] and Statement Voting [ZZ17a,ZZ17b]. However, those systems require
mix-nets as their underlying primitive. This makes them less compatible to the blockchain
setting due to the heavy work load of the mixing servers.
There are a few blockchain based e-voting schemes in the literature, but most of
them, e.g. Agora [Ago18], only use the blockchain as a realization of the public bulletin
board. The actual e-voting schemes are not integrated with the blockchain. Lee et. al.,
in [LJEK16] proposed a blockchain-based voting solution that heavily relies on an external
`trusted third party' between users and the election authority/authentication authority,
in order to ensure anonymity/privacy of voters. Each candidate is voted for by having
transactions sent to them. Nonetheless, privacy or anonymity of voters can be broken by
collusion between the authentication organisation and the trusted third party. Bistarelli
et. al., in [BMSS17] proposed an end-to-end voting system based on Bitcoin that utilises
a Kerberos-based protocol to achieve voter identity anonymisation. Voting takes place
via sending of tokens from voters to address (public key) of candidates. However, voting
is not private and other voters can be influenced by the trend or likelihood of the overall
results (before voting is concluded). Furthermore, the scheme is susceptible to coercion.
Our work differs from these earlier works because it supports liquid democracy whilst
preserving privacy of the voters and delegates involved in the decision-making process.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we present
the polling system for decision-making in Section 4.2 and a high-level description of the
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main extensions to the scheme presented in Subsection 3.6.4. Next, we provide the new
multiplicative relation zero-knowledge proof in 4.3. Finally, an examination of the quality
of individual choices with respect to final polling decisions is presented in Section 4.4.
The analysis serves as `soft-consensus' evaluation of the general blockchain decisions
by enabling individual participants and the entire system to evaluate agreement on
issues based on decision outcomes. Consequently, this encourages increased discussions,
interactions and general understanding and context among community members towards
issues being decided upon within the system.
4.2 The Proposed Polling Scheme
Here, we briefly describe the main differences between the original scheme in the proposed
treasury system and the privacy-preserving scheme covered in this chapter. Specifically,
two main changes are required to support blockchains with private stake. The first change
involves the voter ballot and the other change covers the process of computing the voting
tally at the end of voting. Next, we recall the ballot encoding process from the treasury
system voting scheme below and thereafter explain the change in the ballot creation
process.
Let m be the number of experts and n be the number of voters. Let e
(m)
i \in \{ 0, 1\} m
be the unit vector where its i-th coordinate is 1 and the rest coordinates are 0.We use
Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(\ell )
i ) to denote coordinate-wise encryption of e
(\ell )
i , i.e. Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(\ell )







i,1 , . . . , e
(\ell )
i,\ell ). Let u
(\ell )
i = Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(\ell )
i,1)
In the treasury system, a voter's ballot is represented as Enc\sansp \sansk (e
(\ell )
i ). However, in the
privacy-preserving voting scheme, the original unit-vector ballot is accompanied with a




i,1 , . . . , v
(\ell )
i,\ell ).
Basically, at a high-level, each voter provides a zero-knowledge proof that confirms




i and their stake \alpha 
whose encrypted value can be verified on the public ledger. See Section 4.3 for a formal
presentation of the multiplicative relation zero-knowledge proof. Therefore, the additional
ballot v
(\ell )
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in the equation below.
v
(\ell )
i = \alpha \cdot e
(\ell )
i
Therefore, given the already weighted unit vector ballots, the tally procedure no
longer requires the weighting of voter ballots before homomorphic addition. The tally
procedure then proceeds as described in the original delegative voting scheme in Chapter 3.
Specifically, the delegations section of each ballot is homomorphically combined and jointly
decrypted by the voting committee using decryption shares they provide. Thereafter,
expert ballots are weighted by the amount of delegation received and homomorphically
combined with the direct voting sections of the voters' ballots to obtain the encrypted
tally. Finally, voting committee members provide decryption shares and jointly decrypt
the election tally ciphertext. Figure 4.1 depicts an overview of the main pre-voting,
voting and post-voting operations in the privacy-preserving scheme. Basically, it depicts
operations carried out by the voting committee, voters and experts in the election process.
It covers the ballot casting procedures by voters and experts as well as the procedures
involved in the election tally computation. Additionally, a formal presentation of the
protocol for the polling scheme is depicted in Fig. 4.2.
4.3 A New Vector Multiplicative Relation Zero-knowledge Proof
Besides the novel unit vector zero-knowledge proof of Section 3.7, the multiplicative
relation zero-knowledge protocol presented in this section are required for secure execution
of the polling protocol \scrF Poll described in Fig. 4.2.
Let u(n) = (u0, . . . , un - 1) and v
(n) = (v0, . . . , vn - 1) be two vectors of n elements such
that vi = \alpha \cdot ui for i \in [n]. Given element-wise encryption of u(n), v(n) and \alpha , we now
construct a 3-move honest verifier ZK proof of knowledge showing that u(n) and v(n) are
in the correct multiplicative relation with respect to \alpha . Specifically, for i \in [0, n - 1], given
C := Enc\sansp \sansk (\alpha ;\beta ) and Ai := Enc\sansp \sansk (ai; ri), we set Vi := C
ai \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; ti). This allows the
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Figure 4.1: An overview of interactions among voting committee members, voters, experts and
the underlying blockchain in the privacy-preserving delegable voting scheme for
general blockchain-based decision-making.
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\bfS \bfe \bft \bfu \bfp \bfp \bfh \bfa \bfs \bfe :
• Upon receiving (Init, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) from the environment \scrZ , the committee \sansC j , j \in [k] sends
(KeyGen, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) to \scrF t,kDKG to generate \sansp \sansk .
\bfB \bfa \bfl \bfl \bfo \bft \bfc \bfa \bfs \bft \bfi \bfn \bfg \bfp \bfh \bfa \bfs \bfe :
• Upon receiving (Vote, \sanss \sansi \sansd , vj) from the environment \scrZ , the expert \sansE j , j \in [m] does
the following:
-- Send (ReadPK, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) to \scrF t,kDKG, and receive (PublicKey, \sanss \sansi \sansd , \sansp \sansk ) from \scrF 
t,k
DKG.
-- Set the unit vector \bfe (3) \leftarrow \sanse \sansn \sansc \sanso \sansd \sanse \sansE (vj). Compute \bfc \bfj (3) \leftarrow \sansE \sansn \sansc \sansp \sansk (\bfe (3)) and its
NIZK proof \pi j
-- Post (\sansE j , \bfc \bfj 
(3), \pi j) to \scrF Ledger.
• Upon receiving (Cast, \sanss \sansi \sansd , vi, \alpha i) from the environment \scrZ , the voter \sansV i, i \in [n] does
the following:
-- Send (ReadPK, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) to \scrF t,kDKG, and receive (PublicKey, \sanss \sansi \sansd , \sansp \sansk ) from \scrF 
t,k
DKG.
-- Set the unit vector \bfe (m+3) \leftarrow \sanse \sansn \sansc \sanso \sansd \sanse \sansV (vi). Compute \bfc \bfi (m+3) \leftarrow \sansE \sansn \sansc \sansp \sansk (\bfe (m+3))
and its NIZK proof \sigma i
-- Compute \^\alpha i \leftarrow \sansE \sansn \sansc \sansp \sansk (\alpha i) and \bfv \bfi (m+3) := ((\^\alpha i)e0 \cdot \sansE \sansn \sansc \sansp \sansk (0), . . . , (\^\alpha i)em+2 \cdot \sansE \sansn \sansc \sansp \sansk (0))
together with a NIZK proof \rho i.
-- Post (\sansV i,\bfu \bfi 
(m+3),\bfv \bfi 
(m+3), \sigma i, \^\alpha i, \rho i) to \scrF Ledger.
\bfT \bfa \bfl \bfl \bfy /\bfR \bfe \bfs \bfu \bfl \bft \bfp \bfh \bfa \bfs \bfe :
• Upon receiving (DelCal, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) from the environment \scrZ , the committee \sansC t, t \in [k]
does:
-- Read \scrF Ledger and obtain \sansd \sansa \sanst \sansa .
-- Fetch the ballots \{ (\sansE i, \bfc \bfi (3), \pi i)\} i\in [m] and \{ (\sansV i,\bfu \bfi (m+3),\bfv \bfi (m+3), \sigma i, \^\alpha i, \rho i)\} i\in [n]
from \sansd \sansa \sanst \sansa .
-- For i \in [m], check \sansV \sanse \sansr \sansi \sansf \sansy (\bfc \bfi (3), \pi i) = 1; for j \in [n], \sansV \sanse \sansr \sansi \sansf \sansy (\bfu \bfj (m+3), \sigma j) = 1 and
\sansV \sanse \sansr \sansi \sansf \sansy (\^\alpha i,\bfu \bfj 
(m+3),\bfv \bfj 
(m+3), \rho j) = 1. Remove all the invalid ballots.
-- For j \in [n], if a valid \bfv \bfj (m+3) is posted, parse \bfv \bfj (m+3) to (\bfa \bfj (m),\bfb \bfj (3)).
-- For i \in [0,m - 1], compute si :=
\prod n
\ell =1 a\ell ,i and jointly decrypt it to wi
• Upon receiving (Tally, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) from the environment \scrZ , the committee \sansC t, t \in [k] does:
-- For i \in [0,m - 1], \ell \in [0, 2], compute di,\ell := cwii,\ell .
-- For \ell \in [0, 2], compute x\ell :=
\prod m - 1
j=0 dj,\ell \cdot 
\prod n
j=1 bj,\ell and jointly decrypt it to y\ell 
• Upon receiving (ReadTally, \sanss \sansi \sansd ) from the environment \scrZ , the party P does the
following:
-- Read \scrF Ledger and obtain \sansd \sansa \sanst \sansa .
-- Fetch \{ (xi, yi)\} i\in [0,2] from \sansd \sansa \sanst \sansa , and return (ReadTallyReturn, \sanss \sansi \sansd , (y0, y1, y2))
to the environment \scrZ .
The voting protocol \Pi t,k,m,nPoll
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prover to be oblivious about the plaintext inside C to complete the proof. The protocol
is depicted in Fig. 4.3. Details of implementation performance metrics e.g. running time
and proof size, are provided in Chapter 5.
Vector multiplicative relation ZK argument
Statement: pk, C, \{ Ai := Enc\sansp \sansk (ai; ri)\} n - 1i=0 and \{ Vi := Cai \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; ti)\} 
n - 1
i=0
Witness: \{ ai, ri, ti\} n - 1i=0
Protocol:
• The prover P :
-- Pick random x, y, z \leftarrow \BbbZ p;
-- Compute X := Enc\sansp \sansk (x, y) and Z := C
x \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z);
• P \rightarrow V : X,Z;
• V \rightarrow P : Random \rho \leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} \lambda ;
• The prover P does:
-- Set x\prime := x +
\sum n - 1
i=0 ai \cdot \rho i+1, y\prime := y +
\sum n - 1
i=0 ri \cdot \rho i+1, and z\prime :=
z +
\sum n - 1
i=0 ti \cdot \rho i+1;
• P \rightarrow V : x\prime , y\prime , z\prime ;
Verification:
• Return valid if and only if the following are true:
-- Z \cdot 




x\prime \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z\prime )
-- X \cdot 
\prod n - 1
i=0 A
\rho i+1
i = Enc\sansp \sansk (x
\prime , y\prime )
Figure 4.3: Vector multiplicative relation ZK argument
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Theorem 2. The protocol described in Fig. 4.3 is a 3-move public coin special honest
verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of \{ ai, ri, ti\} n - 1i=0 such that:
\{ Ai := Enc\sansp \sansk (ai; ri)\} n - 1i=0
and
\{ Vi := Cai \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; ti)\} n - 1i=0 .
Proof. For perfect completeness, we first observe that the following verification equations
hold:
Z \cdot 





x\prime \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z\prime )
and
Y \cdot 




i = Enc\sansp \sansk (x
\prime , y\prime ) .
Indeed, by additively homomorphic property,
Z \cdot 






n - 1\prod 
i=0
(Cai)\rho 
i+1 \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z) \cdot 
n - 1\prod 
i=0
Enc\sansp \sansk (0; ti)
\rho i+1
= Cx+
\sum n - 1
i=0 ai\cdot \rho 
i+1 \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z +
n - 1\sum 
i=0
ti \cdot \rho i+1)
= Cx
\prime \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z\prime ) .
Similarly,
X \cdot 




i = Enc\sansp \sansk (x, y) \cdot 
n - 1\prod 
i=0
Enc\sansp \sansk (ai \cdot \rho i+1; ri \cdot \rho i+1) = Enc\sansp \sansk (x\prime , y\prime ) .
For soundness, we show that the protocol is an argument of knowledge (AoK),
by showing that it has a witness-extended emulator. Since the challenge \rho \in \BbbZ p is
randomly chosen, by Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the prover has negligible probability of
convincing the verifier unless all \rho i related terms match on each side of the equality for all
i \in \{ 0, . . . , n - 1\} . The witness-extended emulator Ext runs \langle P \ast , V \rangle to get a transcript.
131
Chapter 4: Blockchain Decision-making Multiplicative Relation ZK
If the prover P \ast has probability p(\lambda ) of making an acceptable argument, the black-box
witness-extended emulator Ext also has success probability p(\lambda ) to produce an accepting
argument. It rewinds the protocol to the challenge phase and runs it with fresh challenges
until it has n acceptable arguments. Since the prover P \ast has probability p(\lambda ) of making
an accepting argument in the first place, the emulator Ext will take an average of n/p(\lambda )
rewinds, which takes poly(\lambda ) running time. Again, there is overwhelming probability
that we have transcripts with n different challenges. The n different challenges give us a
n\times n transposed Vandermonde matrix
\scrV =
\left[         
1 1 . . . 1





\rho n - 11 \rho 
n - 1
2 . . . \rho 
n - 1
n
\right]         





i denote the prover's replay when \rho i is challenged in the accepting transcripts. By




i, we can get three vectors
\scrX := (x\prime 1, . . . , x\prime n),\scrY := (y\prime 1, . . . , y\prime n),\scrZ := (z\prime 1, . . . , z\prime n) .
Hence, Ext can compute
(x, u0, . . . , un - 1) := \scrX \cdot \scrV  - 1,
(y, r0, . . . , rn - 1) := \scrY \cdot \scrV  - 1,
and
(z, t0, . . . , tn - 1) := \scrZ \cdot \scrV  - 1
Thereafter, Ext outputs the witness \{ ai, ri, ti\} n - 1i=0 .
For perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge, we need to construct a simulator \scrS ,
that on receiving challenge \rho outputs the simulated argument that is indistinguishable
from a real argument with challenge \rho . On challenge \rho , the simulator \scrS randomly selects
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x\prime , y\prime , z\prime \leftarrow \BbbZ p. It then computes
X := Enc\sansp \sansk (x
\prime , y\prime )/







\prime \cdot Enc\sansp \sansk (0; z\prime )/





The simulator \scrS then outputs (X,Z, \rho , x\prime , y\prime , z\prime ). Clearly, the distribution of simulated
transcript is identical to the distribution of a real one. Hence, the protocol is perfect
special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
4.4 Analysing Consensus
The overarching aim of decision-making mechanisms is to reach the best decision. However,
it is usually unclear what constitutes the best alternative. In other words, in a multi-party
decision-making process, it is difficult to agree on what constitutes the best solution,
due to differences in individual preferences, interests, knowledge, skill, orientation, etc.
Therefore, integration of community-wide knowledge, skills and expertise of members is
fundamental for long-term sustainability of jointly-maintained utilities such as blockchain
(developmental projects).
Consensus building [IB99] has been proposed as a way to deal with complex, strate-
gic and often controversial planning and decision-making. Sustained innovation and
development requires the continued maintenance of the complex interaction between
all stakeholders (with varying expertise, skill sets and values). The goal is to select
and implement solutions that offers `mutual' gains among contending, and potentially
conflicting stakeholders. Within collaborative governance, consensus emanates from
inclusive representation of all relevant participants with shared objective, and com-
mitment to providing solutions and establishing and building trust towards marginal
successes [IB99,ENB11,AG07].
Consensus building or processes are typically time-costly and resource-consuming.
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However, the nature of decentralised blockchain infrastructure helps mitigate against these
potential challenges. For instance, by design, planning on decision-making within the
governance and treasury system supports lengthy discussions and deliberations spanning
a range of system epochs in any given system period. Specifically, there is ample time to
discuss and deliberate on submissions, issues and proposals before the voting process.
Similarly, the decentralised nature of blockchain technologies and `electronic' voting
reduces required resources associated with general decision-making, e.g. access to web
browser and internet [Adi08].
Conversely, within collaborative decision-making settings, it is suggested that consen-
sus kills innovation, creativity and uniqueness by encouraging individuals that participate
in the process to (tend to) abandon their decisions and align with the group decision.
However, this is not necessarily true considering that the debates and discussions take
place before compromises are made or decisions are reached. Moreover, our decision-
making systems provide vote privacy because ballots are encrypted. Hence, it is difficult
for any individual participant to pre-emptively align their votes with others (or the group
choice) because it is not clear what other participants' choices or the most popular choices
are (before tally results are released). Accordingly, rather than suppress the individual,
consensus empowers the individual through social activity and interaction [Tri89], and
can lead to novel practices, ideas, and relationships within the community.
Research evidence shows that engaged citizenry/community is better than a passive
one [IS04] and collaborative decision-making with community-inclusive participation can
also help achieve improved community relations. As a result, participants become willing
evaluators of decisions and policies, which results in improved community-wide support
for decisions reached rather than factional support. Thus, enhancing the effectiveness
of collaborative decision-making for governance, which is particularly important to
maintaining sustainable blockchain systems.
Agreement represents, perhaps, the single most popular criterion for evaluating
consensus. Typically in the literature, consensus is analysed in terms of agreement [IB99,
ENB11,BM10]. We emphasise that consensus is not Majority Rule. Consensus involves the
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evaluation of agreement among a set of parties on a set of alternative solutions [HVHC02]
in a multi-party collaborative decision-making process (e.g. blockchain decision-making
process). Classical definitions of consensus imply absolute agreement among all parties
as a condition for consensus [IB99]. This type of (full) consensus is quite feasible within
small teams or organisations with members having relevant information needed for
decision-making, although, it allows a single `opposing' member to stall the process of
decision-making. Moreover, the extreme implausibility of guaranteed/continuous full
agreement on all issues among parties, makes this definition of consensus problematic
and less useful. By extension, this definition would equate the utility of decisions with
`almost unanimous', i.e. very high but not perfect, agreement to those with complete
disagreement - as both being not useful. Nonetheless, in real-world scenarios multi-party
decisions need not be unanimous or in absolute agreement (full consensus) for decisions
to be useful.
Soft consensus or acceptable threshold of consensus (rather than full consensus)
suffices for collaborative decision-making systems involving dispersed and cross-functional
networks/participants [IH18]. We remark that setting thresholds for consensus is difficult
due to the inherent dynamic nature of consensus and the issues/topics being decided upon.
No two decision-making scenarios are the same. In evaluating consensus, it is critical to
identify the uniqueness and nuances of each decision-making scenario. For instance, any
real-world assessment of consensus of a collaborative decision-making process need to
consider the nature of the decision, the open and available facts, the issues of contention,
amount of funds involved (in the case of treasury), proposal submission and deliberation
time, participants, etc., for any useful inference to be drawn about understanding and
improving consensus. Identifying consensus building processes and outcomes is difficult
and effective consensus requires adaptation and can sometimes be autonomous [IB99].
Therefore, in order to accommodate the spectrum of consensus between unanimous
agreement and total disagreement, soft agreement is defined as an iterative dynamic
process that evaluates the agreement between all participants, and the agreement between
the individual participant's preference and the group solution [HVHC02]. Typically, two
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primary related measures are used to evaluate consensus. Namely, Consensus measure
- measure of agreement among all participants - and Proximity measure - measure of
agreement between individual solutions and collective solution [HVHC02, IB99].
In line with the aim of collaborative decision-making, we note that our key goal
of evaluating consensus is not to produce `winners and losers', rather, the goal is to
build, enhance and encourage community-wide participation and acceptance (sense of
belonging and responsibility) and ownership of the growth, changes and developments
of the underlying blockchain system. Consequently, feedback is a key component of
consensus evaluation because information obtained from proximity measure is useful for
influencing discussion and minimising disagreement among stakeholders [HVHC02].
Evidently, developments or changes with better consensus are more durable and
sustainable because high consensus implies a higher agreement (support) among the
parties of the decision-making process. Furthermore, agreements of this nature tend to
be of very high quality because they generally take into consideration the knowledge
offered by each participant [IB99] rather than only interests of some parties.
With the help of an illustrative example of a system period, we now provide an
evaluation of consensus of our blockchain-based decision-making process.
4.4.1 Example of Consensus Evaluation
Typically, consensus is measured through the use of some dissimilarity function e.g. cosine
of angles, Euclidean distance. The dissimilarity is measured between corresponding
individual preferences/solutions (proximity measure) and group solution, as well as
the evaluation of agreement among all participants on the group solution (consensus
measure).
For the purpose of consensus measurement in our blockchain decision-making system,
we propose an adaptation of the approach of [BM10], which itself is an adaptation
of [HVHC02]. In [BM10], proximity measure and consensus measure were utilised in
evaluating the degree of consensus on a spatial-GIS decision among relevant stakeholders.
Our adaptation is essential in order to accommodate subtleties peculiar to blockchain
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systems (or cryptocurrencies) e.g. cryptocurrency stake distribution. Specifically, for
consensus measurement on our blockchain-based decision-making system, we identify the
following key elements:
• Proposals, issues or alternative solutions
• Stakeholders or participants in the decision-making process
• Available resources (or system funds)
• The decision-making process (or voting scheme)
• Outcomes of the decision-making process (or solution set)
• Agreement among all participants (or consensus measure)
• Agreement between individual solutions and the system outcome/solution (or
proximity measure)
Furthermore, below is a list of the processes/steps for consensus evaluation (of
decisions) within our blockchain-based collaborative decision-making system:
• Preference specification
• Collective solution calculation
• Distance measure
• Distance aggregation
• Consensus measure and
• Proximity measure
We now present an explanation of each of the above-outlined steps involved in the
consensus evaluation process using 10 hypothetical example proposals that have been
submitted to the blockchain and decided upon using the decision making system.
Following results in usability [Vir92,Lew94], we assume 5 participants (2 experts and
3 voters) are involved in the current voting process. For simplicity, without the loss of
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generality, we also assume a flat model of stake distribution in this illustrative period
of the decision-making system. Namely, we assume that all participants (expert/voter)
have equal stake in the system e.g. 1 coin each.
4.4.1.1 Preference Specification
Each participant respectively specify his preferences based on his assessment of the
individual proposals, using criteria/guidelines such as: usefulness of proposal, timeliness,
cost-benefit impact of proposal, profile of proposer, relevance of proposal, urgency of
proposal, amount of funds requested, duration of proposal, quality of proposal, etc.
However, users are free to further evaluate proposals as they deem fit (or based on their
personal judgement).
Particularly, users vote Yes,No,Abstain for proposals either directly or indirectly
by delegating their voting power to experts in that particular topic. For consensus
evaluation, we encode a Yes,No, or Abstain vote as 1, 0, or \bot respectively. We remark
that the ballots of users who vote Abstain (\bot ) for any proposal are treated as being
the same as the system outcome for that proposal. Hence, for consensus evaluation,
they are considered as being in agreement with whatever is the outcome of the group
decision-making for the affected proposal.
4.4.1.2 Collective Solution Calculation
The group solution of our decision-making system is obtained through the application of
the voting rule on all the ballots cast by the experts and voters in the system. Specifically,
for our system, where the voting rule is Fuzzy Threshold Voting, this corresponds to
ranking of the alternative proposals based on the number of votes for minus the number
of votes against, and checking that the remainder is at least 10\% of all votes recorded (or
system threshold).
Particularly, in the case of treasury system voting, winning proposals are determined
as those that receive funding from the (ranked) list of all `qualified proposals'. Therefore,
proposals that meet the minimum threshold but do not receive funding because of the
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limitation of available funds are not considered members of the set of `winning proposals'.
The set of `winning proposals' are those that satisfy all the winning requirements within
the decision-making system.
Details of how the participants voted on all 10 proposals in our illustrative example
is presented below. Table 4.1 provides information on how all voters and experts cast
their ballots.
Table 4.1: User preference
Prj 1 Prj 2 Prj 3 Prj 4 Prj 5 Prj 6 Prj 7 Prj 8 Prj 9 Prj 10
User 1 / Voter 1 1 B 1 B 1 B A A B \bot 
User 2 / Voter 2 \bot 1 1 \bot 0 1 1 0 \bot 1
User 3 / Expert A 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
User 4 / Expert B 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
User 5 / Voter 3 0 1 A 1 \bot A 1 \bot A 1
Total 3 5 4 3 1 5 2 1 4 2
System Decision 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
4.4.1.3 (Normalised) Distance Measure
For each participant, we calculate the distance measure (DM) of every vote/ballot for
each proposal by comparing the participant's choice with the system decision. We apply
the dissimilarity function given below:




where DMi,j (respectively, NDMi,j) is the distance (respectively, normalised distance)
between the ith participant's choice for project j and the system solution for proposal
j is TSj . PPi,j is the i
th participant's preference/choice for project j and PS is the
preference size of voter's choice.
In the case of our blockchain decision-making system PS = 2, for choices Yes and No
because Abstain is interpreted differently. As earlier explained, for consensus evaluation,
the choice of voters/experts who vote Abstain i.e. \bot for any proposal is considered
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as being the same as system decision for that particular proposal. Hence, a distance
measure of zero (0) is assigned for a participant who votes Abstain for any project
proposal. The distance measure based on the users' choice specification for the system
decision-making is presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Distance specification
Prj 1 Prj 2 Prj 3 Prj 4 Prj 5 Prj 6 Prj 7 Prj 8 Prj 9 Prj 10
Voter 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Voter 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Expert A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Expert B 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Voter 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
4.4.1.4 Distance Aggregation and Consensus Degree on Projects
Using the normalised distance measure, NDM, we calculate the degree of consensus
among all participants (voters and experts) on each project as follows:





where CDj is the consensus degree for project j, and p is the size/number of participants.
The consensus degree based on the distance measure of users' choice in the system
decision-making is presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Consensus degree
Prj 1 Prj 2 Prj 3 Prj 4 Prj 5 Prj 6 Prj 7 Prj 8 Prj 9 Prj 10
Voter 1 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
Voter 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5
Expert A 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Expert B 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
Voter 3 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5
Total 1.5 0 0.5 1.5 0.5 0 1.0 0.5 0 1.0
Consensus degree 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8
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4.4.1.5 Consensus Measure
We now proceed to calculate the overall consensus among all participants (for our
illustrative example through an aggregation of the consensus degrees, CD. The consensus
measure, CM , is calculated through the aggregation procedure of [YF94], which utilises
Ordered Weighted Average (OWA). The aggregation operator enables the consensus
degrees on the `winning proposals' have more importance or weight [HVHC02] in the
aggregation procedure. The expression for CM is as follows:










where CDW is the set of consensus degrees for `winning proposals', t is its cardinality, n
is the total number of projects, and \beta \in [0, 1] is used to control the influence of consensus
degree of the winning projects on the overall consensus measure in the decision-making
system.
Evidently, higher values of \beta causes consensus degree of the winning proposals to
highly influence the overall consensus measure. Typical values of \beta recommended in
the literature are 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9 [HVHC02, BM10]. We use a \beta value of 0.8 in our
example to emphasize the importance of consensus degree among the participants on the
winning projects. Clearly, the value of \beta at any given (system) period will be influenced
and determined by a number of system factors, e.g. number of proposals, urgency and
crucialness of proposal, previous \beta values. Table 4.4 shows the consensus measure for
different values of \beta .
Table 4.4: Consensus measure for various values of \beta 
\beta 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
CM 0.87 0.881 0.891 0.902 0.912 0.923 0.933 0.944 0.954 0.964 0.975
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4.4.1.6 Proximity Measure of Participants
Here, we evaluate the proximity measure, PM , of each participant's voting preference to
the collective system-wide decision by aggregating each participant's distance measure
across all the proposals. Analogous to the calculation of consensus measure, we utilise
OWA aggregation operator as follows:











where NDMi,j is the distance measure between participant i
\prime s preference for proposal
j and the collective decision for proposal j. For participant i, NDMWi,k is a special
normalised distance measure between the collective decision for proposal k in the `set of
winning proposals' and the corresponding participant i\prime s preference for that proposal.
Thus, NDMW only considers normalised distance measures for proposals that satisfy the
decision-making system winning requirements, i.e. winning proposals.
Table 4.5: Proximity measure for \beta = 0.8
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 1 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 3 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 4 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 5 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 6 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 7 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 8 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 9 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{j}. 10 \mathrm{A}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{g}. PMi PMi(\beta = 0.8)
\mathrm{U}1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 0.85 (1 - \beta )0.85 + \beta 0.97
\mathrm{U}2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.9 (1 - \beta )0.9 + \beta 0.98
\mathrm{E}.\mathrm{A} 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.95 (1 - \beta )0.95 + \beta 0.99
\mathrm{E}.\mathrm{B} 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.8 (1 - \beta )0.8 + 0.875\beta 0.86
\mathrm{U}5 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.85 (1 - \beta )0.85 + \beta 0.97
As earlier explained, we assign a value of 0.8 to \beta and present the proximity measure
between each participant's preference and the system decision in Table 4.5 above. Table 4.5
summarises the proximity measure for the example considered. Evidently, participants
with high proximity measures contribute positively towards the system consensus while
proximity measures close to zero signify negative contribution towards overall decision-
making system consensus. Besides, it can be observed that Voter 1 and Voter 5 both
have the same proximity measure of 0.97, despite having different voting preferences.
This can be explained by the observation that these two voters voted exactly the same
way for proposals in the `winning set'. In turn, the `winning set' or collective decision
highly influenced our aggregated measures due to the high \beta value used.
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4.5 Applications
In this section we briefly discuss additional independent applications for some of the
delegable voting systems at the core of our treasury system presented in Chapter 4
and its extension discussed in Chapter 5. Specifically, we explore the use of the system
in decentralised blockchain oracles and provide general guideline for their adoption by
ERC20 token based blockchains on Ethereum.
For increased utility of blockchains, there is need for these platforms to provide data to
and access data from sources that are external to the blockchains themselves [ZCC+16b].
Oracles are simply external/additional sources of data/information for a system e.g.,
hashing oracles, decryption oracles, etc. For blockchain systems, an oracle is an agent
that provides additional real-world data that are external to the blockchain's system.
Data oracles can be used to retrieve general data which may be needed for triggering
certain conditions in smart contracts applications based on real-world events.
Decentralised oracles can be used as market data oracles for providing blockchains
with data about real-world markets. For instance, decentralised oracles are used in
decentralised prediction markets such as Augur1 and Gnosis2 to support placement of
wages on future real-world events. Decentralised oracles also find application in smart
securities, derivatives, insurance, Trade Finance, etc.
Typically, on the native web, oracles can be thought of as third-party APIs. However,
a critical factor to consider for deployment of oracles on blockchain platforms is the
absence of `a trusted party'. Therefore, it is crucial that decentralised oracles are
used to provide data to blockchains, to prevent single point of failure. For example,
TownCrier [ZCC+16b] provides an authenticated data feed for blockchain platforms
by using trusted hardware (Intel's SGX) to retrieve data from trusted HTTPS-enabled
website and serving same to smart-contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. TownCrier
adopts simple majority voting among multiple websites offering the same information,
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solve the oracle problem of blockchain platforms and smart contracts. To prevent single
point of failure, Chainlink relies on many nodes to source responses for off-chain data
requests.
Our proposed voting scheme can be deployed within decentralised oracle networks to
determine `truth' among competing solutions or answers proposed by oracle nodes as
response to data request on a decentralised oracle network. The voting scheme can be
deployed in a majority election rule to determine the `truth' among the available options.
We remark that computational expense (gas in Ethereum) is a key factor that
impacts design choices for contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. Code execution cost
on Ethereum is standardised using gas, and opcode's gas cost is based on its expected
execution time. Gas is the measure of computational complexity of a transaction on
Ethereum, i.e. the more the operations, the higher the cost of gas needed for execution.
Naturally, similar to xMcCorry et al. in [MSH17], the voting protocol can be deployed
as multiple smart contracts directly on the Ethereum blockchain and rely on nodes the
network to ensure the correct execution of the protocol. A single smart contract that
handles the election process and the logic of the voting protocol and zero-knowledge
verification, and another contract for distribution of zero-knowledge proofs required for
correct protocol execution by the parties involved. The second contract is to ensure all
participants use the same codes for the creation and verification of the zero-knowledge
proofs. The codes for the second contract are to only be run by users locally (not on the
network).
The cost of computing reconstructed keys in [MSH17] is the predominant factor
for deciding the number of voters the scheme can support. Specifically, because the
reconstruction of the keys must be done in a single transaction, and the block's gas limit
must not be surpassed by the gas used for the reconstruction. However, the contract
can be modified to perform the processing in batches and allow multiple transactions to
complete the task. Thereby, supporting a voter size beyond the current 50 voter upper
limit. Moreover, the authors explain that a dedicated blockchain will almost certainly be
a requirement to support a large-scale election.
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Alternatively, instead of carrying out all computations on the smart contract, a more
efficient approach would require significant off-chain computation as shown in [SGY20].
This approach would involve incorporating the off-chain process in a publicly verifiable
and efficient way to reduce on-chain computation on the Ethereum blockchain.
To improve efficiency and minimise gas costs in the execution of the protocol, several
cost optimisations will be required. Specifically, it will be important to use the recently
introduced Ethereum pre-compiled smart contracts for elliptic curve operations [Rei17]
because the cost of gas is lower in pre-compiled smart contracts in comparison to native
Ethereum smart contract. s For deployment, the voting protocol can be encapsulated in
a smart contract and deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. The smart contract holding
the voting protocol logic can be deployed to use the contract address of an ERC-20 token
contract as its constructor variable. Holders of the token can then participate in the
voting process using transactions sent to the address of the contract smart contract.
The smart contract will require the token cap data for all token holders of a given
ERC-20 token, which can be computationally expensive depending on the actual number4,
or associated Merkle proof [SGY20].
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we described a privacy-preserving delegable blockchain-based voting
scheme for general decision-making. We provide a brief discussion of existing works in
practice similar to our scheme by highlight key differences (limitations) in comaprison
to our proposed scheme. Our solution mainly leverage concepts and building blocks
from our treasury system presented in Chapter 3, to support voting on blockchains with
private stake information.
The presentation of this chapter further supports the presentations in Chapter 3 in
relation to the main research question of this thesis. Specifically, in addition to addressing
the thesis research question, it extends the scheme in Chapter 3 to support blockchains
4Some tokens have as small as 6 users and others as high as over 3 million holders. See
https://etherscan.io/tokens for details
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with private stake information.
Specifically, we provide a new multiplicative relation non-interactive zero-knowledge
(MR NIZK) proofs to prove the relationship between two unit vector ciphertexts and
an encrypted scalar value. This allows a voter to submit a vector encryption that is
essentially an encryption of their stake multiplied by a unit vector encryption (same as
in the treasury system but already weighted with the voter's stake). Further, we provide
formal descriptions of the MR NIZK proofs and the extended polling scheme.
Finally, to enhance utility of decisions reached on the system, we provide metrics
that enable system participants evaluate their decisions within the context of collective
solutions reached on the blockchain. These metrics are 1) distance measure which
covers the distance between individual choices and collective choice (system outcome)
2) consensus measure which is essentially a weighted aggregation of individual distance
measures and 3) proximity measure which is an aggregation of individual distance
measures across all the proposals voted on in a system period.
Next, in Chapter 5, we provide a security analysis of our proposed systems using
traditional security properties in the voting literature. We also provide details of im-





Following the presentations of the treasury system in Chapter 3 and the privacy-preserving
general decision-making system for blockchains in Chapter 4, in this chapter we formally
analyse the security of the designed systems. Specifically, we evaluate the security of our
proposed system by examining how the system satisfy traditional securities properties
expected of blockchain-based and e-voting systems e.g. robustness, ballot secrecy, voter
eligibility enforcement, fairness, verifiability, coercion-resistance, [DGS03,KY04,KKW06,
Adi06,CCFG16,Adi08,CZZ+19]. Formal proofs of security of the systems can be found in
Appendix B. Moreover, we discuss the security of the designed voting (polling) protocol
under the UC static corruption model. Thus, we prove that the protocol UC-realises the
ideal voting functionality \scrF t,k,m,nVote , under the stated static corruption model.
Furthermore, we present information on implementation and performance of the
prototypes. The result of the implementation confirms the feasibility and practicality of
the proposed systems for use within real-world cryptocurrencies or general blockchain
technologies.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 examines the
security of the proposed systems using conventional properties of secure electronic voting
systems in the literature. Thereafter, in Section 5.2, we present details of implementation
and performance of the complete prototype. Particularly, we elaborate on prototyping
information and details of the test network used in the experiments to evaluate the
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practicality of the proposed blockchain-based systems. Subsequently, Section 5.3 details
the evaluations and benchmark of the prototypes. Specifically, it provides graphical
representations of the communication and proof size of the prototypes implementation.
5.1 Security Properties
Below we discuss our scheme within the context of conventional electronic voting secu-
rity properties established in the literature [Gri03,BY86,KY04,Adi08,Ben06,DGS03].
Specifically, for each listed property, an explanation of how our scheme satisfies the given
property is provided. Our analysis implicitly assumes honesty or accurate functioning of
voting clients of all participants.
• Robustness / Reliability: In our voting scheme, it is unconditionally guaranteed
that any individual voter, stakeholder, or participant may fail resulting in no
negative effect on the protocol, i.e. there is no single-point of failure. Furthermore,
through the use of distributed threshold key generation and decryption, our protocol
is not affected when any number of voting committee members \scrC less than the
threshold t fail or become corrupted. The protocol guarantees termination under
the given scenarios.
• Privacy: This property guarantees that no information about individual ballots
is leaked except the final tally result. Our scheme achieves this through the
CPA-security of the elliptic curve lifted ElGamal encryption scheme under which
individual ballots are encrypted. Moreover, the additively homomorphic property
of lifted ElGamal, which is exploited for adding individual ballots to obtain the
voting result in our tally algorithm, does not require that ballots are decrypted.
Therefore, an adversary cannot learn additional information about the voter's
choice by observing the unit vector ballot ciphertext.
• Eligibility / Authentication: This property ensures that only qualified parties
are authenticated and allowed to vote. Specifically, in our scheme, this property
is achieved through a registration stage at the beginning of the system epoch.
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Also, we remark that given the decentralised blockchain architecture, every eligible
participant is able to participate and vote in the decision-making process by
submitting a valid stake-locking registration transaction (that also assigns them a
voting power corresponding to their locked-stake).
• Uniqueness: Closely related to the authentication property of ensuring only
eligible users participate in the decision-making process, the uniqueness property
generally ensures that no voter should be allowed to vote more than once. However,
within our scheme, we construe uniqueness to guarantee that users only submit a
number of valid votes relative to their locked stake. In other words, a user's vote
is directly proportional to their voting stake. In our scheme, we guarantee that a
user does not gain any advantage by splitting their stake into multiple accounts,
each with a smaller fraction of the original stake (Sybil attacks). We remark that
although users can submit multiple ballots during the voting stage, only the latest
valid ballot is included in the tally process. The motivation for multiple voting is to
enable users change their decisions e.g. vote directly after initially delegating their
voting power or contrariwise, throughout the voting stage. Furthermore, we prevent
ballot copying through the use of encrypted ballots, i.e. a voter (respectively expert)
cannot copy other voters' (respectively other experts') ballot without the knowledge
of the randomness in the encrypted ballot.
• Integrity: Through the use of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and spe-
cialised blockchain transactions, the scheme guarantees that only properly formatted
unit vector ballots are considered in the tally process (and discards of invalid ballots).
Thus, guaranteeing the correctness or accuracy of the voting outcome because only
validly recorded ballots published on the blockchain, are used in the tally process.
The inherent immutability of blockchain transactions prevents the adversary from
altering the recorded blockchain ballots without detection by other parties on the
network. Moreover, in a worst-case scenario where the majority of the voting
committee members are malicious, the integrity of the voting result is guaranteed.
However, the privacy of the ballots become compromised in this case.
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• Fairness: The semantic security of the lifted ElGamal homomorphic encryption
scheme and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs/arguments of correct unit-
vector ballot encryption helps guarantee that no partial sum or intermediate tally
results can be revealed before the tally is completed. Therefore, for any voter/expert,
their voting decision in not influenced by the recorded ballot (on the blockchain) of
how other parties voted, i.e. a party gains no advantage by delaying their voting
decision until after others have submitted their ballots.
• Coercion: The distributed and decentralised nature of blockchain-based voting
makes large-scale coercion difficult to achieve (when compared to conventional
voting systems) because of the high technical and monetary cost of efficiently
coordinating, enforcing and ensuring that users comply with coerced/forced voting
choices. Furthermore, rational honest voters within the system are incentivised
to support decisions that improve the overall health of the platform (underlying
cryptocurrency) because of the direct implications of bad decisions on their held
stake. Therefore, they can submit multiple ballots to falsely `convince' a coercer
of voting in a manner required by the coercer (because only the last valid ballot
is considered in the tallying process). However, we note that it is impossible to
eliminate coercion risk because a `willing' voter can supply the coercer with their
credentials. Also, a coercer watching over the shoulder of a voter can physically
ensure the voter's ballot corresponds to his decision.
• Voter anonymity / pseudonymity: Our construction inherits the privacy
e.g. anonymity or pseudonymity , provided to users by the underlying blockchain.
Specifically, participation in the voting process does not reveal additional user
information (except the fact/observation that they submitted a ballot). Therefore,
there is no association between identity of voters and how they voted.
• Verifiability: Verifiability allows observers/participants to verify that votes have
been recorded, tallied and declared correctly. Following the definitions of [KRS10],
our scheme satisfies individual, universal and eligibility verifiability. The individual
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verifiability property ensures a voter can check that their ballot is successfully
`published' on the underlying blockchain while universal verifiability guarantees
that any party can check that the tally corresponds to published ballots on the
blockchain. Additionally, eligibility verifiability covers the requirement that any
party can verify that all ballots published on the blockchain are from eligible voters.
This property is particularly useful in preventing against ballot stuffing. Evidently,
our scheme satisfies individual and universal verifiability because a voter can verify
their vote is properly recorded on the blockchain and anyone can verify that the
final `encrypted' tally corresponds to the homomorphic addition of all valid ballots
recorded on the blockchain and their associated zero-knowledge proofs of validity.
Also, any party can verify the tally outcome by combining published decryption
shares (accompanied with valid proofs of correct decryption) from the committee
members and comparing with the outcome from the committee. Moreover, our
scheme achieves eligibility verifiability because the registration transaction can be
used to support eligibility checks in verifying that ballots recorded on the blockchain
are from eligible participants. We remark that this verifiability relies on the fact
that the voting committee is cryptographically distributed.
5.2 Implementation and Performance
Here, we provide details of the implementation for both the treasury system and privacy-
preserving decision making system for blockchain governance. Mainly, we produced two
independent implementations of the main algorithms and unit vector non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs in Scala and Python. The implementations are based on elliptic curve
groups for efficiency. The results from these distinct implementations were compared for
consistency and correctness. The Python implementation1 uses Petlib [Dan] - a Python
library that implements a number of privacy enhancing technologies. Moreover, the
Scala implementation also includes a full-prototype of the systems built upon Scorex 2.0
[IOH] - a modular blockchain framework for designing blockchain systems. Therefore,
1https://github.com/balogunh/TreasuryPrototype
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the systems rely on Scorex 2.0 for the underlying blockchain functionalities of storing
ordered sequences of transactions and messages. Specifically, the transactions or messages
involved are:
• proposal submissions
• voter, expert and committee stake locking
• voting results
• additional data e.g. signatures for results or proofs for verification of results,
randomness for committee member selection
Note that to minimise storage space on the blockchain, service messages for the decision-
making processes are stored in a dedicated side-chain (whose entries are also anchored to
the main chain). We now provide more detailed information about the implementation
prototyping.
5.2.1 Prototyping
For the prototype implementations, the voting protocol carries the main computational
and storage workload. Therefore, performance testing and evaluations focuses on the
voting protocol. The proposed systems were implemented as a fully functional cryp-
tocurrency prototype using the Scorex 2.0 framework to provide the underlying required
blockchain functionalities. Scorex 2.0 is a flexible modular framework designed partic-
ularly for fast prototyping with a rich set of already implemented functionalities such
as asynchronous peer-to-peer network layer, built-in blockchain support with pluggable
and extensible consensus module, simple transactions layer, JSON API for accessing the
running node, etc.
Socrex 2.0 offers some key benefits for rapid efficient prototyping in comparison
to other blockchain frameworks. These include, its flexible modular design, compact
functional code written in Scala programming language, full-fledged implementation of a
blockchain system built on top of Scorex - TwinsCoin, a hybrid Proof-of-Work (PoW) and
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Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrency [CDFZ17]. Hence, we adapt and extend Twincoin
with the adequate functionalities for the voting protocol. For example, treasury integration
requires modification of the existing transactions structure and block validation rules, as
well as introduction of new modules for keeping treasury state and prevent transaction
forging and other relevant attacks.
To ease code maintenance, we also adopt a modular approach to developing different
elements of the voting protocol e.g. distributed key generation. All cryptographic proto-
cols related to the voting procedure were implemented in a separate library. Therefore,
these protocols can also be reused within other blockchain systems or within other stan-
dalone voting systems. The cryptographic protocol implementation uses BouncyCastle 2
library (ver.1.58) that provides required elliptic curve operations. Additionally, some
operations in the finite field were implemented with help of the BigInteger class from the
Java Core. Note that sub-protocols of the developed system were implemented exactly
as described, without any protocol-level optimizations.
In the pre-voting stage (see Fig.3.9), the implemented registration procedure includes
functionalities proposal submission, voters, experts and committee members registration
and random selection of the voting committee. Locked stake (security deposits) were
implemented through locked unspent transaction output (UTXO) records. All system
events are recorded in the blockchain so everyone can easily verify correctness of the
operations at each stage of the voting protocol.
The implementation also contains a full-fledged distributed key generation protocol
with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for correctness of messages. The protocol is
resistant to the corruption of up to half of the committee members. During the protocol
execution, a list of malicious members is maintained. This is used to prevent corrupted
committee members from further participation in further stages of the protocol and
allows for punishing them (through stake forfeiture) in the future.
Furthermore, the voting ballot is implemented as a special ballot transaction and it
is also accompanied with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of correctness (of unit
2a collection of Java cryptographic APIs
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vector encryption). Invalid ballots are rejected when their verification fails and are never
be included in the blockchain. For the post-voting stage separate transactions are used for
joint decryption of tally, randomness submission for the next system epoch, punishment
for the malicious and disqualified members, incentive rewards for participants, locked
stake or deposit refund and distribution of payments for approved/winning proposals.
We remark that most of the operations are automatised and do not require direct
user involvement except for the proposal submission and ballots casting operations. A
user only needs to configure the node properly and run it to participate in the system.
All complex operations such as randomness extraction, distributed key generation, joint
tally decryption and payments are implemented as completely automated operations.
Also, each stage lasts a fixed number of blocks and comprises its own special transactions.
These transactions are included in the blockchain if and only if valid against the current
(treasury and general-decision making) system and blockchain state.
5.2.2 Test Network
The test of the developed system prototypes were carried out in a real environment
comprising a local network of 12 blockchain full-nodes. The deployment was successfully
run for several days spanning dozens of system epochs. A completed cycle consists of 780
blocks (or approximately 4.5 hours treasury cycle) because the underlying blockchain
(TwinsCoin) consensus had a block generation time of 10 seconds. The network had
9 voters, 3 experts and 12 candidates with varying amount of cryptocurrency stake.
Besides, there are 12 candidates for membership of the voting committee from which 10
were selected. For the tests carried out, the number of proposals varied from 1 to 7.
Furthermore, the tests involved the simulation of multiple unusual or adversarial
conditions. For instance, a malicious committee member in the distributed key generation
provides incorrect shares, non-participation by some experts or voters in the actual voting
process despite registering, refusal to participate in the decryption of tally by some voting
committee members, etc. As long as there exist a working honest majority of the voting
committee members, the voting outcomes (tally) were always successfully obtained and
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rewards were correctly distributed to participants.
5.3 Evaluations
For evaluating performance of the cryptographic protocols a special set of tests were
developed as a part of the cryptographic library. Tests were run on the working station
with Intel Core i7-6500U CPU @ 2.50GHz, 16GB RAM, running Linux Ubuntu 16.04 64 bit
and scalaVersion 2.12.3 . All performance benchmarks are obtained for single-threaded
version of the implementation. Providing multi-threaded execution and native code
implementation, as well as protocol-level optimizations, allows for further improvement
of running time.
We are interested in the computational and communicational complexity of the
messages for processing the generation of the shared secret/public key, ballot casting
and validation, and tally calculation. Thus, we evaluate the computation time and space
requirement of the distributed key generation protocol execution, voters' and experts'
ballots processing and tally calculation during one system cycle (epoch).
We benchmarked key generation protocol running time for varying number of voting
committee members e.g. from 10 to 100. Note that, higher numbers of committee
members might be required to guarantee honest majority on random selection from a
large amount of system participants. Moreover, we generated shared public keys for the
setting where all committee members are honest, as well as other settings with malicious
committee members. With a minority malicious voting committee members, the exact
number or ratio of malicious parties does not influence the protocol running time for any
honest participant. Fig. 5.1 depicts the running time of the distributed key generation
protocol.
Clearly, as seen in fig. 5.1 the overall running time of the protocol increases with
increasing number of committee members and ratio of malicious committee members. For
example, the DKG protocol execution takes about 0.3 second and 2.4 seconds for fully
honest committee sizes of 40 and 100 respectively. Moreover, to complete distributed key
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Figure 5.1: DKG protocol execution time depending on the number of committee members
generation protocol execution, it is necessary to transmit data/messages (communication)
over the peer-to-peer network. The dominant factor in the execution time is the size
of the committee because each member committee member needs to verifiably share
their secret with all other members of the committee according to the protocol in fig. 3.6.
Latency is a real-world factor that affects the execution time of the DKG protocol shown
in Fig. 5.1 if the tests involved geographically distributed committee members. However,
this is accommodated by the fact that the protocol is expected to occur over a given time
frame where the involved parties post appropriate data (transactions) to the blockchain
(semi-synchronous communication). Moreover, a system epoch comprising the election
process is designed to take place over an extended period of time, e.g. 30 days.
Expectedly, the communication size depends on the size of the committee and the
ratio of malicious committee members. Similar to DKG protocol execution time, the size
of the committee and corruption ratio are dominant factors in the overall size of messages
required to complete the protocol execution. For example, the traffic size for the DKG is
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Figure 5.2: Total size of the DKG protocol messages sent over the peer-to-peer network depend-
ing on the number of committee members
about 50kB and 800kB for fully honest committee sizes of 20 and 80 respectively. The
increase in overall message size for given committee size and varying member corruption
ratio is is explained by the fact that additional messages (communication) are needed
between honest members to report malicious activities of erring committee members.
Further, additional messages are also needed to reconstruct the secret shares of erring
members. Fig. 5.2 depicts the communication sizes for varying committee sizes, as well
as for different ratios of malicious committee members.
Recall that an adversary controlling 50\% of the committee members, can only break
confidentiality of voters' ballots, but not the integrity of tally result or individual ballots.
For any voter, to generate a single ballot takes less than 1 second in a voting epoch
with hundreds of experts. Hence, ballot generation has little influence on the overall
performance of the voting protocol.
Meanwhile, the number/size of experts is the most important factor in the time it
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Figure 5.3: Execution time for voter ballot generation with varying number of experts.
takes a voter to generate a ballot. Specifically, since a ballot is encoded as coordinate-
wise encryptions of a unit vector, therefore, the length of the vector dominates the time
required to create a ballot. As explained in Subsection 3.6.4, the length of the unit-vector,
in turn, depends on the number of experts in a given election epoch. Specifically, a
voter's unit-vector ballot (m + 3)-bits long, where m is the number of experts. However,
for an expert, the length of the unit vector ballot is always 3-bits long (because experts
vote directly on proposals) and it's creation time is also negligible in the overall protocol
performance. Fig 5.3 depicts typical running time for a voter to generate ballot for
varying number of experts.
However, unlike ballot generation, the tally process involves considerable computation.
Specifically, to obtain tally outcomes, all ballots submitted to the blockchain are collected
and their correctness is validated using their accompanying NIZK proofs. Subsequently,
the tally is computed using only ballots with valid proofs (that pass the verification checks).
The tally involves homomorphic addition of expert ballots, and voters' ballots, and
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subsequent joint decryption to obtain tally. Given a fixed, expert size, the computation
here is dominated by the number of voters. Specifically, the number of voters directly
affect the number of homomorphic additions required for computing the tally encryption
while the size of experts already influence the length of the unit vector ballots as earlier
discussed.
Fig. 5.4 depicts the average time required to actually compute tally results given
different number of voters. As shown in the figure, the time to compute the tally of the
voting process is linear in the size of voters. We note that, in case there is malicious
behaviour by a committee member in the tally computation, the execution time will
increase to accommodate the process on reconstructing the shared secret of the malicious
member by other committee members.
Figure 5.4: Execution time for computing tally outcomes of the entire voting process with
varying voter size.
Fig. 5.5 shows the prover's running time, the verifier's running time and the size of
the unit vector zero-knowledge proof that has been used in the ballot casting. The time
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to create the NIZK proofs is mostly influenced by the size(length) of the unit vector
ballot. This length (m + 3) is dominated by the number of experts, m in a voting epoch.
As seen in fig. 5.5, there is a sharp increase in the unit vector NIZK creation time between
unit vector size of 250 and 500. The time increase from about 0.6sec to about 3.4sec is
attributed to increased computation for NIZK proof, which is caused by the increase
in number of experts (which is the direct implication of increasing the size of the unit
vector). Clearly, this negatively impacts the scalability of the system for large values of
experts, m. However, in practice the number of experts expected in an election epoch
is smaller than 500 and these proofs along with corresponding ballots are generated
locally by voters. Further discussion on anticipated sizes in real-world systems is provided
in Section 5.4.
Figure 5.5: The prover's running time, verifier's running time and the size of the unit vector
ZK proof.
Recall that the privacy-preserving decision-making system requires additional vector
multiplicative relation zero-knowledge proofs. Hence, fig. 5.6 depicts the prover's running
time, the verifier's running time and the size of the needed zero-knowledge proof. Similar
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to the special honest verifier unit vector zero-knowledge proof in fig. 5.5, the length of
the unit vector ballot is the dominant factor in time to create and verify the proof. The
proof creation time scales poorly with increase in the size of the the unit vector (number
of experts) in an election epoch as shown in fig. 5.5. Moreover, details of anticipated
size of the unit vector ballot in a real-world deployment is provided in Section 5.4, to
mitigate the scalability issues in the zk proofs.
Figure 5.6: The prover's running time, verifier's running time and the size of the vector multi-
plicative relation ZK proof.
Finally, the overall communication cost for all the voting ballots per project during
the entire treasury period and privacy-preserving decision-making is depicted in Fig. 5.7
and Fig. 5.8 respectively. In particular, for a treasury period with 2000 voters and 50
experts, the overall communication is approximately 10MB per project. For a period of
the privacy-preserving decision-making system (respectively the treasury system) with
5000 voters and 50 experts the overall communication is approximately 40MB per project
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Figure 5.7: The overall communication for all the voting ballots during a treasury period.
Figure 5.8: The overall communication for all the voting ballots during a period of the privacy-
preserving decision-making system.
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(respectively 25MB for the treasury system). From fig. 5.7 and fig. 5.8, the communication
sizes is dominated by the number of experts (unit vector size) and the size of voters in
the voting epoch.
Remark. Note that in practice, the treasury period is long enough, e.g. 30 days
(approximately 4320 blocks for Bitcoin), so blockchain space overhead for treasury
deployment in the cryptocurrency blockchain is insignificant. Moreover, we consider
a sidechain approach [BCD+14, KZ19, GKZ19] for the system implementations as an
effective solution. This allows for separation of treasury/decision-making functionalities
from the main blockchain consensus, thereby providing a number of advantages e.g.
maximising transaction block space for other pertinent transactions. In particular, the
system protocols do not influence the main blockchain consensus, therefore, enabling
transfer of all implementation complexity to a sidechain. Additionally, storage space on
the mainchain is preserved for core clients as a result of the modular construction.
5.4 Discussion
In a real-world blockchain, voters only need to create their ballots and associated proofs
and post these to the blockchain. For voters, these processes are done on their local clients
and the outputs are posted as appropriate transactions to the blockchain network where
it is propagated to other nodes. Mainly, the time between submitting ballot transactions
and confirmation that the transaction has been committed by majority of nodes on the
blockchain, is a factor to consider in real-world deployment. For example, currently on
the Bitcoin blockchain, transaction propagation time to about 90\% of all network nodes
is about 15 seconds3 [NAH16].
Additionally, from the evaluations it is clear that the size of the unit vector is a very
dominant factor in the performance of the protocols. However, since the size of a unit
vector ballot is exactly three more than the number of experts, i.e. | unit vector ballot| =
| experts + 3| , some of the performance bottleneck can be mitigated. Specifically, this
requires that the number of experts is set to a reasonably practical number.
3https://www.dsn.kastel.kit.edu/bitcoin/
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One way of doing this, is through classification of experts based on the topics of
proposals such that no individual can participate as an expert across all the areas being
voted on. Moreover, an alternative approach would involve ranking of available experts
based on a so-called reputation or prestige [KSG03,WS06,Szt15,PK15,dPLC17,HWC+21,
KSA+21] and allowing a subset of the top-ranked experts to participate in the voting
process. Essentially, reputation is a measure of quality of contributions (or honesty) of
the expert to select activities e.g., consensus building, on the blockchain.
Now, we provide discussion on potential numbers of a deployment of our proposed
systems in a real-world cryptocurrency. This anticipated size is based on numbers from
real-world deployments of cryptocurrency treasury system 4. Given the recent summary
from the Cardano Project Catalyst Fund 45 with about 216,749 ballots across all 267
proposals, spanning categories such as dapp integrations, distributed decision-making,
developer ecosystem, proposer outreach, etc. and 56 winning proposals6. This implies
an average of about 800 individual ballots per proposal. Note that the total number of
ballots cast for a proposal does not depend on the amount of stake involved. Rather,
each ballot is weighted by the stake of its `caster' in the tally process.
The anticipated communicational overhead of a proposal for a treasury system
(respectively privacy-preserving general decision-making system) with 1000 ballots and
100 experts is estimated at about 8.3MB (respectively, 15.3MB). The increase in size
in the privacy-preserving system is attributed to the additional multiplicative relation
zero-knowledge proof required in the ballot casting process. Moreover, in a given system
epoch, with an expert size of 50 and 10, 000 voters , the anticipated communicational







The goal of this thesis has been to construct provably-secure community-inclusive cryp-
tographic protocols that exploits the decentralised nature of blockchains and optimises
community intelligence through appropriate decision-making systems. The work pre-
sented in this thesis explored sustainable development and inclusive maintenance of
blockchains.
The importance and proliferation of blockchain technology has been well documented,
both in the literature and in practice. The decentralised architecture of blockchain tech-
nologies that enable (sometime) mutually distrustful parties to engage in a computation
tasks without the need for a `trusted third party' or single point of failure has enabled
the deployment and adoption of blockchains across multiple sectors such as finance,
healthcare, futures and prediction markets, retail, etc.
However, this consensus layer decentralisation or decentralised ethos of blockchains
is often not reflected in the development and management of blockchains. Typically,
decisions on development and maintenance of these platforms serves as a source of
centralisation in the system with `powerful minority' decision-making. Moreover, some
of the prevalent practices have been described as benevolent dictatorship [AMM18].
Consequently, there has been a number of cryptocurrency platforms such as Dash with
DGBB, to provide treasury system support for blockchain development. The goal is to
democratise the development process of the blockchains, by providing funding support
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for community members (or any interested parties) with proposals that improve the
blockchain in particular or the general cryptocurrency ecosystem.
As demonstrated in this thesis, we explored existing solutions and literature and
provide an affirmative answer to the question - is it possible to have provably secure
community-inclusive blockchain-based self-sustenance mechanisms that will ensure long-
term sustainability of cryptocurrencies? Specifically, we identified and explored the role of
funding (and funding source) in the overall management of blockchains. We highlighted
the various funding sources and their suitability towards long-term cryptocurrency
development funding. In our proposed treasury, system we adopt a hybrid funding that
guarantees the availability of funds for cryptocurrency development funding (even with
decreasing miner's reward) and does suffer from the deficiencies associated with a funding,
for example, based only on donations or patron organisations.
To optimise community-inclusion in contributions to blockchain development and
allocation of blockchain development funds, for the first time, we proposed and developed
a UC-secure blockchain-based voting scheme (for treasury systems) that supports liquid
democracy. It is an incentivised voting scheme, and supports private ballots and is robust
to adversarial attacks from the corruption of less 50\% of the voting committee members.
We guarantee the integrity of election outcome in the rare scenario where all committee
members are corrupt using the zero-knowledge proofs which are publicly posted to the
blockchain.
Given the increased interest in decentralised governance in blockchains, we extend
the applicability of the delegable voting scheme at the core of our treasury system and
proposed a privacy-preserving system to support general decision-making on blockchains
with private stake information. Besides, to enhance community acceptance and increased
participation in the decision-making process, we provide a method for evaluating `con-
sensus' on decisions reached within the system. The analysis utilises a set of distance
measure metrics.
Moreover, for improved efficiency, we propose a novel honest-verifier zero-knowledge
proof for unit vector ballot encryption with logarithmic size communication. Whereas,
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similar homomorphic-tallying based cryptographic schemes such as Helios [Adi08] and
its variants, the proof size is linear in the size of the ballot.
We provide implementations of the the algorithms and full-prototype of the proposed
systems (treasury and privacy-preserving general decision-making) and benchmarks from
tests on the feasibility of the proposed schemes for use in real-world blockchains. The
prototype leverage the Scorex framework which utilises TwinsCoin consensus for the
underlying blockchain. Results show promise for adoption in real-world systems.
Recall that the voting schemes requires locking (freezing) the deposits (stakes) of
entities who participate in an election epoch. This mainly serves as a mechanism to
incentivise correct behaviour from the different participants. For example, locked deposits
of election committee members and experts who behave maliciously are confiscated.
Moreover, for other voters, this provide an incentive to vote in support of proposals that
are healthy to the overall growth of the blockchain. This is because voting for proposals
that for example negatively affect the exchange rate of a cryptocurrency directly affect
the value of their locked stake. Further, without the coin locking, it is trivial for an
adversary to collect sufficient coins for a single snapshot of the system epoch for the
purpose of attacking the scheme.
Despite the above incentivisation provided by locking stake, it is true that this
affects the usability of stakeholders. For example, owners of locked stake cannot spend
their coins for other purposes e.g., purchasing a good online, while it is locked. For
general deployment of the voting schemes proposed in this thesis outside of blockchains
(cryptocurrencies), malicious activities by participants will still be detected. However,
it is left to be decided what the incentive (reward/punishment) mechanisms will be to
encourage honest behaviour by the entities involved in the execution of the protocol.
In our schemes, to prevent Sybil attacks, we assume a flat model of stake dis-
tribution, i.e. every stakeholder owns exactly 1 coin, and voting power is directly
proportional to the amount of stake owned. Indirectly, this can lead to a situation
where blockchain development decisions are mostly made by the wealthy (plutocracy).
Given the pseudonymity/anonymity provided by blockchains and the separation from
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real-world identities of stakeholders, it is difficult to securely distribute voting powers
(one-man one-vote) based on real-world identities. However, there are potential measures
to mitigate excessive influence or dominance by the wealthy in the blockchain schemes.
An example of this measure, is to leverage a metric that captures the contributions of
stakeholders based on their activities on the blockchain e.g. reputation, and allow users
that meet a certain threshold participate in the election process (without the requirement
to have sufficient funds). This is particularly useful for allowing community members
with technical know-how to serve as experts in the decision-making system even if they
do not possess the required fund. However, it is also important to achieve a balance and
prevent scenarios where it is possible to compromise the underlying blockchains with
little to no resources in the system, as an attack against other stakeholders with major
stake.
This requires careful design and game-theoretic analysis to ensure secure imple-
mentation or adoption and protection against new attack vectors that make it easy to
compromise the long-term value and overall development of the underlying blockchain.
This is an interesting area of future work considering new results in decentralised identity
management platforms such as CANDID [MMZ+20] that offers Sybil-resistance.
Overall, the work presented in this thesis provides insights into new research directions
to further developments in blockchain research and beyond.
6.1 Future Directions
In this thesis, we investigated funding sources and decision-making on utilisation of funds
in blockchains. Thereafter, we initiated the study of blockchain treasury systems for
the community to collaboratively collect and distribute funds, for supporting the system
in a decentralised manner. Thereby, eliminating single point of failure or unhealthy
centralisation of power. The proposed treasury system is currently adopted in practical
deployment in real world cryptocurrencies. In particular, the treasury model is in
the Voltaire release [Car18b] of Cardano [Car18a]. Horizen (formerly ZenCash) also
implements DAO Treasury Protocol-level Voting System [Hor18] based on our scheme.
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We note that, the voting scheme in the privacy-preserving general blockchain decision-
making and treasury system can further be enhanced with game-theoretic approaches
to optimise individual contributions. Thus, enabling better intelligent collaborative
decision-making. However, the current voting schemes do not provide coercion resistance
or receipt freeness because voters can prove how they voted to a coercer. The schemes can
be improved to achieve receipt-freeness or coercion resistance by adopting the well-known
cast or validate process of schemes such as Helios. Although, this also does not address
the problem of a malicious client edited to output ballot randomness to users.
We remark that the current voting scheme in our proposed blockchain systems of
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 assumes correct/honest operation of the clients of all participants
in the system for its security. Additionally, privacy of our schemes can be further enhanced
by providing a ranked output of winning proposals without revealing the tally numbers.
Moreover, the treasury and decision-making systems in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
respectively, can be improved by building on recent advancements in practical Fully-
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) e.g. SEAL [SEA19]. Specifically, the efficiency of the
schemes can be significantly improved by exploiting the Single-Instruction Multiple-Data
(SIMD) [SV14] operations for ballot creation, as well as the cyclic rotation capability on
encrypted vectors in the tally computation process.
Another interesting potential application of our blockchain-based voting system is
in efficient decentralised oracle network for blockchain platforms. Finally, it will be
interesting to conduct further research, especially as it relates to usability of the proposed
system when it is finally in production in real-world cryptocurrencies.
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In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we provide the details of our blockchain-based treasury
system and privacy-preserving general decision-making system. Recall that both systems
rely on the delegable stake-weighted voting scheme for their operations. Therefore, this
appendix presents the relevant zero-knowledge proof protocols used to guarantee that
participants (voters, experts and voting committee members) in the systems behave
honestly in the protocol execution. Finally, Appendix B provides the security proof for
the voting protocol at the core of our systems proposed in this thesis.
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A Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proofs Protocols
A.1 NIZK for Lifted Elgamal Encryption of 0
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for Lifted-Elgamal Encryption of 0
NIZK\{ (pk, C), (m, r) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r) \wedge m = 0\} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gmhr)
Witness: m = 0 and r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random w \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute A1 := gw and A2 := hw
• Compute e1 = hash(h,C,A1, A2) and z = r \ast e1 + w
• Return \pi 1 := (A1, A2, z1)
Verifier:
• Compute e1 = hash(h,C,A1, A2) and return valid if and only if
-- gz1 = C1
e1 \cdot A1
-- hz1 = C2
e1 \cdot A2
Figure 1: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for Lifted-Elgamal Encryption of 0
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A.2 NIZK for Lifted Elgamal Encryption of 1
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for Lifted-Elgamal encryption of 1
NIZK\{ (pk, C), (m, r) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r) \wedge m = 1\} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gmhr)
Witness: m = 1 and r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random v \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute B1 := gv and B2 := hv
• Compute e2 = hash(h,C,B1, B2) and z2 = r \ast e2 + v
• Return \pi 2 := (B1, B2, z2)
Verifier:
• Compute e2 = hash(h,C,B1, B2) and return valid if and only if
-- gz2 = C1
e2 \cdot B1
-- hz2 = (C2 \cdot g - 1)e2 \cdot B2
Figure 2: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for Lifted-Elgamal encryption of 1
A.3 NIZK for Lifted Elgamal Encryption of 0 or 1
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for Lifted-Elgamal encryption of 0 or 1
NIZK\{ (pk, C), (m, r) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r) \wedge m \in \{ 0, 1\} \} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gmhr)
Witness: m \in \{ 0, 1\} and r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• if m=0:
-- Pick random w \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute A1 := gw and A2 := hw
-- Pick random z2 \leftarrow \BbbZ p, e2 \leftarrow \{ 0, 1\} 256; Compute B1 := g
z2
C1






-- Compute e := hash(C, h,A1, A2, B1, B2) and e1 := e\oplus e2
-- Compute z1 := r \cdot e1 + w




-- Pick random v \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute B1 := gv and B2 := hv





-- Compute e := hash(C, h,A1, A2, B1, B2) and e2 := e\oplus e1
-- Compute z2 := r \cdot e2 + v
-- Return: \pi 3 := (A1, A2, B1, B2, e1, e2, z1, z2)
Verifier:
• Computer e = hash(C, h,A1, A2, B1, B2) and return valid if and only if
-- e = e1 \oplus e2
-- gz1 = C1
e1 \cdot A1
-- hz1 = C2
e1 \cdot A2
-- gz2 = C1
e2 \cdot B1
-- hz2 = (C2g )
e2 \cdot B2
Figure 3: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for Lifted-Elgamal encryption of 0 or 1
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A.4 Alternative NIZK for Lifted Elgamal Encryption of 0/1
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for lifted Elgamal Encryption of 0/1
NIZK\{ (pk, C), (m, r) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r) \wedge m \in \{ 0, 1\} \} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gmhr)
Witness: m \in \{ 0, 1\} and r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random \beta , \gamma , \delta \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute B = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (\beta ; \gamma ) and A =
EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m \cdot \beta ; \delta )
• Compute e = hash(C, pk,B,A);
• Compute f = m \cdot e + \beta and w = r \cdot e + \gamma ; and v = r \cdot (e - f) + \delta 
• Return \pi 5 := (B,A, f, w, v)
Verifier:
• Compute e = hash(C, pk,B,A) and return valid if and only if
-- Ce \cdot B = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (f ;w)
-- Ce - f \cdot A = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (0; v)
Figure 4: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for lifted Elgamal Encryption of 0/1
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A.5 NIZK for Correct Lifted Elgamal Decryption
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for correct lifted Elgamal decryption
NIZK\{ (pk, C,D), (sk) : D = C\sanss \sansk 1 \wedge pk = g\sanss \sansk \} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , ciphertext C := (C1, C2), and the decryption
share D
Witness: sk \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random w \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute A1 := gw and A2 := Cw1
• Compute e = hash(C,D,A1, A2) and z = sk \ast e + w
• Return \pi 4 := (A1, A2, D, z)
Verifier:
• Compute e = hash(C,D,A1, A2) ; and D = C2gm , and return valid if and only
if
-- gz = he \cdot A1
-- Cz1 = D
e \cdot A2
Figure 5: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for correct lifted Elgamal decryption
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A.6 NIZK for m
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for knowledge of message m
NIZK\{ (pk, C), (m, r) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r) \wedge m \in \{ 0, 1\} \lambda \} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gmhr)
Witness: m \in \{ 0, 1\} \lambda and r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random s, t\leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute E = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (s; t)
• Compute e = hash(C, pk,E); and w = e \cdot m + s; and v = e \cdot r + t
• Return \pi 6 := (w, v,E)
Verifier:
• Compute e = hash(C, pk,E) and return valid if and only if
-- EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (w; v) = C
e \cdot E
Figure 6: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for knowledge of message m
A.7 Designated NIZK for Message m
Designated Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for knowledge of message m
NIZK\{ (pk, C, \^e), (m, r) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (m; r) \wedge m \in \{ 0, 1\} \lambda \} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gmhr)
and \^e = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (e)
Witness: m \in \{ 0, 1\} \lambda and r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random s, t \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute E = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (s; t) and B = \^em \cdot Enc(s)
and D = \^er \cdot Enc(t)
• Return \pi \prime 6 := (B,D,E)
Verifier:
• Compute e = Dec(\^e) and return valid if and only if
-- B,D = Ce \cdot E
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Figure 7: Designated Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof for knowledge of message m
A.8 Designated Verifier NIZK for \pi 
Designated Verifier Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge proof
NIZK\{ (pk, C,X), (s) : C = EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (e) \wedge X = gs\} 
Statement: Public key, pk := h \in \BbbG , and ciphertext C := (C1, C2) = (gr, gehr)
and X
Witness: s, r \in \BbbZ p
Prover:
• Pick random w \leftarrow \BbbZ p; Compute A = gw; and D = Cs \cdot EC.Enc\sansp \sansk (w)
• Return \pi 7 := (A,D)
Verifier:
• Compute e = Decsk(C) and z = Decsk(D) and return valid if and only if
-- gz = Xe \cdot A
Randomise:
• Pick random v, t\leftarrow \BbbZ p
• Compute A\prime = A \cdot gv and X \prime = X \cdot gt and D\prime = D \cdot Ct \cdot EC.Encpk(v)
• \pi \prime 7 := (A\prime , D\prime )
• Return \pi 8 := (X \prime , \pi \prime 7)




The security of the treasury voting protocol is analysed in the universal composability
(UC) framework. We provide Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Let t, k, n,m = poly(\lambda ) and k/2 < t \leq n. Protocol \Pi t,k,n,mVote described
in Fig. 3.11 UC-realizes \scrF t,k,m,nVote in the \{ \scrF Ledger,\scrF 
t,k
DKG\} -hybrid world against static
corruption under the DDH assumption.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we construct a simulator \scrS such that no non-uniform PPT
environment \scrZ can distinguish between (i) the real execution EXEC\scrF Ledger,\scrF 
t,k
DKG
\Pi t,k,n,mVote ,\scrA ,\scrZ 
where
the parties \scrV := \{ V1, . . . ,Vn\} , \scrE := \{ E1, . . . ,Em\} and \scrC := \{ C1, . . . ,Ck\} run protocol
\Pi t,k,n,mVote in the \{ \scrF Ledger,\scrF 
t,k
DKG\} -hybrid world and the corrupted parties are controlled
by a dummy adversary \scrA who simply forwards messages from/to \scrZ , and (ii) the ideal
execution EXEC\scrF t,k,m,nVote ,\scrS ,\scrZ 
where the parties interact with functionality \scrF t,k,m,nVote in the
ideal model and corrupted parties are controlled by the simulator \scrS . Let \scrV \sansc \sanso \sansr \subseteq \scrV ,
\scrE \sansc \sanso \sansr \subseteq \scrE and \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr \subseteq \scrC be the set of corrupted voters, experts and voting committee
members, respectively. Note that the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure,
and its corresponding NIZK proofs are simulatable ZK under the DDH assumption.
Simulator. The simulator \scrS internally runs \scrA , forwarding messages to/from the
environment \scrZ . The simulator \scrS simulates honest voters Vi \in \scrV \setminus \scrV \sansc \sanso \sansr , honest experts
Ei \in \scrE \setminus \scrE \sansc \sanso \sansr , trustees Cj \in \scrC \setminus \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr and functionalities \scrF Ledger,\scrF t,kDKG. In addition, the
simulator \scrS simulates the following interactions with \scrA .
In the preparation phase:
• Upon receiving (InitNotify, sid,Cj) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote for an honest voting
committee Cj \in \scrC \setminus \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS acts as Cj , following the protocol \Pi t,k,n,mVote
as if Cj receives (Init, sid) from the environment \scrZ .
• \scrS simulates \scrF t,kDKG so that it generates and stores (pk, sk).
In the voting/delegation phase:
• Upon receiving (VoteNotify, sid,Ej) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote for an honest
expert Ej \in \scrE \setminus \scrE \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS reads pk from \scrF t,kDKG. \scrS computes cj(3) \leftarrow 
Enc\sansp \sansk (0




(3), \pi j), \{ In
(\sansE j)
\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansE j)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1
\Bigr) 
.
• Upon receiving (CastNotify, sid,Vi, \alpha j) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote for an honest
expert Vi \in \scrV \setminus \scrV \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS reads pk from \scrF t,kDKG. \scrS computes ui(m+3) \leftarrow 
Enc\sansp \sansk (0




(m+3), \sigma i, \alpha i), \{ In(\sansV i)\eta \} \ell 1\eta =1, \{ Out
(\sansV i)
\eta \} \ell 2\eta =1
\Bigr) 
.
• Once the simulated \scrF Ledger receives (Post, sid, cj(3)) from a corrupted expert
Ej \in \scrE \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS uses sk to decrypt cj(3), obtaining the vote vj . \scrS then
sends (Vote, sid, vi) to \scrF t,k,m,nVote on behave of Ej .
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• Once the simulated \scrF Ledger receives (Post, sid,ui(m+3), \alpha i) from a corrupted voter
Vi \in \scrV \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS uses sk to decrypt ui(m+3), obtaining the vote vi. \scrS then
sends (Vote, sid, vi, \alpha i) to \scrF t,k,m,nVote on behave of Vi.
In the tally phase:
• Upon receiving (DelCalNotify, sid,Cj) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote for an honest
trustee Cj \in \scrC \setminus \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS acts as Cj , following the protocol \Pi t,k,n,mVote as
if Cj receives (DelCal, sid) from \scrZ .
• Upon receiving (TallyNotify, sid,Cj) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote for an honest
trustee Cj \in \scrC \setminus \scrC \sansc \sanso \sansr , the simulator \scrS acts as Cj , following the protocol \Pi t,k,n,mVote as
if Cj receives (Tally, sid) from \scrZ .
• Upon receiving (LeakDel, sid, \delta ) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote , the simulator \scrS simu-
lates the last honest committee Ct's decryption share according to \delta , and it simulates
the corresponding NIZK proof in the 1st round of the tally phase.
• Upon receiving (LeakTally, sid, \tau ) from the external \scrF t,k,m,nVote , the simulator \scrS 
simulates the last honest committee Ct's decryption share according to \tau , and it
simulates the corresponding NIZK proof in the 2nd round of the tally phase.
Indistinguishability. The indistinguishability is proven through a series of hybrid
worlds \scrH 0, . . . ,\scrH 4.
Hybrid \scrH 0: It is the real protocol execution EXEC
\scrF Ledger,\scrF t,kDKG
\Pi t,k,n,mVote ,\scrA ,\scrZ 
.
Hybrid \scrH 1: \scrH 1 is the same as \scrH 0 except that during the voting/delegation phase, in \scrH 1,
the honest voter Vj 's encrypted ballots are replaced with Enc\sansp \sansk (0
(m+3)) and simulates
its corresponding unit vector NIZK proof.
Claim 1. \scrH 1 and \scrH 0 are indistinguishable if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-
CPA and the unit vector NIZK proof is simulatable ZK.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Namely, if an adversary \scrA can distinguish \scrH 1 from
\scrH 0, then we can construct an adversary \scrB who can either break the IND-CPA game of
the PKE encryption or the ZK probability of the unit vector NIZK proof.
Hybrid \scrH 2: \scrH 2 is the same as \scrH 1 except the following: During the voting/delegation
phase, in \scrH 2, the honest expert Ei's encrypted ballots are replaced with Enc\sansp \sansk (0(3)) and
simulates its corresponding unit vector NIZK proof.
Claim 2. \scrH 2 and \scrH 1 are indistinguishable if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-
CPA and the unit vector NIZK proof is simulatable ZK.
Proof. The same as the previous proof.
Hybrid \scrH 3: \scrH 3 is the same as \scrH 2 except the followings. During the tally phase, \scrH 3
uses NIZK simulator to simulate all the decryption proofs instead of the real ones.




Proof. The advantage of the adversary is bounded by the ZK property of the decryption
NIZK.
Hybrid \scrH 4: \scrH 4 is the same as \scrH 3 except the followings. During the tally phase, the
honest committee Ct's decryption shares are backwards calculated from the \delta and \tau 
received from the \scrF t,k,m,nVote .
Claim 4. \scrH 4 and \scrH 3 are statistically indistinguishable.
Proof. The distribution of the decryption shares in \scrH 4 have identical distribution to the
shares in \scrH 3.
The adversary's view of \scrH 4 is identical to the simulated view EXEC\scrF t,k,m,nVote ,\scrS ,\scrZ . There-
fore, no PPT \scrZ can distinguish the view of the ideal execution from the view of the real
execution with more than negligible probability. This concludes our proof.
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